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This thesis springs from the relationship that individuals in the Nanti
communities of Montetoni and Maranxejari tentatively began, extended,
strengthened, negotiated, and renegotiated with me and Chris Beier from 1995 to
2001. The work before you was made possible by the trust that the people in these
communities gave me the opportunity to earn, and the patience that they usually
evinced, even during systematic inquiry into minutiae like the details of migration
routes or syllable stress that became tedious even to me at times.
Most of the residents of these two communities have at one time or
another, and frequently more than once, taken time out of their day to talk with us,
answer questions we have posed, and visited us as part of their daily visiting
rounds. Some individuals, however, have contributed substantial portions of their
time to help us with our research, and I want to thank them personally: Ajorora,
Anteres, Barentin, Bisarota, Bixotoro, Esexira, Tsyabera, Tyejerina, Joja, and
Migero.
My debt to Chris Beier, my partner in working with the Nanti communities
and in life more generally, is incalculable. With respect to the present work, Chris
has been my interlocutor in innumerable conversations in which many of the ideas
presented in this study were first hatched. It is difficult to say, in many instances,
where my ideas begin and where those that which arose from our fruitful
interactions end. Without Chris’ support and able partnership both in the field and
at home, it is unlikely that I would have been able to achieve a small fraction of
what we have accomplished together.
Joel Sherzer directed my inchoate fascination with the nexus of language,
cognition, and social interaction. He has provided me with what I believe is a rare
mixture of direction, encouragement, and freedom to explore that I very much
value.
ii
If this work has any merit, it will owe much to Elizabeth Keating, whose
acute criticisms helped me refine vague ideas, to support my claims with solid
data, and to excise what I could not support.
Tony Woodbury has on many occasions brought my attention to new ways
to think about the phenomena I examine in this study, and has been a steady source
of encouragement during the long processes of bringing this work to term.
David and Judy Payne, who have also carried out linguistic research among
the Nanti, have been affable interlocutors in discussions about the Nanti language
and have been generous with data they have gathered. Their colleagues, Betty and
Wayne Snell have also been generous in sharing unpublished data on Matsigenka
gathered over the course of several decades.
Carolina Izquierdo shared with Chris Beier and myself several memorable
experiences in the Urubamba River valley. Her research on Matsigenka medicinal
practices also fruitfully challenged me to deepen my study of Nanti medicinal
practices.
Glenn Shepard has been an invaluable source of comparative ethnographic
and linguistic information about the Matsigenka of the Manu region, and has
usefully challenged me to rethink several of my ethnographic and linguistic
conclusions.
Nathaniel Gerhart was our companion on two visits to Montetoni; his
ornithological expertise has contributed to my understanding of Nanti hunting
practices and our collaborative research on Nanti knowledge of local avifauna has
proved fruitful for both ethnographic and linguistic purposes.
Not least of all, I wish to acknowledge and thank those who have at various
times, and for various reasons, provided financial support that made possible the
research upon which this thesis is based.  Charlie Munn provided funding for
our1998 fieldwork, and arranged for Nathaniel Gerhart to join us. His financial
support came at a particularly critical time during our work with the Nanti of
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Montetoni and Maranxejari, and I thank him for it. The University of Texas
Liberal Arts Graduate Research Fellowship I received for research during the
summer of 2001 supported research on this and other topics related to the Nanti
language. Finally, I wish to thank the financial supporters of Cabeceras Aid
Project. While Cabeceras Aid Project has never directly supported my research
activities, it has made possible my work with Nanti communities of the upper
Xamisuja on matters of importance to the community. The joint work has been of
incredible importance in building a relationship of trust with the communities,
without which my ongoing research would be impossible.
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This study examines speech reporting practices among the Nanti, a small
Arawakan indigenous group living in the southeastern Peruvian Amazon. The
goals of the study are to provide an empirical description of Nanti speech reporting
practices and a theoretical account for their patterning and organization.
 A descriptive framework using the concept of speech reporting strategies
is developed and then used to describe Nanti speech reporting practices. The
organization of Nanti speech reporting practices is accounted for in terms of a
model that takes speaking practices to be emergent patterns of language use arising
from the interplay of language ideologies with the communicative needs of
individuals in concrete interactions.
Nanti speech reporting practices are found to be organized into two major
spheres, one concerned with the transmission of orally-obtained knowledge, and
the other with the representation of human agency and evaluative positions. The
former sphere is analyzed as arising from ideologies of knowledge that privelege
direct experience over inference and hearsay, while the latter is analyzed as arising
from ideologies that take discussions of talk and physical action to be the
appropriate means for communicting about agency and evaluative position.
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1.0 Goals, Orientations, and Arguments
In the decades since linguistic anthropologists began to heed Dell Hymes’
call to explore the variation and complexity of speaking practices throughout the
world’s speech communities (Hymes 1962), it has become apparent that practices
which enable speakers to communicate metalinguistically about verbal production
and interaction constitute an essential part of the linguistic repertoires of human
communities (Lucy 1993). Empirical research on talk about talk, talk that
encapsulates talk, and talk that transforms and re-presents talk, shows these
processes to vary in significant ways across speech communities (Lucy 1993, Hill
and Irvine 1993, Coulmas 1986, Janssen and Van der Wurff 1996), but no society
has been reported to communicate without recourse to metalinguistic resources of
this type.
Of these metalinguistic resources, some of the most ubiquitous are those
called speech reporting practices. By means of speech reporting practices,
speakers re-present in the context of their own talk, utterances that have been
produced by others, by themselves at other times, and by figures in belonging to
possible and even fictional worlds.
However, research that answers Hymes’ call by seeking to understand
speech reporting practices as social practices that are enmeshed in social action
and the constitution of social life form a minority of the studies on reported
speech, and ethnographic studies of speaking practices that take speech reporting
as their central theme are rarer still1.
As Lucy has remarked,
                                                 
1 For example, no book-length ethnographic treatise on reported speech exists, although Basso
(1995), Hanks (1990), Sherzer (1983) devote considerable attention to the topic; see chapter 5.
2There is little open-ended exploration of the variety of types of
metalinguistic structures and virtually no serious attempt to understand the
broader functions of metalinguistic speech as a human activity. Therefore,
[logico-linguistic] approaches cannot address question about the
functioning and significance of reflexive language in social and
psychological life, For this, a more broadly gauged approach will be
necessary, one which involves recognizing the multiple functions of
language in communicative activity. (Lucy 1993, p 14)
This work is intended as a start in filling this gap, by taking at its focus the
speech reporting practices of speakers of Nanti, an Arawakan language of lowland
southeastern Peru. In this study, I seek to advance our understanding of speech
reporting as a communicative practice that is both patterned by its role in the
conduct of social life and also constitutive of social life.
My study is driven both by an interest in understanding the local patterning
of speaking practices as found in the Nanti communities, and also by a
comparative interest, which seeks to understand more generally the place of
speech reporting practices in the communicative repertoire of human speech
communities. Each of these issues is subtle and far-reaching in its own way, and I
advance each only modestly in the present study. It is my hope that this work
represents the first steps in a long journey.
My research takes as its starting point a pair of observations, first
articulated by pioneers of the ethnography of speaking tradition, but now held by
most linguistic anthropologists:
1) That the patterning of communicative activity goes beyond the grammatical
patterning of language that is of interest to the linguist, to embrace the patterns of
3deployment of linguistic resources in social activity, and that therefore,
communicative activity and social activity are profoundly intertwined (Bauman
and Sherzer 1989, p 6).
2) That culture largely emerge through the deployment of communicative
resources in interaction (Urban 1991).
The first observation has two important corollaries. First, that use of
language in the context of social activity is not the chaos envisioned by Saussure
in his conception of parole, a vision reiterated by Chomsky in his
competence/performance distinction. Rather, speaking practices display
regularities and a coherence that can be illuminated by empirical investigation.
And second, that in order to understand the patterning of speaking practices, we
must go beyond purely linguistic order, to the sociocultural order.
My interest in Nanti speech reporting practices encompasses both the
question of how reported speech is deployed by Nanti speakers to achieve social
goals, and also how the social world shapes those very practices. In pursuing
answers to these questions I seek to fulfill one of the primary goals of the
ethnography of speaking as originally articulated: to understand the factors that
pattern speaking practices in particular societies (Bauman and Sherzer 1989, p xi).
In this respect, I see my work as squarely in the ethnography of speaking tradition.
In other ways, this work is a departure from traditional approaches in the
ethnography of speaking tradition. Rather than focusing on a particular speech
event and attempting to understand the genres and styles deployed in that context,
or seeking to characterize the broad range of speaking practices in a particular
culture, and classify them in terms of either the anthropologist’s or speakers’
typologies of speaking practices (e.g. Juncosa 1999, Sherzer 1983, Stross 1974), I
instead focus on a single speaking practice - speech reporting - and seek to
4understand the factors that produce the patterns of use that I observe across
multiple social contexts2.
In pursuing this general goal, I have taken speaking practices to be
emergent patterns of use of particular communicative strategies, which are
organized by both ideologies shared by members of a speech community and the
immediate social goals of speakers in communicative interactions. This approach,
adumbrated by Voloshinov early last century (Voloshinov 1973 [1927]) and
increasingly adopted by linguistic anthropologists in recent years (Scheiffelin,
Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998), takes the social organization of talk to derive
substantially from speakers’ conceptions of language and communication and from
their conceptions of matters that intersect profoundly with language, such as the
nature of knowledge and meaning (Rumsey 1990).
In my account of Nanti speech reporting practices I argue that it is possible
to see that there (at least) two distinct areas of practice, each organized through
different ideologies. In the first area of practice, I propose, speech reporting
strategies are deployed to communicate about matters of which the speaker has no
direct experience. This patterning, I contend, arises through the interplay of the
communicative needs of Nanti speakers with Nanti ideologies regarding the
appropriate conditions for making knowledge claims in communicative
interactions.
The second area of practice involves the use of reported speech to talk
about human agency and the evaluative positions that people take. That is, the use
of reported speech to talk about how humans effect changes in the world (e.g. by
                                                 
2 In this respect, my approach bears some resemblance to that employed by Hanks in his study of
deixis in Yucatec Maya (Hanks 1990), in which he examines the linguistic and sociocultural
resources that Maya speakers bring to bear in their deictic practices. In doing so, the study of deixis
becomes an ethnographic tool for exploring Maya conceptions of space, the body, and the
relationship between them.
5making decisions, giving orders, and making promises), and about the judgements
they make as critical beings (e.g. whether something is ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘acceptable’,
etc.). This area of speech reporting practice, I argue, arises because of, and is
organized by, a Nanti ideology that takes an individual’s utterance to be the most
appropriate means for discussing their agency and evaluative stances.
In another break with much other research in the ethnography of speaking
tradition (though not the goals of the tradition), my research also incorporates an
explicitly comparative perspective. My comparative interest is grounded in the
observation that speaking practices, even ones that take very similar forms across
cultural contexts, will occupy a necessarily different place with respect to the
constellation of speaking practices in a given community. Nevertheless, I propose,
some speaking practices - and I count speech reporting practices among them -
provide semiotic affordances that make the more likely to be used for certain
purposes than others.
For example, there is evidence that speech reporting is tied to issues of
evidentiality in many societies (Hill and Irvine 1993, Sherzer 1983), and that
areally in lowland tropical South America, reported speech is centrally involved in
representations of agency and subjectivity in discourse (Basso 1995).
It is also clear, however, that there are significant differences in speech
reporting practices between speech communities. Variation is evident in both the
formal features of reported speech and the way in which reported speech forms
part of social action in different speech communities.
Observations of variation, combined with that of the universal presence of
reported speech in human societies lead naturally to comparative questions. In
what ways, and to what degree do the formal characteristics of speech reporting
practices vary? How is reported speech articulated to social action more generally
in human societies? And critically, is there anything that we can say about the
6ways in which formal and functional characteristics of speech reporting practices
are related, from a comparative perspective?
Answers to these questions require two things. First, detailed descriptions
of speech reporting practices from a significant number of speech communities are
required as a basis for an understanding of the kinds of variations found in the
form and function of speech reporting practices. Second, suitable theoretical
frameworks are needed for empirically describing the organization of speech
reporting as a speaking practice, as well as the properties of reported speech as a
form of social action.
I argue that at present, neither of these exist. While there has been
considerable research on reported speech, most of it is unsatisfactory for our
purposes for two reasons. First, very little research treats reported speech as a
speaking practice that is fundamentally embedded in a social world and in
communicative interaction. Instead, the bulk of research looks at reported speech
in written texts, especially written fiction, or at decontextualized sentences
generated by the author. Such research focuses on grammatical properties of
reported speech (e.g. tense shifts in indirect reported speech) and does not examine
the organizational processes involved in speech reporting in face-to-face
interaction. As such, this research tells us very little about speech reporting as a
human activity. Consequently, the quantity of research that can serve the
comparative goals sketched above is small.
Thus, much research needs to be carried out with the appropriate empirical
orientation before we even have a substantial and reliable empirical basis for a
comparative understanding of reported speech as a social practice involved in
everyday communicative interaction.
The second point is related to the first. Since the vast majority of research
on reported speech has treated it as either a decontextualized or overwhelmingly
literary phenomenon (which is a special form of decontexualization), there does
7not exist a suitable descriptive framework for reported speech as a speaking
practice that forms part of communicative interaction specifically, and social
action more generally.
Some scholars (e.g. Tannen 1986, see below) have recognized the
weakness of the traditional descriptive frameworks for describing reported speech
in interaction, but few compelling alternatives have been suggested.
These observations motivate another strand of the current work: to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional framework used to describe reported
speech and to propose an alternative framework, that of ‘projected speech’. The
core idea of the projected speech framework is that ‘speech reporting’ is actually a
complex of communicative strategies that mediate utterances in a source situation
with those in the ongoing interaction. These strategies include ones that detach
utterances from the source situations (extraction strategies), ones that transform the
utterance (transformation strategies), and ones that insert the transformed utterance
into the ongoing interaction (insertion strategies).
This framework, I argue, rectifies many of the short-comings of the
traditional framework, and provides a candidate framework for the ethnographic
description of speech reporting practices.
1.1 Methodology
This study examines an pervasive aspect of the everyday speaking
practices of individuals in an indigenous society in lowland tropical Latin
America: the use of reported speech. This focus on everyday speaking practices
raises important methodological and analytical issues different from those raised
by most other studies of discourse in societies of the same part of the world, which
typically take as their focus public verbal performances or highly performatively
regimented discourse forms, and which leave everyday speaking practices largely
8unexplored (Basso 1995, Gnerre 1986, Juncosa 1999, McDowell 1994, Sherzer
1983, Urban 1991).
While I am interested in the use of reported speech by Nanti individuals in
public verbal performances, such as feast oratory, I am just as interested in its use
in the numerous interactions that Nanti individuals are involved in throughout the
day: social visits with their neighbors, brief conversations that take place in
passing on forest paths, talk during communal fishing expeditions, talk during trips
to family gardens, and conversations with visitors to the community, among many
others. My interest in what might appear to be mundane uses of language,
compared to ceremonial performances of myths or the magical verbal
performances of ritual specialists, stems from a desire to understand how Nanti
individuals employ reported speech to carry out social and communicative goals
across the spectrum of interactions that transpire in the ebb and flow of Nanti
social life. This is not to say that I believe it is possible to achieve a complete and
totalizing understanding of the role of a particular speaking practice in the lives of
a group of individuals; communicative interaction is sufficiently rich and variable
that additional layers of empirical and analytical complexity are left untouched by
any study. Nevertheless, I believe that useful insights can be gained by studying
speaking practices across multiple contexts and settings. While the approach I take
here is not typical of ethnographic studies of language in indigenous Latin
America, there at least one major study that takes a similar approach, as noted
above: Hanks’ study of referential practice among the Yucatec Maya (Hanks
1990).
In the present study, I take the position that understanding everyday Nanti
speech reporting practices requires the analysis of actual instances of speech
reporting activity as they transpire in concrete social interactions. As I argue in
chapter 2, speech reporting practices (and indeed, speaking practices more
generally) are emergent patterns of language use that arise from the intersection of
9knowledge and beliefs about the communicative properties of speech reporting
strategies with individuals’ specific social and communicative goals in particular
interactional contexts. As such, the phenomena that concern me do not come into
being except in the course of particular trajectories of social action and interaction.
Consequently, speech reporting practices are not phenomena that can be profitably
studied by elicitation techniques that seek to obtain, by metalinguistic means,
information about the uses of reported speech. As Silverstein (1981) has made
clear, the ways in which language is linked to social action and interactive setting
are frequently unavailable for accurate introspection or metapragmatic
contemplation. Since speech reporting is an irreducibly social as well as linguistic
phenomenon, any recourse to elicitation, hypothetical discussion, or simulated
performance is unlikely to yield reliable data.
These considerations make reliance on audio-recordings of interaction and
their transcription, translation, and ethnographic contextualization the
methodological core of my research, as it is for the majority of linguistic
anthropological research (Duranti 1991).
In the Nanti communities of Montetoni and Maranxejari, this
methodological approach raises a series of interesting challenges. For example, no
Nanti individuals are literate or speak Spanish, rendering unfeasible reliance on
local consultants for the transcription and translation of audio recordings, long a
methodological mainstay for linguistic anthropologists working in indigenous
Latin American communities (Graham 1995, Sherzer 1983, Urban 1991).
In order to overcome this particular difficulty, I have become a competent
speaker of Nanti, so that I am now capable of accurately transcribing and
translating recordings of Nanti interaction. My learning of Nanti was in no small
measure aided by the sheer necessity of learning to speak the only language
spoken in a community in which I have lived for months at a time. I have also,
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since my third visit in 1997, made linguistic research a central part of my work,
recognizing the necessity of developing personal competence in Nanti.
I have at the same time pursued detailed study of Nanti history, material
and social practices, and discourse more generally, which has contributed critically
to my ability to contextualize interactions, and specific utterances in them, within
the broader flow of life in Montetoni and Maranxejari.
Another interesting challenge arises from the intersection of my research
goals and my social position in the Nanti communities. As indicated above, I am
interested in uses of reported speech by Nanti individuals across a wide range of
interactive settings found in Nanti society. Many of these are fairly intimate
settings, involving discussions between small numbers of people. At the same
time, it is relatively difficult for me as an individual to fade into the background as
non-central participant. Consequently, many of the interactions I have recorded
over the last four years of research in the Nanti communities have involved me as
a participant. Indeed, the careful reader will notice that most of the data segments
examined in chapters 3 and 4 include me or Chris Beier, my research partner, as
either a focal or peripheral participant.
By having been a participant in the interactions I analyze, I affected their
course (I explore this issue in connection with extraction strategies and speech
projection practices in chapter 4). Had I not been a participant in the interactions I
analyze, they would either not have occurred at all, or would have unfolded in
different ways. In this respect, it is impossible to claim that my presence did not
affect trajectories of social and communicative action that I discuss.
It is my contention, however, that in these interactions, Nanti individuals
still made use of the communicative strategies with which they are familiar, and
which are employed in interactions in which I am not present. While the social and
communicative goals that Nanti individuals pursued in the interactions in which I
was present were no doubt shaped, to varying degrees, by my presence, these
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individuals nevertheless pursued them with the communicative tools familiar to
them from previous interactions with other Nanti individuals, and as informed by
Nanti language ideologies. In other words, while I played a role in shaping the
interactions, as I believe all interactants do, this did not cause Nanti individuals to
innovate entirely new speaking practices.
These contentions are supported by two facts. First, that the bulk of human
communicative practice is beyond out conscious awareness and manipulation
(Silverstein 1981), and second, that much of human behavior is guided by durable,
transposable schemas of action (Bourdieu 1977). Thus, while my presence in the
interactions I record lead to unique trajectories of social action, these courses of
social action are pursued with the communicative tools and processes and social
understandings that inform all Nanti interactions. Since it is these tools, processes
and understandings that I seek to describe and explicate, my inability to erase
myself from the ethnographic data I use is not an insurmountable difficulty (see
also Duranti 1991, p 118).
In fact, I maintain that as a participant in the communicative interactions I
discuss, I have the analytical advantage of having been a social actor in the
interaction, thereby gaining easier access to implicit understandings and contextual
factors that informed the communicative activity of the participants.
1.2 Ethnographic and Historical Background
This study concerns communicative and social processes in two indigenous
communities in lowland southeastern Peru: Montetoni and Maranxejari. These two
communities are located at the navigable limits of the Camisea River, a tributary
of the Urubamba River, one of the major rivers of the southern Peruvian Amazon.
The headwaters region of the Camisea region, where Montetoni and Maranxejari
are situated, occupies a transitional zone between the lowland tropical rainforest
that stretches for thousands of kilometers to the north and east and the cloudforest
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of the surrounding Andean foothills. The Camisea River itself is small, fast-
flowing river that is dotted with numerous rapids near Montetoni and Maranxejari.
Travel on this river is slow, arduous, and frequently dangerous.
The residents of these communities speak an Arawakan language called
Nanti, which is closely related to several other languages spoken in southern Peru,
including Matsigenka and Asháninka (see Appendix 1). The residents of
Montetoni and Maranxejari display many cultural affinities with the Matsigenka,
the geographically nearest indigenous group, although they also exhibit significant
differences in social practices, material culture, and language.
The Nanti of the Camisea region presently depend on a combination of
swidden agriculture, hunting, and fishing for food, and a combination of forest
products and recently-introduced manufactured products for tools, shelter, and
clothing. The most important food crops are sexatsi (yuca or manioc) and parijanti
(plantains), though most families in addition raise a wide variety of root and fruit
crops. Monkeys, peccaries, and birds are the principal sources of game. Hunting is
carried out exclusively by bow-and-arrow, except for a few bird species that can
be trapped. Much fishing is also dependent on bow-and-arrow techniques,
although the use of xogi (barbasco), a vegetable poison, fishing nets and hook-and-
line techniques are also important.
Since the late 1980s, when the Nanti of the Camisea region first developed
friendly relations with the neighboring Matsigenka and with non-indigenous
individuals, metal tools, especially axes, machetes, knives, and metal cooking pots,
have become a central part of the material basis of Nanti life. Beginning in the
early 1990s, manufactured clothing has also been adopted by most of the residents
of Montetoni and Maranxejari.
It was in fact the desire for access to these kinds of goods, especially
machetes and axes, which led, in large part, to the formation of the two
communities in which I carried out the research on which the present work is
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based. Prior to the mid-1980s, the individuals who now reside in Montetoni and
Maranxejari lived in the headwaters region of the Timpia River, a river
immediately to the south of the Camisea. Encounters with Dominican missionaries
in the mid-1970s led to the Nanti discovery of metal tools. Nanti interactions with
the Dominicans were less than pleasant, however, and the Nanti broke of contact
with those missionaries.
In the early 1980s the few metal tools the Nanti succeeded in obtaining
wore out, leading to attempts to acquire new ones. At the same time, pressure on
the settlements that eventually relocated to the Camisea from Nanti living further
upriver provided an incentive for the present residents of Montetoni and
Maranxejari to relocate. These pressures led to the beginning of a migratory
process from the Timpia to the Camisea basin that led to well over half the Nanti
from the Timpia basin to resettle in several settlements at the Camisea headwaters.
The movement of families from the Timpia to the Camisea began in 1985 and
continued in full force until 1995.
In 1987 Nanti individuals made their first friendly contact with Matsigenka
from the Camisea basin, which provided an initial trickle of metal tools. In 1991 a
Matsigenka schoolteacher settled with several Nanti families living in the
downrivermost settlement at the time and encouraged the foundation of Montetoni.
Prior to the foundation of Montetoni, Nanti settlements consisted of small number
of families, and rarely, if ever, exceeded fifty individuals. Over the next several
years all the other Nanti in the Camisea basin resettled in Montetoni, which
reached a population of about 250 individuals.
The residents of Montetoni at first welcomed the schoolteacher, who
brought a steady supply of manufactured goods, but became increasingly
dissatisfied with him after several years. The schoolteacher felt a need to ‘civilize’
the Nanti, which included attempts to suppress many Nanti cultural and linguistic
practices. At the same time he became increasingly abusive, coercing
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unrecompensed labor from Nanti individuals and even sexually assaulting Nanti
women and girls.
In 1996 the schoolteacher and a small number of Nanti founded
Maranxejari, a new settlement some 10 kilometers downriver from Montetoni.
Attempts by the schoolteacher to force the remaining Nanti to relocate to
Maranxejari led to a series of antagonistic interactions in which the author was
involved. This led the author and Chris Beier to publish a report detailing the
conflict between the Camisea Nanti and the schoolteacher (Beier and Michael
1998), which led to the filing of legal charges against the schoolteacher in 1998.
Soon thereafter he fled the region permanently.
Since 1998, the Montetoni and Maranxejari have been entirely self-
governed, and the residents of these communities have innovated new social forms
in the face of the novel social circumstances they are experiencing living in large
multi-family group communities, including weekly village-wide feasts and a
recognized community leader.
1.3 My Involvement With the Nanti Communities
My involvement with the Nanti communities of the Xamisuja region began
as that of a casual visitor, then developed as that of an activist working with these
communities to further their autonomy and well-being, and only later became that
of an anthropological and linguistic researcher.
I first visited Montetoni in 1993, a year after having completed my
undergraduate work and six years before beginning graduate work in
anthropology. I had decided to travel through lowland southeastern Peru to satisfy
a life-long fascination with the Amazon basin, and in the course of my travels
made friends with individuals in several communities in the lower Urubamba
River valley. One of these friends suggested I visit Montetoni, which he had
visited a year before. With his help I reached Montetoni where I stayed for a little
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over a week. During this brief stay the community made a request at a village-wide
meeting that I help provide metal goods and medical supplies to the community.
I returned again in 1995, this time with Chris Beier, with a supply of
machetes and medical supplies for the community. This visit coincided with an
outbreak of gastro-intestinal illness that the medicines we brought we successful in
quelling. Working with the sanitario, a Matsigenka man who served as the
community health provider, during the two weeks we were in the community, we
succeeded in earning the trust of many individuals in the community. We were
asked to return with more medical supplies in the future.
In 1996 Chris Beier and I founded Cabeceras Aid Project, a 501 (c) 3 non-
profit organization, whose mission is to support Amazonian indigenous groups in
their struggles for well-being and self-determination. With the fund-raising made
possible by this institutional infrastructure, Chris Beier and I organized a 12-month
project to work with the Nanti communities to enable them to handle the health
problems arising from their new steady contacts with outsiders. We were also
concerned with ensuring that the Nanti communities obtained secure legal
guarantees to their lands.
We returned to Camisea region in June of 1997 to begin work in
Montetoni, and to our surprise found that Montetoni had fissioned into two
communities: Montetoni, and a smaller settlement downriver from Montetoni,
called Maranxejari. The downriver settlement was inhabited by the Matsigenka
schoolteacher who had been living among the Nanti since 1991, and it soon
became clear that a rather antagonistic relationship had developed between him
and the residents of Montetoni over the issue of where the latter group was to live.
It soon became clear that the schoolteacher was engaged in a bluntly
coercive and abusive course of action which had as its goal the economic and
sexual exploitation of Nanti individuals and political domination over the Nanti as
a group. Under these circumstances we soon found ourselves siding with the
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residents of Montetoni in a number of matters, which quickly embroiled us in the
conflict.
After roughly three months of mostly medically-related work in the two
Nanti communities, Beier and I returned to Lima to write a report on the situation
in the Nanti communities, hoping to prompt action on the part of Peruvian
government authorities to rectify situation. As discussed in the previous section,
this was eventually successful.
Beier and I returned to the upper Camisea in 1998 for three more months of
work in the communities, during which time I researched land use patterns in order
to obtain data necessary for future land-titling activities. Beier and I returned in
both 1999, 2000, and 2001 to work with individuals who had been chosen by the
community to receive training in medicine to treat newly-introduced illnesses such
as malaria and certain respiratory and gastro-intestinal illnesses. During this entire
period, the work we carried out in the Nanti communities was planned and
executed in accord with agreements made between the Nanti communities and
ourselves regarding the goals the residents of the communities wanted to see us
help them with.
In addition to work we carried out for the communities, starting especially
in 1999 (the year Beier and I began graduate work in anthropology) we began to
carry out organized anthropological and linguistic research. We explained to the
residents of Montetoni and Maranxejari that nosyaninxa ‘my people’, were
interested in their language and in what they did, such as hunting, farming, and
feasting. We asked if it was acceptable to make audio and video recordings in
order to help us communicate to ‘our people’ about what the people of Montetoni
and Maranxejari said and did, and we were told that it was. At the same time,
however, it has been made clear to us on many occasions that our welcome
presence in the Nanti communities is contingent on our doing work that the
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community deems important and supplying goods that the community deems
necessary.
The relationship that has developed between the residents of the Nanti
communities and Beier and myself is perhaps an unusual one. Beier and I are
frequently referred to by the residents of Montetoni as “mujigaxenarira”, ‘those
who help us’, foregrounding our work for the community, and backgrounding our
research work, which the residents of Montetoni and Maranxejari at present appear
to consider a sometimes amusing but ultimately useless activity. We have on many
occasions shown and demonstrated to Nanti individuals the fruits of our research.
From explanations we have overheard Nanti individuals make to visitors to the
communities about our presence, it is clear that many Nanti, especially the
community leaders, have a fairly clear understanding of our broad research goals.
I personally feel that the two strands of work I participate in while in the
Nanti communities profoundly enrich each other. The research I have carried out
on a variety of linguistic and anthropological topics has made my community-
oriented and Nanti-directed work much more fruitful and productive than it
otherwise be, and this latter sphere of work has profoundly enriched my
understanding of Nanti society and language.
1.4 Conventions Adopted in the Text
Placenames
When discussing places or geographical features in areas presently or
previously inhabited by the Xamisuja Nanti, I employ the Nanti name. If
Matsigenka or Spanish alternatives exist, I will mention them parenthetically after
the first use of the placename in a given chapter.
In discussing places or geographical features in areas which have never
been inhabited by Nanti individuals, I employ Nanti placenames when discussing
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Nanti orientations to those places, but use Spanish or Matsigenka names when
discussing the orientation of Spanish or Matsigenka speakers towards those places.
Personal Names
The use of personal names by residents of the Nanti communities in the
Xamisuja basin is a relatively recent innovation, arising from contact with
Matsigenka individuals in the early 1990s. Nanti individuals were assigned
Spanish names by Matsigenka schoolteachers and more recently, by government
doctors and by a Matsigenka evangelist who occasionally visits the area. I have
chosen to represent these names using the Nanti orthography, reproducing the
Nanti pronunciation of these names, which derives from the reanalysis of Hispanic
names in terms of Nanti phonology.
Transcription
Given the profound empirical complexity and subtlety of even the simplest
utterance, any transcription system will only partially reproduce the source
recording. This requires that in transcribing speech data, a researcher must decide
which features of an utterance are relevant to her research goals and design the
transcription system accordingly (Bucholtz 2000, Ochs 1979).
In the present study, I am principally concerned with the lexical content of
utterances. As such, I do not find it particularly important to transcribe prosodic
and intonational features. I am also not particularly interested in phenomena such
as utterance overlap, hesitation noises, voice loudness, and so on. Consequently,
the transcriptions I provide are quite unlike those produced by researchers in
conversational analysis, who pay close attention to features like those just
mentioned.
One consequence of my focus on lexical content is that I have chosen to
transcribe lexical items in their full form, although it is not uncommon for the
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ultimate and penultimate syllables of a word to be deleted in fast speech. These
syllables are not deleted in careful speech, and are easily recoverable by Nanti
speakers, both in ongoing interaction and when they listen to audio recording of
conversations.
Nanti fast-speech syllable deletion is a highly systematic phenomenon that
depends on the process by which prosodic feet are formed in Nanti words.
Specifically, in Nanti, words are footed by bisyllabic feet that are formed from left
to right, with the final syllable always left unfooted, unless it incorporates a long
vowel or diphthong. As a result, either the final syllable, or the final two syllables,
are left unfooted. Those syllables left unfooted by this process are precisely those
which are deleted in rapid speech.
In the transcriptions in this text, I employ a caret (^) to indicate the point in
a particular uttered word where the segments started being deleted. The segments
following the caret are thus reconstructions from the grammatical and
communicative context. This reconstruction is quite straightforward, as the deleted
segments are almost always a mode suffix and/or the object suffixes of verbs,
which can be easily deduced from other features of the morphology of the verb.
The allophonic form of the final uttered segment is also helpful in deducing the
deleted segment that follows.
Nanti words are transcribed in an orthography very similar to one devised
by David and Judith Payne of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, and Angel and
Olga Diaz of the Iglesia Misionera Maranatha for use in Nanti Bible translation
and for the creation of Nanti literacy materials.
In the light of some discoveries regarding Nanti phonology that I made
since the creation of this orthography in 1997, I have made some modifications to
the original orthography proposed. The orthographic system employed in this text
is summarized in Appendix 1.
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I employ a four-line interlinear representation of the transcribed text and its
translation. In this system, the first line of text, in bold, is the transcribed Nanti
utterance. The second line, below the first, is a break-down of the forms in the line
into their constituent morphemes. The third line consists of morpheme-by-
morpheme direct translations of the constituent morphemes of the line above. The
fourth line, separated by an empty line from the previous three, is a free translation
into English. The following is an example:
oxanti nomantsigataxe.
o-xant-i    no-mantsiga-t-ax-e
3FN-say-RLI 1S-be.sick-EPC-COMP-IRI
She said, “I was sick”.
Many of the morphemes are translated by means of morpheme codes. This
is necessary because of the highly polysynthetic nature of Nanti, which would
render morpheme-by-morpheme translations very lengthy if prose descriptions
were used. For example ‘RLI’ is an abbreviation for ‘realis mode - irreflexive’. A
listing of the morpheme codes used in this study is found at the end of Appendix 1.
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Translation
The substantial differences between the grammars of Nanti and English,
and between the discursive practices of Nanti speakers and the English-reading
audience of this thesis, raise some challenges for translation. The two greatest of
these challenges are the relationship between Nanti mode-marking and English
tense-marking, and Nanti ellipsis.
Nanti verbs are unmarked for tense. Instead, they are obligatorily marked
for a two-way realis/irrealis mode distinction (see section Appendix 1). In
considering translation to English, in which verbs are obligatorily marked for
tense, it is these mode markers that are the most suitable basis for deciding into
which tense the English verb should translated.
Subtleties arise, however, because the realis suffix can be translated as
either past-tense, or present-tense. The only basis for choosing one translation over
the other is understanding of the circumstances that the utterance evokes. For this
reason, the careful reader may note switches in tense in a translated segment of
speech that is not accompanied by any switch in the mode-marking morphology of
the original Nanti.
The second great challenge for translation, as noted above, is Nanti use of
ellipsis. As with speakers in any speech community, Nanti speakers are rarely
maximally explicit, using shared understandings and the surrounding discourse to
do much of the work of making an utterance effectively meaningful. In much of
the data I use, therefore, literal translations of utterances substantially fail to
capture what a speaker communicates by making an utterance.
The solution I have adopted is to use the free-translation line of the
interlinear translation to provide supplementary information, frequently
parenthetically. Critically, my ability to do this depends on my participation in the
communicative contexts in which the utterances were uttered, and my knowledge
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of Nanti life. For this reason, the step from the literal morpheme-by-morpheme
translation to the free translation might at times be hard to follow for the reader.
Finally, there is no such thing as an infinitival form of the Nanti verb, or
any other relatively "inflection-free" form of the verb. In particular, verbs typically
appear with person marking, in the form of affixes that indicate the grammatical
person of the subject, and object of the verb. For this reason, I have opted to
exemplify verbs in the text with third person masculine forms of the subject and
object affixes3, except in cases in which this would render the verb bizarre from a
pragmatic standpoint4.
                                                 
3 This choice is motivated by the fact that third person masculine marking (see Beier and Michael
2001) involves morphophonological processes that produce the least ambiguous form for the task
of identifying the verb root.
4 E.g. for verbs used to indicate activities that are prototypically carried out by women in Nanti
society, such as certain gathering activities, or for activities such as giving birth, which can only be
performed by women.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Perspectives on Reported Speech
2.0 Introduction
Reported speech has been a topic of theoretical work for a diverse group of
scholars from several academic traditions. Descriptive and formal linguists,
beginning in the early 20th century and continuing into present, have studied the
grammatical aspects of reported speech (Bally 1912, Coulmas 1986, Jespersen
1924, Longacre 1983, Van der Wurff 1996). With the lonely exceptions of
Voloshinov and Bakhtin (Bakhtin 1981 [1975], Voloshinov 1973 [1929]),
however, attempts to grapple with reported speech as a socially-situated and
interactively-grounded phenomenon languished until the 1970s, when
ethnographers of speaking and sociolinguists began to turn their attention to the
topic (Basso 1985, Sherzer 1983, Tannen 1986). More recently, interest in reported
speech, frequently under the rubric of ‘metalinguistics’, or ‘metapragmatics’, has
mushroomed (Lucy 1993).
In this section I examine two different theoretical framings for the study of
reported speech, that of Voloshinov and Bakhtin, and that formulated by Deborah
Tannen. My choice of Voloshinov (and to a lesser degree, Bakhtin) as one of my
two foci in this chapter stems from the seminal role of Voloshinov’s work in both
previous ethnographic studies of reported speech and in my own thinking. While
the examination of work by a scholar active in the 1920s by a modern linguist or
anthropologist may usually be symptomatic of a penchant for antiquarian matters,
in the case of Voloshinov, nothing could be further from the truth. In many
respects, Voloshinov was decades ahead of his time, as I hope the reader will come
to appreciate in the subsequent discussion.
My choice of Deborah Tannen as my second major focus in this chapter
derives from the fact that her work on reported speech, especially as summarized
in Talking Voices (Tannen 1986), represents one of the few attempts to
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substantially rethink the nature of reported speech from a modern, interactionally-
grounded, and empirically-based standpoint. Although I ultimately criticize
Tannen in several key areas, many of her empirical observations are acute, and her
recognition of the flaws in the traditional framework for describing and analyzing
reported speech merit attention.
2.1 Voloshinov: Reported Speech, Ideology, and Society
The first scholar to treat reported speech not merely as a grammatical
phenomenon, but as an aspect of social life and action was Valentin Voloshinov,
the Soviet philosopher of language, whose landmark Marxism and the Philosophy
of Language remains a rich source of insight on the nature of reported speech as a
social practice. Voloshinov’s work also prefigures many aspects of more recent
research linking speaking practices and ideology (Schieffelin, Woolard, and
Kroskrity 1999), a theoretical focus in my approach to projected speech (see
chapter 4).
Voloshinov’s work on reported speech extends in many interesting
directions, but here I restrict myself to reviewing those areas that are relevant to
the theoretical positions and empirical claims I make in subsequent chapters. My
most important goal in this section is to discuss the ideological approach to speech
reporting practices that is developed in Voloshinov’s work, which serves as a basis
to my own approach to reported speech. Another important goal in this section is
to enable the reader to see connections and parallels between Voloshinov’s
approach to reported speech and the projected speech framework that I develop in
chapters 3 and 4, and at the same time to point to weaknesses in Voloshinov’s
account that I argue can be addressed through the framework of projected speech.
In understanding Voloshinov’s treatment of reported speech, it is helpful to
situate it within his broad conception of language as a social and ideological
phenomenon.
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In taking language as the focus of his investigations, Voloshinov was
inspired by two goals. First, he wanted to find an approach to language in Marxist
thought other than the mechanistic, reflexological approach inspired by Pavlovian
psychology. Second, he wished to free the study of language from the abstract
objectivism of Saussure, by which language is conceived of as an abstract structure
(langue) which is unrelated to social interaction, and by which speech (parole) is
seen as a chaotic and imperfect instantiation of langue5. His goal, then, was to find
an understanding of language as meaningful and creative, and also as essentially
embedded in and shaped by human activity.
Voloshinov’s strategy for reaching this goal is to theorize a fundamental
interdependency between signs and ideology6. Language itself is but a particular
sign system, and thus language and ideology, Voloshinov argues, are
fundamentally interdependent.
According to Voloshinov, an ideological product is something which
...refracts another reality outside itself. It represents, depicts, or stands for
something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. Without signs
there is no ideology. (ibid., p 9, italics in original)
                                                 
5 As noted by Dell Hymes, in this latter goal the work of Voloshinov coincides presciently with that
of the ethnography of speaking, some 40 years later.
6 Ideology is, of course, a notoriously polysemous and contested term (see Woolard 1999 for a
discussion). Voloshinov’s own conception of ideology appears quite broad, although he leaves it
largely unexplicated. He appears to use the term to refer to meanings and evaluations that circulate
in the social sphere, and which arise from the material bases of social life. At various points
Voloshinov talks of ideology as the basis of shared meanings, recalling the notion of
intersubjectivity. It is interesting that, writing during the early years of the USSR, he largely avoids
speaking of ideology as ‘mystification’.
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That is, any manifestation of ideology is intrinsically semiotic. At the same
time, Voloshinov argues, signs are themselves thoroughly ideological entities:
A sign does not simply exist as part of reality - it reflects and refracts
another reality. Therefore, it may distort that reality or be true to it, or may
perceive it from a special point of view, and so forth. Every sign is subject
to the criteria of ideological evaluation (i.e., whether it is true, false,
correct, fair, good, etc.). (ibid., p10)
As Voloshinov goes on to argue, the ideological and semiotic spheres of
human activity are precisely overlapping:
The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate
with one another. Whenever a sign is present, ideology is present, too.
Everything ideological possesses semiotic value. (ibid., p10, italics in
original)
Thus, ideological products are composed of signs, which are themselves
suffused with ideological content.
Significantly then, signs are fundamentally ideological products and
acquire their ability to “reflect and refract reality”, i.e. to mean, precisely through
their status as ideological products. The processes by which signs become suffused
with ideological content are precisely those of social interaction and struggle.
For Voloshinov, language - and in particular the word - is the (ideological)
sign par excellence. The significance of this fact for Voloshinov is that it renders
language an ideological product. As such, language is a set of signs that are
socially constituted and socially shared (or shareable - as ideological products,
linguistic signs can be objects of struggle and contestation), making linguistic
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meaning a social process. This removes meaning from the abstract realm of
structure or consciousness, where Saussurean abstract objectivism places it, and
makes it part of human interaction and society.
Linguistics thus becomes, in Voloshinov’s terms, a sociological enterprise,
rather than a formal logico-mathematical one. In this enterprise, dialogue becomes
the focus of study rather than the isolated utterance.
In another era, with different technology and in the context of different
methodological traditions, this conclusion may have led to an ethnographic
approach to language. However, in Voloshinov’s case, the conclusion that
dialogue was to become the focus of a sociologically-formulated linguistics
instead led him to look at the interaction between different parts of novelistic texts,
thereby metaphorizing the notion of dialogue into that of interactions of sense and
meaning between different ‘voices’ present in a text.
The manner in which different voices exist side by side in a text thus
became a central concern for Voloshinov, leading him to examine reported speech.
By studying reported speech, Voloshinov hoped to understand the processes by
which speech from one speaker was received and assimilated into the speech of
others:
The productive study of dialogue presupposes, however, a more profound
investigation of the forms used in reported speech, since these forms reflect
basic and constant tendencies in the active reception of other speakers’
speech, and it is this reception, after all, that is fundamental also for
dialogue. (ibid., p117, italics in original)
For Voloshinov, reported speech is of interest because it is precisely in the
reporting of speech that we see the ways in which an originary utterance is
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received, understood, and manipulated in the ideologically-constituted “inner-
speech consciousness” of the listener:
How, in fact, is another speaker’s speech received? What is the mode of
existence of another’s utterance in the actual, inner-speech consciousness
of the recipient? How is it manipulated there, and what process of
orientation will the subsequent speech of the recipient of the recipient
himself have undergone in regard to it? What we have in forms of reported
speech is precisely an objective document of this reception. (ibid., 117)
It is critical for Voloshinov that although what is in question is the nature
of the existence and manipulation of another’s utterance in the “inner-speech
consciousness of the recipient,” that this is understood to be not an idiosyncratic,
individual process, but rather, a process that is constituted by social forces and
processes that intersect with language.
[T]his document provides us with information ... about the steadfast social
tendencies in an active reception of other speakers’ speech, tendencies that
have crystallized into language forms. The mechanism of this process is
located, not in the individual soul, but in society. (ibid., 117)
Thus, reported speech shows the impress of ideology, which is understood
by Voloshinov to operate on a societal level, on specific utterances. Reported
speech thus becomes an instrument for examining the ideologies that affect
dialogue more generally.
The relationship that Voloshinov envisions between forms of speech
reporting and “social tendencies” is a functional one. Society “selects” forms of
speech reporting that are consonant with “socially vital and constant” factors:
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It is the function of society to select and to ... adapt to the grammatical
structure of its language just those factors in the active reception of
utterances that are socially vital and constant... (ibid., p117)
As the conditions of society change, altering what is social vital and
constant, so to do forms of speech reporting:
Should it happen that circumstances conspire to disparage some particular
form ... then this may be taken as evidence that the dogmatic tendencies in
understanding and evaluating the messages to be reported are not properly
manifested by that particular form... (ibid., p118)
What Voloshinov argues in these passages, then, is that speech reporting
practices are intrinsically tied to social action through ideology, which mediates
material activity and semiotic activity. Voloshinov’s thesis thus provides a charter
for investigating ideology through the study of speech reporting practices, and
conversely, for explaining the organization of speech reporting practices in terms
of ideologies current in the society, which in turn relate to the society’s material
base. As Voloshinov comments:
The conditions of verbal communication, its forms, and its methods of
differentiation are dictated by the social and economic prerequisites of a
given period. These changing sociolingual conditions are what in fact
determine those changes in the forms of reported speech brought out in our
analysis (ibid., p123)
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Voloshinov’s formulation of the relationship between speech reporting
practices and the wider social sphere raises issues that are important to address.
Although Voloshinov argues convincingly for the existence of an intimate
relationship between reported speech and ideology, certain links in his chain of
argument, upon closer examination, appear in need of further refinement.
For instance, Voloshinov sketches a relationship between speech reporting
practices, ideology, and the “socially vital and constant” factors of language in
which each of these elements fits tightly and neatly into the other. Each of these
elements are consonant with one another and work together in such a way as to
constitute a fully coherent and consistent semiotic-ideological-material system.
Ideology mediates between the semiotic realm and the material basis of society,
assuring that language - and speech reporting in particular - selects for the
“socially vital and constant” elements of communication and interaction. This
ideologically-guided process of selection yields speaking practices which
harmonize with the “ social and economic prerequisites” of the society. In this
way, language, ideology, and economics for a seamless whole. In short,
Voloshinov describes a system that does not leak.
This is, of course, a characteristic property of functionalist theories, and it
is in fact possible to view Voloshinov as espousing a form of Marxist
functionalism in the realm of language, in which ideology serves to mediate the
harmonization of language with the social and economic bases of life. However, as
the by-now-commonplace criticisms of functionalism in its various guises point
out (e.g. Sahlins 1976), harmonization between different realms and systems of
human activity is rarely that perfect. In short, there is slippage between these
different realms and systems.
The fact that there is in fact slippage between the different aspects of the
system does not, of course, render Voloshinov’s observations about their inter-
relation entirely false. Instead, it problematizes their relationship, requiring that
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their relationship be examined empirically. It also prevents us from transparently
reading off ideology from speech reporting practices, or conversely assuming that
certain speech reporting practices logically follow from particular ideologies.
Rather, the question becomes how speech reporting practices can be harnessed for
ideologically-shaped social action, and how the features and organization of
speech reporting practices provide affordances and constraints for social action.
Another aspect of Voloshinov’s framework that could benefit from further
theorization and empirical grounding is the relationship between ideology and
speech reporting practices. While Voloshinov argues persuasively on theoretical
grounds that speech reporting practices are intimately related to ideology, it
remains unclear which specific ideologies are related to specific speech reporting
practices, and how. Moreover, while Voloshinov makes clear that speech reporting
practices are directly affected by the factors which are “socially vital” in the
“active reception of utterances”, he does not explain what such “socially vital”
factors might be.
In other words, while Voloshinov recognizes that ideology plays a
significant mediating role between ‘social factors’ and speech reporting practices
(and speaking practices more generally), he fails to specify what the mechanisms
might be by which ideology achieves this mediation. Similarly, he fails to
recognize that the socially vital factors might be different for different social
actors, and as such, that speech reporting practices may not be uniform throughout
a society.
Progress in this area will depend heavily on empirical research that can
trace the relationship between speaking practices and ideologies, which is in fact
becoming a significant area of research in linguistic anthropology (Schieffelin,
Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998).
The results I present in chapter 4 indicate that in Nanti society, at least,
ideologies regarding knowledge and knowledge claims in discourse play an
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important role in shaping speech reporting practices. Similarly, ideologies that
relate to the representation of human agency also appear to be significant factors
that affect the use of reported speech by Nanti individuals.
It should be noted, in this regard, that since Voloshinov understood that
speech reporting practices are complexly tied to the social lives of the individuals
who employ them, he also realized that speech reporting practices should vary
across language communities. He therefore recognized, in a certain sense, that the
relationship between speech reporting practices and “socially important values”
must be investigated empirically:
Within its scope we must rigorously define to what extent a given language
community differentiates the social reception of the speech to be reported,
and to what extent the expressiveness, the stylistic qualities of speech, its
lexical coloration, and so forth, are felt as distinct and socially important
values (ibid., p119)
Finally, it is important to recognize the shortcomings of Voloshinov’s
reliance on novelistic text for his study of dialogue generally, and speech reporting
in particular.
The problems involved in his use of these texts are nicely exemplified in
Voloshinov’s discussion of the relationship between reported speech and the
reporting context. In this discussion he takes to task previous researchers, who
isolated reported speech from surrounding utterances:
Earlier investigators of the forms of reported speech committed the
fundamental error of virtually divorcing the reported speech from the
reporting context.... Meanwhile, the true object of inquiry ought to be
precisely the dynamic inter-relation of these two factors, the speech being
33
reported (the other person’s speech), and the speech doing the reporting
(the author’s speech). After all, the two actually do exist, and take shape
only in their interrelation, and not on their own, the one apart from the
other. The reported speech and the reporting context are but terms of a
dynamic interrelationship. This dynamism reflects the dynamism of social
interorientation in verbal ideological communication between people
(within, of course, the vital and steadfast tendencies of that
communication). (ibid., p 119)
The relationship between reported speech and reporting context is of
paramount importance. Unfortunately, Voloshinov interprets this relationship very
narrowly, reducing it to the question of authorial penetration of the reported
utterance. Alternatively, one could identify the narrow construal of authorial
penetration as the source of the shortcoming. In any event, the outcome is that in
his examination of the relationship between reported speech and its reporting
context, Voloshinov restricts his attention to authorial manipulation of surface
segmentable forms that arguably transform an ‘original utterance’ into the reported
form.
Voloshinov therefore does not discuss the socially strategic uses of
reported speech that arise from the sequential placement of reported speech at a
particular phase of an interaction, which makes the instance of reported speech
function in a particular rhetorical manner: as agreement, rebuttal, or evidential
support. Nor does he examine how other interlocutors respond to a reported
utterance.
Similarly, Voloshinov does not address in his discussion of authorial
penetration the manipulation of non-segmental aspects of the originary utterance,
such as intonation, prosody, kinesic, and the broader interactional features relevant
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to the meaning of the original utterance, such as background knowledge, and the
micro-history of the originary interaction.
The shortcomings of Voloshinov’s treatment of the relationship between
reported speech and its reporting context spring from the same source, namely,
that Voloshinov is not actually examining reported speech that originates in one
interaction and is then reported in a the ‘reporting context’ of another interaction.
Rather, he is looking at reported speech in fictional literature.
In a very significant sense, these putative instances of reported speech in
fact ‘report’ nothing. They are instead created ex nihilo for the artistic needs of the
writer. Reported speech in novels of course employs many of the grammatical
strategies employed by interactants reporting speech in communicative
interactions - that is one of the mimetic strategies of Western fictional literature.
However, these ‘reported’ utterances are not tied originary utterances in a previous
interaction. These novelistic ‘reported’ utterances do not occupy, therefore, a place
in a chain of utterances comparable to that occupied by a reported utterance in a
communicative utterance. They do not partake of the social life of reported
utterances in the same way as those that appear in communicative interactions.
It would be extremely strange, for example, for someone to take a stretch
of Anna Karenina’s speech in the eponymous novel and argue that Tolstoi had
mis-reported it. Such contestability, however, is integral to instances of reported
speech that arise in communicative interaction. By being part of ongoing and
intertwining trajectories of social action, reported speech in communicative
interactions possess characteristics that do not appear in novelistic reported speech.
While Voloshinov criticizes previous research that neglects the reporting
context for reported speech, this same criticism can be made of Voloshinov
himself, since ultimately he is little-concerned with actual interactions in which
actual reporting contexts arise. Furthermore, this criticism can be broadened to
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include mention of Voloshinov’s failure to consider the entire social trajectory of a
reported utterance.
This lacuna, I contend, is precisely one of the gaps filled by the projected
speech framework I elaborate in the next chapter. By explicitly making room in
the descriptive framework for the situation that serves as the source for the
reported speech, as well as the ongoing interaction in which the speech is reported,
and the processes by which utterances transit between them, the social trajectory of
reported speech thereby becomes a focus of research.
2.2 Tannen: Constructed Dialogue and Involvement
One of the most theoretically innovative and empirically insightful scholars
to examine reported speech in recent years is Deborah Tannen. Significantly, and
in contrast to Voloshinov and Bakhtin, Tannen explicitly examines reported
speech in the context of communicative interactions. This empirical focus leads
her to several novel theoretical positions regarding reported speech, which I
examine below.
In certain respects my own empirical findings and theoretical positions
converge with those of Tannen - for example in her critique of Voloshinov and
Bakhtin’s reliance on novels as sources of data, and in her questioning of the
empirical validity of the notions of directly and indirectly reported speech - but in
other important areas I differ with her, such as in her complete rejection of
‘reporting’ as a meaningful notion in describing the process of embedding speech
within speech.
Tannen’s interest in reported speech arises from analyses of strategies in
“casual conversation” that “involve” the participants in an ongoing interaction, and
especially in narratives that unfold in the course of an interaction. For Tannen,
“involvement” refers to
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an internal, even emotional connection individuals feel which binds them
to other people as well as to places, things, activities, ideas, memories, and
words. (Tannen 1986, p13)
Involvement is also important as the currency of conversational
engagement, in that it
creates of an emotional experience of insight (understanding the text) and
connectedness (to the other participants, to the language, to the world).
(ibid., p13)
Tannen’s notion of involvement thus recalls in some ways the concept of
intersubjectivity. Tannen also finds involvement significant because it plays an
important role in allowing participants in interactions to come to understand the
communicative content of the interaction. Involvement achieves this by drawing
participants into investing in meaning-creation:
Much as one cares for a person, animal, place, or object that one has taken
care of, so listeners and readers not only understand information better but
care more about it - understand it because they care about it - if they
worked to make its meaning. (ibid., p17)
At the same time, Tannen’s interest in involvement converges with her
concerns about the relationship between discourse in conversation, and that found
in literature. Involvement strategies, she remarks, are “the basic force in both
conversational and literary discourse” (ibid., p17). Tannen observes that the
involvement strategies of conversation can be understood as the conversational
analogues and precursors to strategies employed in written literature, and that
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therefore, by studying involvement strategies in conversation, one is studying the
basis and wellspring of literature.
An important goal in this work thus becomes underscoring the creative and
artistic nature of casual conversation, and to emphasize that participants in such
conversations routinely employ highly sophisticated and developed forms of what
others have called ‘verbal art’.
Tannen thus approaches reported speech with two goals: first, to show how
reported speech creates involvement; and second, to show the creative and artistic
nature of speech reporting. In keeping with these goals, she examines instances of
reported speech in American, Greek, and Brazilian (Portuguese) narratives and
conversation.
Tannen’s first step in her treatment of “reported speech” in conversation is
to argue that it does not exist. Instead, she argues, instances of what are typically
called “reported speech” are better understood as “constructed dialogue.” The
position Tannen that takes in creating the latter term is that “reported speech” , as
it is found in conversational interaction, is not primarily the creation of the quoted
party, as the term “reported” arguably suggests. Rather, “reported speech” is
“primarily the creation of the speaker” (ibid., p 99), and as such is better described
and “constructed dialogue”. As Tannen argues:
The point here is that [repeating an utterance produced in another context]
is not a passive act of “reporting” but rather an active one of creating an
entirely new and different speech act, using the “reported” one as source
material. (ibid., p109)
It is therefore necessary, Tannen argues, to talk not of “reported speech”,
but rather of “constructed dialogue,” a term that properly acknowledges the
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creative and indeed central role of the person “reporting” the speech. Tannen goes
further to say that
 the term “reported speech” is grossly misleading in suggesting that one
can speak another’s words and have them remain primarily the other’s
words. (ibid., p101)
Tannen also argues that the exceptionality of accurate reproduction7 also
casts doubt on the suitability of “reporting” as an appropriate descriptor for the
conversational strategy thereby designated. This is true even in cases of highly
faithful replication of another’s words, Tannen asserts, because
[m]eanings are dependent on contexts, so in reporting speech, the context is
transformed, altering the meaning. (ibid., p101)
The reader will notice that in these passages Tannen makes several points
similar to those made in the preceding chapter, and probably for similar reasons:
once one looks at reported speech in the context of communicative interaction, the
poverty of traditional, literary approaches to reported speech becomes apparent. In
                                                 
7 As discussed in the previous chapter, while the exceptionality of accurate reproduction may hold
true for surface-segmentable features of utterances, using isomorphisms between surface-
segmentable features of utterances as the criterion for ‘accurate reproduction’ is a significant
analytical oversight. Such isomorphisms are but one criterion for ‘accurate reproduction’, one that
might be natural for analysts working with an understanding of language significantly mediated by
written texts, but only one. I argue that the real question we should pose as ethnographers of
language is 1) Do participants in a system of metapragmatic practice consider projected speech (or
particular forms of projected speech) to be guided by a principle of ‘accurate reproduction’, and if
so, 2) What constitutes ‘accurate reproduction’ in this system of metapragmatic practice?
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particular, Tannen and I both see that “reporting” is not a processes of passive
replication, but one that involves transformation of an originary utterance. We also
both note the importance of the recontextualization of reported speech in shaping
its meaning.
After these early points of agreement, however, our views diverge. In
particular, I am critical of two related positions that are central to her
understanding of constructed dialogue: first, that in reporting someone else’s
speech, one has, in large measure, made the other person’s words one’s own; and
second, “that uttering dialogue in conversation is as much a creative act as is the
creation of dialogue in fiction and drama” (ibid., p101)
The first of these positions, in my view, is either empirically false, or
empirically valid only under a very narrow and ethnographically unsophisticated
construal of what it means for words to ‘belong’ to someone.
Tannen’s position on this matter here is best rendered in her own words:
[I]f dialogue is used to represent utterances that were spoken by someone
else, when an utterance is repeated by a current speaker, if it exists
primarily, if not only, in the reporting context, although its meaning
resonates with association with its reported context… In the deepest sense,
the words have ceased to be those of the speaker to who they are attributed,
having been appropriated by the speaker who is speaking them. (ibid., 101)
While it is certainly true that quoting someone is never a hermetic
transportation of an utterance from one interaction to another, in which neither the
reporter nor the new context leave the form or sense of the original utterance
unaltered, this does not mean that the connections between the two utterances are
so disrupted that the original utterer cannot exercise unique privileges with respect
to the quoted speech.
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For example, original utterers can contest the accuracy or fairness of
speech attributed to them precisely because of their special place in the genealogy
of the reported utterance (consider, for example libel or slander suits that revolve
around what the aggrieved party putatively said). In certain cases, original utterers
continue to exert considerable (even literal) ownership over utterances circulating
in the sphere of discourse (consider academic citation and the issue of plagiarism;
also the legal and social significance of copyright and intellectual property more
generally).
It is true that the linkage (which may include something like ‘ownership’)
that exists between an originary utterer and a subsequent reported utterance cannot
typically be read out from transcripts of interaction in which the speech report
transpired or even from a narrow ethnography of a particular interaction. Generally
speaking, these linkages between utterances and utterers emerge from a broader
ethnographic understanding of the social life of utterances and reported utterances
across interactions.
The dynamics and relationships that exist between an originary utterer and
subsequent reports of that person’s utterances are empirical questions that must be
investigated. In any community, local language ideologies and the interactional
particularities of reported speech combine to create particular relationships of
ownership and control between the originary utterer and subsequent projections of
that speech into new interactions.
For example, in Nanti discourse (see chapter 4), utterances projected from
past source situations are understood to be the words, not of the projector, but of
the originary utterer. This language-ideological understanding is an essential part
of the importance and use of speech projection in Nanti society. At the same time,
speech projection from non-past source situations, which typically serves to
represent the agency and evaluative positions of others, appears to be constrained
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by the qualities and actions of the individual to which it is attributed (see chapter
4).
In short, while it is true that strategies of projection can effect significant
modifications via the processes of extraction, transformation, and insertion, this
does not necessarily (or even normally), disrupt relationships of responsibility and
control between the originary speaker and reported utterance. In fact, it appears
that the ever present backdrop of social relations and ideology against which acts
of speech projection take place assure that it is not the case that “ it is grossly
misleading in suggesting that one can speak another’s words and have them
remain primarily the other’s words” (ibid., p 101).
In a related move, Tannen also includes a critique of “folk wisdom” 8
regarding the nature of reported speech, which she argues underpins the false
understanding of ‘constructed dialogue’ as ‘reported speech’. Tannen describes
this “folk wisdom” (i.e. language ideology) as maintaining that reporting speech is
a passive act of reproduction of another person’s utterances. Correspondingly,
Tannen argues, Americans disregard the role of the speech reporter, failing to
question her motives and goals. Moreover, Americans fail to consider the meaning
of the utterance in the original reported context, and how this becomes transformed
in the new reporting context. According to Tannen then, American linguistic
ideology regards speech reporting as an unproblematic, transparent, and unbiased
piping of utterances from one communicative interaction to another.
The principal question that Tannen’s discussion of American language
ideology raises is an empirical and ethnographic one: has Tannen accurately
                                                 
8 In the context of Tannen’s discussion, it is somewhat unclear to what “folk” she is referring. She
refers to “Americans” , but does not further specify the class, race, ethnicity, or gender of the
population to which she refers. Tannen also discusses the use of reported speech among
Portuguese-speaking Brazilians and Greek women, but it is uncertain if her comments about “folk
wisdom” extend to these speakers.
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described American linguistic ideology regarding reported speech? Since Tannen’s
assessment of this aspect of American language ideology is largely impressionistic
and based on anecdotal evidence, her claims are hard to evaluate directly.
However, I think it is not hard to argue that Tannen has exaggerated the degree to
which Americans regard speech reporting to be a passive reproduction of an
utterance, and the degree to which Americans disregard the role of contexts in
creating meaning.
It is a commonplace, for example, that public figures (e.g. politicians) fear
having their utterances “taken out of context”, just as claiming that an utterance
has been taken out of context is a defense mounted by those accused of offensive
(e.g. racist) speech. Moreover, it strikes me that Americans are quite sensitive to
the motives and goals people have for reporting utterances. I furthermore think that
unless we take humans to be ‘metapragmatic dupes’, we should expect members of
a speech community to have a good sense of the strategic and interactional
possibilities of the systems of metapragmatic practice in which they participate.
However, since Tannen’s claim seems to be based on an impressionistic
assessment of the nature of American language ideology, it is possible that she has
a different domain in mind than the one in which I am evaluating her claims about
“folk wisdom” regarding reported speech9.
I now turn to the final major point of Tannen’s theoretical development
that I discuss here, her claim that in reporting speech, the reporter is as creative as
                                                 
9 A second matter that Tannen’s comments raise is the significance that she attributes American
“folk wisdom” and her own counterpoised assessment of reported speech. In essence, Tannen
frames American ideologies about speech reporting as ‘mystifying’ or ‘deluding’ beliefs, that cause
Americans to systematically misapprehend the nature of reported speech. Her own beliefs about
reported speech, however, are framed as breaking through this mystification and revealing the true
nature of ‘constructed dialogue’. In treating American language ideology as a kind of pathology,
however, Tannen fails to take seriously its role in organizing American speech reporting practices.
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any literary author. In essence, Tannen’s point here is that speech reporting is not
passive replication, but rather a fully creative act:
I wish … to claim that uttering dialogue in conversation is as much a
creative act as is the creation of dialogue in fiction and drama. ... It is
constructed just as surely as is the dialogue in drama or fiction. [ibid., p101
& 110]
As I observe in the next two chapters, it is certainly true that projecting
speech involves strategic manipulation and transformation at many levels and at
many points. I argue, however, that Tannen overstates the empirical facts in
claiming that the liberties that someone can take in reporting another’s speech are
on par with those of that a novelist or playwright can take in creating a work of
fiction.
Critically, in drama or fiction an author does not typically deal with the
utterances of actual agents participating in a network of social relations and action
which includes the person performing the quotation10. In face-to-face
communicative interactions, however, it is typically the speech of socially ‘real’
personae that is being reported.
This social fact makes the reporter accountable, both in the particular
instance of quotation and across such instances in the discursive life of the
                                                 
10 The case of Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses shows the importance of the difference
between speech attributed to socially ‘real’ personae and socially ‘fictional’ ones. The characters in
the Satanic Verses, while occupying a fictional space, were still too tightly bound in the social and
ideological networks of Islamic fundamentalist society - too real - for their utterances, and hence
the reporter of those utterances, to be free of the obligations of accuracy and fairness current in that
society. In reporting inaccurately, according to the metapragmatic norms of fundamentalist Islam,
Rushdie risked his life.
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individual11, to norms of responsible metapragmatic conduct (Hill and Irvine
1996). These norms include adherence to particular uses of strategies of extraction,
transformation, and insertion, which prevent modifications to the originary speech
that might be deemed ‘distortions’, ‘misrepresentations’, and ‘exaggeration’ by
members of the speech community. Such norms can also be related to local
ideologies relating to ‘privacy’, ‘personal confidence’, and what is considered
harmful or beneficial to say about another.
In short, while reporting speech clearly involves strategic, even creative,
manipulation and transformation, this metapragmatic activity takes place within
networks of social relations and systems of ideology, as well as within specific
systems of metapragmatic practice. These factors work to constrain the freedom of
the reporter to alter, manipulate, and create utterances that she can attribute to
others. This is not to argue, of course, that these constraints render individuals
metapragmatic automatons that report utterances mechanically. Simply, it is to
argue that these individuals do not operate with the freedom of a writer of fiction.
As I demonstrate in the case of Nanti speech reporting practices, however,
although reported speech is a considerably richer phenomenon than many
approaches acknowledge, especially literarily-based ones, it is still organized by
ideologies of representation and evidentiality, as well as by the range of speech
reporting strategies that Nanti individuals recognize.
It will not have escaped the attentive reader that my criticisms of Tannen
approach a common theme from slightly different directions. Namely, that in her
discussion of reported speech, Tannen tends to disregard the place of reported
utterances in the trajectories of social action that precede and continue beyond the
particular face-to-face interaction she is examining. It is precisely in these longer
                                                 
11 The significance of this fact relates in part to ‘discursive persona’ that the individual works to
generate, which can be an important source of symbolic capital - i.e. being known as reliable,
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trajectories, and their intersection with one another, that what one person has said
about another becomes wider knowledge and her reporting activity becomes
subject to commentary, critique, and disciplining (see, for example, Goodwin &
Goodwin 1987). It is precisely because of this wider social and discursive network,
I argue, that it is meaningful to speak of originary utterers having ownership of
their words, to assume that members of a speech community are not
metapragmatic dupes, and to see that reporters are constrained in what they report
and how they report it.
Finally, I also find it questionable whether Tannen’s treatment of
“constructed dialogue” as primarily a strategy to create interactional involvement
is sufficient to account for the empirical facts relating to the social functions of
projected speech.
While several scholars from quite different intellectual traditions have
argued that “reported speech” is an aspect of creating verbally artistic effects of
vividness and heightened performance (Longacre 1976), it is also apparent
projected speech is frequently, if not typically, yoked to social and interactive
goals quite different from that of creating an engaging and affecting narrative.
As I observe in Chapter 5, with respect to discussions of projected speech
in both Kalapalo and Nanti society, the making of properly evidentially-grounded
knowledge claims in both those societies appears to centrally involve speech
projection. Similarly, it seems unlikely that concerns about involvement motivate
the use and organization of reported speech in North American legal proceedings.
Rather, the evidential aspects of reported speech appear to be what is salient to its
use and regulation in this context (Philips 1992).
Similarly, Kuna uses of “retellings and reformulations”, also discussed in
Chapter 5, centrally concern the appropriation of authoritative speech for rhetorical
                                                                                                                                       
trustworthy, or to the contrary, an exaggerator, a liar.
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purposes and for the strategic distancing of the speech reporter from the claims
made in the reported speech. These uses of projected speech revolve around
strategic attempts to manipulate relationships of authority and responsibility in the
context of discursive contestation, and concerns about ‘involvement’ as such
appears to play a modest role in these uses.
In closing, I want to observe that the converse of the shortcomings of
Tannen’s approach to reported speech - which derive, I have argued, from her
restriction of analytic focus to the immediate interaction - is her very perceptive
analysis of local strategies of speech projection in particular interactions.
For instance, Tannen notes the existence of, and provides examples of,
several forms of projected speech that are not recognized by the traditional
indirect/direct speech framework. These include: speech representing what wasn’t
said, speech as exemplification of typical behavior or attitudes, speech used to
summarize a position or consequence in a situation, choral speech - speech
attributed to a group, and using speech to represent one’s own thoughts or that of
others.
Each is a type of projected speech that is important to consider in
developing descriptions of speech projection strategies employed in human speech
communities.
In recognizing the possibilities of recontextualization in speech reporting,
the complex relationship between the reporting utterance and the reported
utterance, and the existence of non-prototypical forms of reported speech, Tannen
opens the door to many of the complexities of speech reporting practices in the
context of face-to-face interaction. In this respect, she advances the study of
reported speech substantially.
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Chapter 3: Critique and Reformulation of the Descriptive Framework
for Reported Speech
3.0 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the commonly-used
descriptive framework for reported speech and to propose an alternative one better
suited to describing speech reporting as a socially-situated speaking practice. The
development of this framework will allow a more insightful description of Nanti
speech reporting practices, which follows in chapter 4.
In order to situate my critique of previous descriptive frameworks for
reported speech, and properly motivate the new one I propose below, it is useful to
render explicit the theoretical approach I take to speech reporting practices.
I take as the basic unit of my analysis the notion of the ‘communicative
strategy’. I see my goal as being to describe the strategies that Nanti individuals
deploy in reporting speech and then show how these strategies come to be
organized into particular constellations of strategies that are deployed to achieve
particular communicative and social goals in particular interactive settings. Or in
other words, my goal is to describe how speech reporting strategies come to be
organized into speaking reporting practices. In this latter goal I rely on the idea,
discussed in the previous chapter, that ideologies play a central role in the
organization of speaking practices
 In describing speech reporting strategies, it is useful to distinguish
between aspects of these strategies that involve and presuppose the features and
micro-history of any particular interaction in different ways. Certain aspects of
speech reporting presuppose and rely on fewer or more generic aspects of an
interaction, while others presuppose and rely on more fine-grained features and on
highly contingent aspects of an interaction. Of course, every instance of speech
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reporting is unique -- a strategic action aimed towards particular ends, be they
vague or precise, in the context of a unique constellation of historical and
interactional facts. However, as one examines example after example of unique
strategic action, certain patterns of use appear across these instances, which in
every particular example are married to unique features unmatched in other
instances.
I think it is useful, therefore, to think of strategies as psycho-social tools in
the Vygotskyan sense (Wertsch 1985): schematic (underspecified) and
transposable models for action/speaking which have particular affordances12 for
meaning-making and social action. When a strategy is deployed it must be
elaborated, fleshed-out and reshaped for use in a given phase of interaction,
producing the amalgam of generic and unique features characteristic of any
particular strategic action.
These affordances arise in large part from the ideologies held by the
interactants, which lead them to construe particular ways of reporting speech as
having particular relationships to “socially vital” factors, as Voloshinov argued
(see chapter 2). Consequently, particular strategies come to be seen as especially
effective or appropriate for pursuing particular social and communicative goals.
Speech reporting practices can thus be seen to arise from the confluence of the
communicative and social needs of participants in specific social interactions with
the affordance-shaping effects of ideology.
                                                 
12 The concept of affordances comes from the work of William Gibson, a cognitive psychologist
who sought to understand the evolution of the visual system (Gibson 1979). An affordance, as it
has come to be understood, is a feature of some object or process that lends itself to certain kinds of
interactions with aspects of its environment. In the social sciences, this term has come to be used to
refer to the properties of social forms, objects, and interactional processes that yield particular
functionalities, in some cases leading to specific intentional uses.
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Speech reporting practices are consequently emergent processes of social
and communicative action that arise from individuals’ needs to carry out actions
using language in concrete interactive settings. The choice of linguistic tools and
their deployment in such settings in turn depends on what interactants deem to be
the social and communicative affordances of specific tools, properties that do not
inhere solely in language itself, but also derive from salient language ideologies.
The salient ideologies may refer principally to language itself, in which
case we tend to refer to the ideology as a language ideology, or it may principally
refer to an extra-linguistic sphere, but may carry implications for language use. As
Kathryn Woolard has put it
[Ideologies] are mediating link[s] between social forms and forms of talk ...
[that] enact and envision ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to
morality, and to epistemology. Through such linkages, they underpin not
only linguistic form and use but also the very notion of the person and the
social group...” (Woolard 1999)
(Language) ideologies can thus be understood as a significant organizing
factor in speaking practices, serving to link speech strategies (‘forms of talk’) to
social action (‘social forms’). Ideologies are never the sole factor, of course, since
talk takes place precisely because individuals seek to fulfill social goals through
interaction - goals which are not simply recapitulations of ideologies, though they
too are influenced by them. Ideologies are, however, arguably one of the most
significant interactionally exogenous factors, and are thus responsible for the
coherence and similarity of communicative praxis across interactions.
Before I begin my description of Nanti SRPs, however, it is necessary to
critically examine and reformulate the descriptive frameworks available for
reported speech. As I argue in section 3.1, the frameworks currently available are
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inadequate for ethnographic descriptions of SRPs in communicative interactions.
Also, the traditional framework is inadequate for describing the pragmatic and
strategic aspects of SRPs, as the traditional framework focuses on surface
segmentable forms, and moreover, written instances of reported speech.
In section 3.2, I propose a reformulation of this framework in terms of what
I term speech projection, which is intended as a more ethnographically flexible
descriptive framework that is more sensitive to the pragmatic nature of speech
reporting.
3.1 A Critique of the Traditional Descriptive Framework for Reported Speech
My interest in Nanti SRPs ultimately resides in the way in which the more
generic aspects of speech reporting strategies are organized into speaking practices
that reflexively constitute and are shaped by trajectories of social action. Critical to
this enterprise is an understanding of what speech reporting strategies are available
to Nanti speakers, and how these strategies are organized with respect to Nanti
social activity. The task thus begins with describing the speech reporting strategies
that Nanti speakers employ.
The contention I make in this section is that the traditional descriptive
framework for describing reported speech is inadequate for this task. In what
follows I critically evaluate this traditional framework, and I demonstrate the need
for a more refined descriptive framework than that currently available.
I support my contentions by inspecting instances of Nanti speech reporting
activity and then examining the shortcomings of the traditional descriptive
frameworks for accurately and thoroughly describing these examples of Nanti
speech reporting activity.
But before I do so, I first want to review the traditional framework for
describing reported speech. Most research on reported speech recognizes the
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existence of two types of reported speech, direct speech and indirect speech13.
These two types of reported speech are understood to be two different ways in
which an originary utterance in an originary situation - the reported event - is
reproduced in the reporting event.
These two types of reported speech are usually distinguished from one
another in terms of two major parameters. One of these parameters is origo
anchoring14 (Hanks 1992), which sets up systematic relationships between the
form of deictic elements in the reported speech, such as tense and person markers,
and the form of these deictic elements appropriate to the reporting and reported
events. The other major parameter is faithfulness15, which characterizes the degree
of penetration of the authorial voice - that is, the degree of semantic and
grammatical manipulation that the original utterance undergoes, as well as the
degree to which the reported speech is characterized or evaluated by the reporter.
In its prototypical form, direct speech is understood to be faithful to the
original utterance, preserving the deictic characteristics of the reported utterance
that are appropriate to the reported event, and also to be entirely free of authorial
penetration. Indirect speech, on the other hand, grounds its deictic elements in the
reporting event, and sometimes allows very substantial authorial penetration.
These two forms of reported speech can thus be characterized in terms of
                                                 
13 In some taxonomies of reported speech, quasi-direct speech, a third form of reported speech
apparently restricted to European written literature is included (Coulmas 1986, Janssen and Van de
Wurff 1996).
14 This term is not in common use in work involving reported speech, but it conveniently designates
processes and relations that are widely recognized in such research included (Coulmas 1986,
Janssen and Van de Wurff 1996).
15 Although the process that I use this term to designate has been an important concern for almost
every scholar who has examined reported speech from a social or functional perspective (Li 1986,
Lucy 1993, Tannen 1989, Voloshinov 1973 [1927]), no common terminology exists to discuss this
process.
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particular parameter values for the parameters of origo anchoring and
faithfulness16.
The following descriptions of direct and indirect speech exemplify well the
common wisdom:
[Direct speech] evokes the original speech situation and conveys, or claims
to convey, the exact words of the original speaker in direct discourse... In
direct speech the reporter lends his voice to the original speaker and says
(or writes) what he said, thus adopting his point of view, as it were.
(Coulmas 1986, p2)
[Indirect speech] adapts the reported utterance to the speech situation of the
report in indirect discourse...In indirect speech on the other hand, the
reporter comes to the fore. He relates a speech event as he would relate any
other event: from his own point of view. ... In indirect speech, the reporter
is free to introduce information about the reported speech from his point of
view and on the basis of his knowledge about the world, as he does not
purport to give the actual words that were uttered by the original speakers
or that his report is restricted to what was actually said. (ibid., p2-3)
I will refer to the above model of speech reporting, and the associated
direct/indirect taxonomy of reported speech as the traditional model.
Despite the widespread use of the direct/indirect speech distinction as a
tool for describing and differentiating forms of reported speech, there are several
reasons why this dichotomy is an impoverished framework for describing the
                                                 
16 In addition, in any given language, direct and indirect speech normally require different
grammatical framing devices (Coulmas 1986, Janssen and Van der Wurff 1996).
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empirical complexities of speech reporting activities in the context of
communicative interaction17.
In the broadest terms, the inadequacies of the direct/indirect speech
dichotomy as a descriptive framework can be summarized as follows: the
traditional framework:
1. lumps together descriptive parameters that logically need not co-occur
and are empirically observed not to co-occur;
2. it employs too few parameters to adequately characterize SRPs;
3. it does not employ the appropriate parameters in characterizing SRPs;
4. it does not provide adequate means for relating the reported and
reporting utterances to their discursive environments18.
I will illustrate the difficulties faced by the traditional descriptive
framework with the help of a few brief excerpts from transcripts of interactions
involving Nanti individuals.
The first excerpt is part of an interaction between Migero, the peresetente
of Montetoni, and myself. In this interaction, which took place in 1997, Migero
discusses the sanitarijo (from Spanish sanitario, ‘health worker’) who was
nominally responsible for healthcare in Montetoni from 1995-1998. In this
                                                 
17 Many of these inadequacies can be understood as deriving from the fact that the direct/indirect
speech dichotomy originates in studies of reported speech in written texts. It is perhaps not a great
surprise that problems arise when understandings of reported speech grounded in text-artifacts are
extended more or less unproblematically to speech reporting phenomena in face-to-face
communicative interactions (see section 2.1 for detailed discussions of this point).
18 These criticisms are in fact related to one another, and are facets of a more general criticism that
the traditional framework adopts an non-interactionalist and asocial perspective on speech
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segment of talk, Migero criticizes the sanitarijo by associating with him talk that,
according to Migero, the sanitarijo will not utter:
Data Segment 3.1
M: Pine    maixa pijatajirixa,          jara
   Pine    maixa pi-ja-t-aj-i-rixa,     jara
   you.see now   2S-go-EPC-REG-RLI-TEMP NEG(FUT)
ixanti      nonxamosotaxitirira.                   tota
i-xant-i    no-n-xamoso-t-axi-t-i-ri-ra.           tota




M: You see, now, when you leave, he will not say “I will visit him over there.
Hold on, I will visit.”
With this data in mind, now let us turn to the shortcomings of the
traditional framework, as outlined above.
Parameter Lumping
Let us first consider the matter of ‘parameter lumping’, raised above.
According to the traditional framework, direct speech is 1) faithful and 2) anchors
the origo in the reported situation; indirect speech is 1) not faithful and 2) anchors
the origo in the reporting situation. By categorizing all instances of speech
reporting in terms of the direct/indirect dichotomy, the traditional framework
assumes that the particular parameter values that constitute those two forms of
reported speech are necessarily co-occurring.
                                                                                                                                       
reporting. See section 2.1 for an extended criticism of what one might call the grammarian’s view
on reported speech.
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There is no reason to assume, however, that these parameter values for
origo anchoring and faithfulness universally co-occur in human SRPs. In Nanti, for
example, the origo is always anchored in the event from which the speech is
reported. As I will show in some detail below, however, whether or not it is
framed as, or taken as, faithfully reproducing an utterance depends on the specifics
of the particular instance of speech reporting.
In the preceding example, for instance, Migero is reporting speech that has
not been previously uttered. In fact Migero frames the speech (jara ixanti, ‘he will
not say’) as something that will never be uttered by the person to which he
(negatively) attributes it. This speech report thus cannot be said to be ‘faithful’ in
the conventional sense of the term. This example of Nanti discourse, then,
demonstrates that anchoring of the origo in the reported situation and faithfulness
need not co-occur.
In terms of that framework that I will elaborate below, we can say that the
forms of speech reporting strategies that are recognized in the traditional
framework as ‘direct speech’ and ‘indirect speech’ are each characterizable as
particular constellations of strategies, which include particular origo anchoring and
faithfulness strategies. These strategies, however, need not co-occur in the
constellations recognized as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ speech. It should therefore not
be a property of the descriptive framework that it stipulates the co-occurrence of
these, or any other, strategies. Rather, hypotheses regarding co-occurrence should
arise through empirical observation. Any descriptive framework that replaces the
traditional one should seek to avoid preemptively stipulating the co-occurrence of
particular speech reporting strategies.
Insufficient Number of Parameters
Next, we turn to the criticism that the traditional framework employs an
insufficient number of parameters in characterizing SRPs. Recall that the
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traditional framework describes speech reporting in terms of a reported utterance
that originates in a reported event, which is then reported by means of a reporting
utterance in the reporting event. The relationship between the reporting utterance
and the reported utterance is characterized in terms of the faithfulness parameter,
and the relationship between deictic elements in the reporting utterance and the
reporting and reported situations is characterized in terms of the origo anchoring
parameter.
Looking back to the example of Migero’s criticism of the sanitarijo,
however, we can begin to see why the small set of descriptive parameters in the
traditional framework is insufficient for the task of ethnographic description of
SRPs.
First, as suggested above, it seems that an understanding of how
‘faithfulness’ works as part of speech reporting requires reference to the kind of
reported situation. For example, in the case of Migero’s criticism of the sanitarijo,
the reported situation is framed as one that will never transpire. What faithfulness
means in this situation will be different from what faithfulness means in reporting
an utterance from an situation framed as having actually occurred in the past. An
ethnographically-aware understanding of ‘faithfulness’ in Nanti speech reporting
practices will therefore need to be able to distinguish between different kinds of
‘reported situations’ involved in the act of speech reporting. As such, it is
necessary to add a multi-value parameter for ‘reported situation’ to the descriptive
framework.
In short, at least one additional parameter is necessary for accurately
describing SRPs in communicative interactions: one that allows the analyst to
characterize what kind of situation the reported situation is. Further examples of
necessary parameters can be easily multiplied, but let us consider one more before
moving on.
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 One afternoon during my 2001 fieldwork, Chris Beier, myself and some
visitors were sitting in our house listening to recordings that Chris and I made
during the previous feast. Chris and I had brought out the recordings at the request
of our visitors, who wanted to listen to the chanting we recorded. Since the
recordings were on mini-disc and we had no external speakers, our visitors took
turns listening using headphones. At one point a listener signaled to me that he was
finished by taking off his headphones and handing them to me. In the interaction
that followed, Esexira was sitting close to me, while Ityarira sat further away,
behind Esexira.
Data Segment 3.2
L: tyani maixa xoganxitsya?
   tyani maixa xog-anxitsya
   who   now want-STAT
L: who wants (to listen) now?
E (to I): pixoga      pinxemero?
pi-xog-a    pi-n-xem-e-ro
2S-want-RLR 2S-IRP-hear-IRI-3FNO
E (to I): Do you want to hear it?
I: //nods//
E (to L): ixanti      noxoga.
          i-xant-i    no-xog-a
     3MS-say-RLI 1S-want-RLR
E (to L): He says “I want (to hear).”
In this case, we see that the reporting utterance is not reporting an
utterance. Rather, it is reporting a gesture as an utterance. This interaction
demonstrates that the assumption that a reporting utterance is necessarily related to
an utterance per se in the reported context is not necessarily valid. This shows that
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speech reporting also involves processes of transformation, such as the
transformation of modalities exemplified above.
Another necessary parameter for an adequate descriptive framework, then,
is one that can be used to characterize the strategies of transformation operative in
speech reporting practices.
The purpose of the preceding examples is simply to show that there is a
thread, that when tugged, leads to an unraveling of the assumption in the
traditional framework that the only parameters necessary to describe reported
speech are faithfulness and origo anchoring. Further tugging and subsequent re-
knitting will take place in section 3.2.
Wrong Parameters
Next, we consider the criticism that the traditional framework does not
employ the right parameters to describe speech reporting practices. This criticism
can be sharpened by saying that the parameters employed in the traditional
framework lose coherence when applied to reported speech in communicative
interactions, and that therefore other parameters must be employed that do not
suffer incoherence in these kinds of interactions.
The most critical parameter, as far as this issue is concerned, is that of
‘faithfulness’, which we have already touched on. Faithfulness, as it is typically
construed, refers to the ‘exact’ or ‘accurate’ reproduction of another’s speech.
However, this exactness and accuracy is typically understood quite narrowly to
refer solely to isomorphisms between segmentable surface features of utterances.
That is, it refers to how precisely two instances of speech would match up if they
were written as standard prose19.
                                                 
19 I contrast ‘standard prose’, as one encounters in novels, with the ‘transcriptional prose’ of the
sociolinguist or linguistic anthropologist, which can incorporate non-segmental features.
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I argue that this notion of faithfulness is unlikely to be useful in
understanding speech reporting practices in communicative interactions for a
variety of reasons. First, speech reporting involves the replication, manipulation,
and deletion of many more aspects of a communicative interaction that simply
surface segmentable forms. These aspects of interaction include prosody, kinesics,
gesture, or affective stance. These can be replicated, altered, excised, or muted in
either typical or idiosyncratic ways.
Second, certain forms of authorial penetration are unavoidable in speech
reporting. The person reporting the speech must, at the very least, decide on a
beginning point and end point for the reported utterance, cutting preceding and
following utterances out of the report. Similarly, at least some of the information
and happenings that lead the interactants in the original interaction to orient
themselves to the utterance in particular ways, and which lead to certain
interpretations and understandings in the reported situation, will remain
unreported.
And third, in reporting an utterance at a particular point in another
interaction, or in framing it in a particular way, the reported utterance can be
understood or interpreted in ways other than the ways it was understood in the
original interaction (see Bakhtin 1981, Tannen 1986).
The notion of faithfulness based on isomorphisms between surface
segmentable forms does not take into account any of these significant processes
which are important aspects of faithfulness in communicative interactions . In
short, the traditional notion of faithfulness thus singles out a particular, and
possibly interactionally quite unimportant, type of correspondence between the
reported and reporting utterance.
While I believe that notions of faithfulness are important in most instances
of speech reporting, as I argue is the case for speech reporting in Montetoni and
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Maranxejari, what constitutes faithfulness for a particular instance or form of
speech reporting should not be stipulated in advance by the descriptive framework.
It is reasonable to expect that notions of faithfulness relevant to speech
reporting in communicative interactions depend both on locally-defined
communicative norms operative in a given speech community, and also on
concerns arising in particular communicative interactions. These factors are
ultimately matters for empirical ethnographic investigation20.
The difficulties associated with the parameter of faithfulness in actual
communicative interactions is clearly illustrated by Migero’s act of speech
reporting. Certainly one cannot be faithful, in the traditional sense, to an utterance
that was not uttered and quite possibly never will be uttered by the person to which
it is being attributed. A notion of faithfulness in based on isomorphisms between
surface segmentable forms in the reported and reporting situations clearly becomes
incoherent here.
This does not mean that notions of faithfulness and accuracy are irrelevant
to the interaction. In choosing an utterance to negatively attribute to the sanitarijo,
for example, Migero cannot choose any utterance that the sanitarijo is unlikely to
utter. It is unlikely, for instance, that the sanitarijo who is discussed in the
preceding excerpt of Migero’s speech will ever say that he will not kill Migero. I
strongly suspect, however, that Migero would be hard-pressed to use this as
evidence that sanitarijo will try to kill him.
                                                 
20 It is curious, in this regard, that the faithfulness of direct speech is normally assumed, rather than
verified through comparisons of utterance forms across situations. One way out of this difficulty is
to reduce one’s claims to the position that direct speech “purports” to be faithful (see, for example,
the quote from Coulmas 1986, given below). At this point, of course, faithfulness ceases to be a
feature of surface segmentable forms and instead becomes a dimension of local linguistic
ideologies and trajectories of social action, which once again call for ethnographic, rather than
purely linguistic, approaches.
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A negative attribution of speech of this sort would violate a sort of
faithfulness different than the kind constituted by segment-to-segment
correspondences of the traditional notion. In this case, faithfulness seems to
include relations between known behavioral proclivities of the individual to whom
the speaker negatively attributes the speech and the behavior implied by the
negatively attributed speech. In any event, faithfulness ‘leaks’, and cannot be
restricted to the sphere of surface segmentable forms.
Thus, the notion of faithfulness, as developed in the study of reported
speech in text-artifacts appears to be neither a coherent nor useful parameter for
describing speech reporting practices in communicative interactions. The
elaboration of a set of ideas that replaces faithfulness is discussed in the next
section.
Relations to Discourse Environments
Finally, we turn to the criticism that the traditional framework does not
provide means for adequately relating reported and reporting utterances to their
discursive environments in the reported and reporting events, respectively.
In traditional framework, the relationship of the reported utterance to
surrounding utterances, and to the wider trajectory of communicative interaction
and social action of which it is a part, is not considered to be a significant feature
of the reported speech itself. This framework therefore does not attend to the fact
that any reported utterance is part of a flow of discourse, parts of which are not
reported. Neither does it attend to the fact that the reporting utterance becomes part
of an ongoing interaction. The reported speech is thus considered to be
autonomous from the speech that surrounds it in both the reported and reporting
events. As conversational analysts have showed, however, the sequential
placement of an utterance in a stream of talk plays a critical role in its
interpretation (Nofsinger 1991).
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Any act of speech reporting involves bracketing off the utterance to be
reported from the surrounding speech that is not be reported. However, the
meaning of an utterance for the interactants in the original interaction depends on
surrounding utterances, and we can expect that its manner of removal from that
discursive environment may leave traces on the utterance when it is reported.
Similarly, by introducing the reported utterance at a particular point in the ongoing
interaction, the reported utterance comes to be meaningful to the interactants in
particular ways.
The bracketing-off referred to above not only involves decisions about the
syntagmatic starting point and ending point of the reported utterance, but also
about what elements and processes in the interactive stream are to be preserved or
eliminated in the act of reporting. For example, in reporting part of an interaction,
the reporter must choose to report or excise gestures, kinesics, and prosody
involved in the segment of the interaction.
This also complicates the traditional understanding of authorial penetration,
the process of the characterization or modification of speech by the person
reporting the speech. In these accounts, authorial penetration is typically conceived
of as a process that results in the insertion or modification of surface segmentable
forms not present in the original speech. However, the fact that a particular
reported utterance can differently understood as a lie, excuse, or flattery,
depending not on surface segmentable alterations but on its deployment at
particular points in an interaction, renders obsolete the reliance on surface
segmentable forms as a measure of authorial penetration.
An adequate descriptive framework for speech reporting will incorporate
processes involved in the removal of speech from one setting and its introduction
into another one. Any ethnographically satisfactory framework must acknowledge
the significance of the discursive environment for the form and meaning of
reported speech.
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3.2 Projected Speech: A Descriptive and Typological Framework for Speech
Reporting Strategies
In the previous section, I identified several shortcomings in the traditional
framework for reported speech, which crucially relies on the direct/indirect speech
dichotomy as a descriptive framework for reported speech in communicative
interaction. The purpose of this section is to propose an alternative framework for
describing speech reporting strategies and their organization into speech reporting
practices.
Before developing this new framework, however, it will be helpful to
reflect on the processes involved in any instance of speech reporting.
In reporting speech, the reporter presents to her interlocutor an utterance
that is attributed to some speaker. The speaker may be known to the participants as
a socially real persona, or may be a figure from a dream, a hypothetical person, a
generic social actor, or a corporatization of a group of individuals. The utterance
itself may be framed as something that was really said (which is the prototypical
case of reported speech in the traditional framework), or may be framed as an
utterance that could be said, will be said, was not said, or will not be said (as in the
case of Migero’s speech report, above). In reporting the utterance, it may be
transformed in a variety of ways, including being ‘edited’ via hypotaxis or
hypertaxis21, undergoing lexical substitution, having characterizing and evaluative
commentary fused into it, or having its origo re-anchored.
It is also a property of the originary utterance and its reported counterpart
respectively that they occupy spaces in the interaction from which the utterance
was taken and in the current interaction into which it is introduced. Speech
                                                 
21 Hypotaxis and hypertaxis refer respectively to the addition and removal of morphemes or
lexemes from an utterance.
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reporting can thus be seen as a process of taking an utterance from one interaction
and introducing it into a new one.
I refer to this fundamental process of extracting an utterance from one
situation, transforming it, and introducing it into another situation as speech
projection. In the process of speech projection an utterance, or any meaningful
action22, is projected from a source situation23 into the current interaction by
means of specific techniques of projection.
The source situation for projection can be any sphere that members of a
speech community consider possible sources of speech that can be made part of
the ongoing interaction. This can include past situations, future situations, possible
situations, counterfactual situations, negated situations, and dream situations, to
name but a few possibilities.
Thus, unlike the traditional reported speech framework, which
overwhelmingly tends to assume that the source world for an utterance is a
veridical past (typically, the veridical past), the framework of projected speech
readily accommodates the kinds of sources for speech noted in the examples of the
previous section.
In any particular instance, speech from a source situation comes to be part
of the current interaction by being projected from the source situation into the
current interaction by a particular technique of projection which mediates the form
that the speech takes in the current interaction. In most cases this mediation is non-
trivial, and can be characterized in terms of three inter-related processes:
extraction, transformation, and insertion.
                                                 
22 For example, a gesture.
23 I use the term ‘source situation’ rather than the possibly more obvious ‘source interaction’ for
two reasons. First, it is sometimes the case that projected speech does not derive from an
interaction, but from a conditional or counterfactual state of affairs. Second, in such cases, an entire
situation of possible events and consequences is invoked, rather than simply an interaction.
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Extraction refers to the process by which speech is detached from a source
situation, be it ‘real’, ‘counterfactual’, or ‘dream’. Extraction involves excising
parts of the verbal interaction deemed (either idiosyncratically by the speaker or as
characteristic of a community’s speaking practices) irrelevant, uninteresting, or
unwanted, and involves including that deemed relevant, interesting, and worth
foregrounding. These exclusions and inclusions can range from the stripping of
prosodic and kinesic characteristics, from deciding on the sections of an
interaction that will be reported, to the omission of the background knowledge of
the participants.
Transformation refers to the processes of alteration and editing that
speech undergoes. This includes shifts in anchoring of the origo (and the resulting
characteristic grammatical shifts in tense, mode, spatial deictics, personal deictics,
etc.), the emphasis or exaggeration of affective posture (e.g. in mockery of
someone else’s speech), referential transformation (e.g. in the ‘genericization’ that
one finds in ‘indirect speech reporting’ in English, where more specific referents
are frequently replaced with less specific ones), and the ‘characterizing’ functions
of authorial penetration (e.g. “He whined that Al Gore was a sore loser.”), among
others.
Insertion refers to the process by which the projected speech is placed into
the ongoing interaction. When speech is projected into an interaction, its position
relative to previous utterances and wider fields of meaning and action affect the
way the reported speech is understood - as agreement, rebuttal, mockery, praise,
etc. Similarly, in Nanti discourse, the report that someone did not say something
can be communicatively very significant if done at the right time, as the prior
excerpt of Migero’s speech shows.
The process of insertion also includes the framing of projected speech by
segmentable devices such as verbs of saying, complementizers, and quotative
particles that either optionally or obligatorily accompany projected speech.
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It is important to underscore that although the facets of speech projection
strategies that I have sketched out above are analytically distinguishable processes,
in any particular instance, they are very likely to influence each other and to be
powerfully shaped by communicative goals of the speaker and the trajectory of the
communicative interaction.
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Chapter 4: Speech Projection Strategies in Nanti Interaction
4.0 Introduction
This chapter describes aspects of the speech reporting practices (SRPs) of
the Nanti residents of the communities of Montetoni and Maranxejari. I also
explore in this chapter ways in which these speaking practices form part of
trajectories of social action in Nanti society.
My description of Nanti SRPs begins with the more generic features of the
communicative strategies employed by Nanti individuals in reporting speech. I
then move on to examining instances of use of these strategies in social action,
which encompass the more contingent aspects of these same strategies, and the
ways in which SRPs are generated as part of social action. I will organize my
presentation using the framework of speech projection, beginning with a
discussion of the possible source situations for projected speech and turning to the
strategies of extraction, transformation, insertion.
I want to point out that although in the following presentation I frequently
discuss projection strategies as distinct from one another, and talk of them as being
distinct from one another, that this is largely for heuristic purposes. As mentioned
above, in any given instance, speech projection strategies are shaped into an
interlocking set aimed at performing particular communicative and social acts.
Thus, although speech projection strategies are analytically distinguishable, any
particular strategy tends to presuppose other strategies with which it is consonant.
Because of this interlocking tendency of speech projection strategies in practice,
my discussion of any particular strategy will also tend include mention of other
strategies with which it tends to intermesh.
In section 4.1 I provide a basic description of Nanti speech projection
strategies, organized in terms of the framework of speech projection.
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In section 4.2, I turn to examining Nanti speech reporting practices,
identifying patterns of use of the strategies described in the preceding section, and
exploring how these patterns of use can be understood to arise from the interplay
of social goals, speech projection strategies, and salient Nanti ideologies. In
particular, I examine how Nanti individuals use projected speech to communicate
about verbally-transmitted knowledge, and how they use projected speech to
communicate about human agency and the evaluative positions people take.
Finally, in section 4.3 I look at a particular trajectory of social action, a
series of events surrounding the relocation of several families from Montetoni to
Maranxejari in 2000, and examine the role of speech projection practices in the
development of these events.
4.1 Speech Projection Strategies
4.1.0 Introduction
Having developed in the previous chapter a more flexible framework for
examining projected speech, and one better-suited for look at speech projection in
communicative interaction, I now turn to describing speech projection strategies
employed by Nanti individuals.
My presentation of Nanti speech projection strategies also looks forward to
my discussions of evidentiality, and of the representation of agency in Nanti
discourse. As I will argue in section 3.4, issues surrounding evidentiality and how
Nanti speakers represent the agency of others in discourse are central to
understanding the organization of Nanti speech projection strategies in particular
interactions.
4.1.1 Source situations for projected speech
The kinds of situations that serve as sources of projectable speech differ
from society to society (see chapter 5 for examples). It is therefore necessary, in
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any particular ethnographic study of speech projection practices, to specify the
kinds of source situation that can serve as sources for projected speech.
In my investigations, I have observed that the following situations can serve as
sources for projected speech: past situations, negative past situations, future
situations, negative future situations, present situations, negative present situations,
and conditional situations. I examine each of these now.
Past Source Situations
This is the prototypical situation for speech reporting in the traditional
framework, and it is hard to imagine a speech community in which past situations
cannot serve as source situations. In Nanti society, as I will argue in the next
situation, projected speech in past situations play an important role in evidentiality
in Nanti discourse.
The following example of a past situation serving as a source situation for
projected speech, comes from a conversation I had with Bixotoro in 1998, in
which I was asking about when how first came to know about the existence of the
people at the Tsyinxateni settlement24. Bixotoro responds by explaining that he
first heard about him, before he met him, and projects the speech by which he
learned of the downriver settlement.
Data Segment 4.1
B: noxemaxotiri.
   no-xem-axo-t-i-ri
   1S-hear-APP-EPC-RLI-3MO
B: I heard about him.
ixanti      ainyo,    ainyo     tsinxatenixu.
                                                 
24 The Tsyinxateni settlement was the downrivermost Nanti settlement in the Tinpija basin, and
several days’ walk from the main Nanti settlement areas further upriver.
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i-xant-i    ainyo     ainyo     tsinxateni-xu
3MS-say-RLI exist(AN) exist(AN) tsinxateni-LOC
He said, “there  is, there is (someone living) at Tsinxateni.
janta ini                   matsigen^xa.
janta i-n-i                 matsigenxa
there 3MS-be.in.a.place-RLI person
There is a person (living) there.”
The source situation from which Bixotoro projects in this example
transpired at least twenty years ago, demonstrating that Nanti individuals project
speech from very temporally distant situations.
Negative Past Situation
The following instance of speech projection from a negative past situation
arose in a conversation during our 1998 fieldwork between myself and Tyejerina, a
young man of rising political prominence in Montetoni. I had announced a few
hours earlier during the communal noon feast meal that Beier and I would be
returning downriver in roughly a week. Tyejerina subsequently visited us in the
house we were staying to discuss our relationship with the community25. In the
following excerpt, Tyejerina makes clear that he sees my presence in the
community as acceptable only if I arrive in the community with Beier, and if I
bring no other of ‘my people’.
Data Segment 4.2
                                                 
25 The negotiation of the basis of a mutually acceptable relationship between the residents of the
Nanti communities on one hand, and Chris Beier and myself on the other, would likely have been a
complex matter under any circumstances. At the time, however, the Montetoni Nanti were in the
midst of conflicts with the Matsigenka schoolteacher (see chapter 1), who had over the course of
several years developed an exploitative and abusive relationship with residents of the Nanti
communities. The Montetoni Nanti sought to assure that our relationship would be different, and
were therefore very careful and explicit regarding the conditions under which we could work in the
community.
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T: itya nonejaxenpi        tera tera nonxante
   itya no-nej-ax-e-npi    tera tera no-n-xant-e
   when 1S-see-COMP-IRI-2O NEG  NEG  1S-IRP-say-IRI
janta mabani      pisyaninxa





T: When I saw [i.e. met] you I did not say, “you should come here with
several companions.”
Future Source Situation
The following instance of speech projection from a future situation
transpired during a videotaped interview with Migero in 1998. The purpose of the
interview was to create a ‘letter’ from Migero to downriver Matsigenka
community leaders, CECONAMA, COMARU, and SPDP26 expressing the desires
and opinions of the residents of Montetoni.
One part of the interview concerned our work in the Nanti communities. I
asked Migero if it was good for Beier and I to return the subsequent year with
additional metal goods and medical supplies. Migero replied affirmatively, and
projected speech from the future situation of our arrival in Montetoni a year hence
to communicate his approval of our proposed course of action:
                                                 
26 The first two acronyms refer to the Centro de Comunidades Nativas Machiguengas (Center for
Machiguenga Native Communities) and the Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba
(Machiguenga Counsel of the Urubamba River), the two rival pan-Matsigenka political federations.
SPDP stands for Shell Prospecting and Development - Peru, the Peruvian subsidiary of the well-




M: je, arisano.  jeje arisano,  xameti, xameti.
   je  ari-sano  jeje ari-sano  xameti  xameti
   yes truly-AUG yes  truly-AUG good    good
M: Yes, yes, definitely, definitely. That’s good, good.
atsi27 nonxa^nte      xameti maixa
atsi  no-n-xant-e    xameti maixa




OK! I will say then (i.e. when you bring the goods) “It is good that you have
brought these various things.”
It is interesting to observe that Migero projects his own speech from a
future situation to communicate to the audience of the videotape his attitude
towards a future set of circumstances being discussed. As I will discuss in section
4.2, projecting speech from non-past source situations is a very common way of
discussing someone’s evaluative position vis-a-vis some set of circumstances.
                                                 
27 This lexeme is an affective particle indicating enthusiasm for, or commitment to, an action or
proposition.
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Negative Future Source Situation
The first data segment we examined in this chapter, in which Migero
criticizes the sanitarijo by attributing speech to him that he will not utter in the
future, is a good example of a negative future situation.
As in the preceding data sample, which exemplified the projection of
speech from a future situation, the speaker uses the source situation as a way to
talk about the orientation of the individual to whom the speech is attributed to
some situation. In the case of Migero’s criticism of the sanitarijo, it is interesting
to note, he is not projecting his own speech from some future situation, but that of
another person.
Present Source Situation
The following data segment, which exemplifies speech projection from a
present source situation is an excerpt from one of the first conversation between,
Beier, myself, and Migero. The conversation was occasioned by the arrival of a
letter from the Matsigenka schoolteacher making several demands, including that
the Montetoni Nanti relocate to Maranxejari. The following data segment is part of
Migero’s response to this demand.
Data Segment 4.4
M: onti         te^ra nonxoge         nojate.
   o-nt-i       tera  no-n-xog-e      no-ja-t-e
   3FNS-COP-RLI NEG   1S-IRP-want-IRI 1S-go-EPC-IRI
M: It’s that I don’t want to go.
aryota      te^ra nonxoge         nojate.
aryo-ta     tera  no-n-xog-e      no-ja-t-e
indeed-DAFF NEG   1S-IRP-want-IRI 1S-go-EPC-IRI
M: That’s right, I don’t want to go.
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L: te^ra nonxoge28?
   tera  no-n-xog-e
   NEG   1S-IRP-want-IRI
L: I don’t want (to go)?
M: tera nonxoge.
   tera no-n-xog-e
   NEG  1S-IRP-want-IRI
M: I don’t want (to go).
ari    no- notimax^e        axa
ari    no- no-tim-ax-e      axa
indeed 1S  1S-live-COMP-IRI here
M: Indeed, I live here.
notima^xe        axa.
no-tim-ax-e      axa
1S-live-COMP-IRI here
I live here.
noxanti    maixa te^ra nonxoge         nojate.
no-xant-i  maixa tera  no-n-xog-e      no-ja-t-e
1S-say-IRI now   NEG   1S-IRP-want-IRI 1S-go-EPC-IRI
I say now, “I don’t want to go.”
In this excerpt, Migero first says that he doesn’t want to go to Maranxejari,
and then, only two utterances later, projects his recent utterance back into the
ongoing interaction. As I discuss in section 4.2, this use of the present situation as
a source situation for speech projection normally arises when speakers are
                                                 
28 Having started speaking Nanti only six weeks prior, I was still making errors in the use of
person-marking verb prefixes. What I intended to say was ‘tera pinxoge’, ‘you don’t want (to go)?’
Migero does not seem confused by my error, however.
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clarifying or emphasizing their desires or their evaluative position with respect to
some matter, as we see in this data segment.
Negative Present Situation
The following data segment, which exemplifies the use of a negative
present source situation, is part of the same conversation from which data segment
3.4 was excerpted. At this point in the conversation Tyejerina sought to make clear
to us that he was in no way sending us away or causing us to leave:
Data segment 4.5
T: tera nonxante       pijataje.
   tera no-n-xant-e    pi-ja-t-aj-e
   NEG  1S-IRP-say-IRI 2S-go-EPC-REG-IRI





I do not say that.
oxanyota           xatinga  onti        pixanti
o-xanyo-t-a        xatinga  o-nt-i      pi-xant-i
3MS-be.like-EPC-RR straight 3MS-COP-RLI 2S-say-RLI
janta nojataje          notimira.
janta no-ja-t-aj-e      no-tim-i-ra
there 1S-go-EPC-REG-IRI 1S-exist.in.a.place-RLI-DEP
Rather, it is the case that at noon you said “I am going back to my land.”
noxanti    nani, nani, xameti.
no-xant-i  nani  nani  xameti
1S-say-RLI fine  fine  good




nonxa^nte      pijataje
no-n-xant-e    pi-ja-t-aj-e
1S-IRP-say-IRI 2S-go-EPC-REG-IRI
I do not send you away against your will and say “go back.”
It this excerpt Tyejerina emphasizes what he is not saying in the present
situation, that is, he projects speech from a negative present - a present that does
not exist. Just as speech projection from a (positive) present source situation is
typically employed to clarify the speaker’s position on some matter of importance,
negative source situation are normally employed to clarify what position the
speaker does not hold.
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Conditional Source Situation
The following instance of speech projection from a conditional situation
comes from the same conversation with Tyejerina mentioned in the preceding
discussion of negative future and negative present situations. At this point in the
conversation he sought to make clear that although we are presently welcome to
visit and stay in the community, this is contingent on our behavior and our
fulfillment of our commitments to the community regarding metal goods and
medical supplies.
Data Segment 4.6
T: jame      nonejaxoti         xanyorira   saburi,
   jame      no-nej-axo-t-i     xanyo-rira  saburi
   NEG(COND) 1S-see-APP-EPC-RLI be.like-NOM machete
xotsiro, jame       nonejaxoti         nonxa^nte
xotsiro  jame       no-nej-axo-t-i     no-n-xant-e




T: had I not seen, for example, the machetes and knives (that you brought),
had I not seen them, I would say “go back.”
Subsequently, he makes a similar point regarding the fact that I come to Montetoni
accompanied by a woman:
T: noxanti    jame      pitentiro,           paniro
   no-xant-i  jame      pi-tent-i-ro         paniro
   1S-say-RLI NEG(COND) 2S-accomany-RLI-3FNO one(AN)
papuntaxa,              inxa^nte        iro
pi-apunt-ax-a           i-n-xant-e      iro
2S-arrive.alone-COMP-RR 3MS-IRR-say-IRI 3FN.PRO
yonta        intinxami peresetente inxa^nte
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i-onta       intinxami peresetente i-n-xant-e




T: I say, had you not accompanied her (i.e. Beier), had you come by yourself,
he would say - that one, the chief, the president - he would say “go back.”
In this data segment, Tyejerina projects speech from two different
situations that would arise if I behaved in ways other than I do. In one case he even
projects what Migero would utter under particular circumstances.
It is worth mentioning that certain source situations that are known to occur
in other societies, and other Amazonian societies in particular, are to the best of
my knowledge not employed by Nanti speakers as sources of projectable speech.
These include dreams and fictional situations.
Dreams are by no means a common topic of conversation. In fact, the only
circumstance in which I have observed Nanti individuals to talk about dreams
(apart from my own inquiries) is following the death of an adult29. In none of the
discussions concerning dreams, though, was speech projected from the dreams. In
these discussions, dreams were discussed entirely in terms of what the speaker
saw.
My inquiries into dreams in 2001 yielded similar results, with Nanti
individuals describing dreams in terms of what they saw. It is possible that the
subjects of the dreams of the men with which I discussed this matter, which
                                                 
29 Dreams which feature a deceased person are thought to be perilous to the dreamer. Especially
shortly after the death of an adult, the dead person is considered restless and may seek
companionship in death. By appearing in a dream, the dead person can cause the dreamer to sicken
and die.
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consisted overwhelmingly of jaguars (matsontsori), precluded the possibility of
speech being available for projection in the source situations.
Fictional situations are likewise not sources for projected speech. This is no
doubt in large part because Nanti individuals rarely invoke fictional situations - i.e.
situations that are epistemically bracketed off for artistic or performance purposes.
In fact, the only cases of arguably fictional situations invoked by Nanti
individuals, of which I am aware, are humorous ones invoked during the joking
interactions that have become an increasingly prominent part of feasts in the last
few years (see Beier 2001).
I have not yet encountered any speech projection from these fictional
situations, even during these interactions. This does not rule out the possibility that
speech projection does occur, or that such a practice will develop.
Interestingly, I have not yet encountered in Nanti discourse examples of
speech being projected from a collectivity or group. Thus, for example, speech is
not attributed to biraxotsya as a group, nor to the residents of Maranxejari. Rather,
projected speech is always associated with an individual. Similarly I have not
encountered examples of speech projection analogous to the ‘they say’ speech
projection (e.g. “They say that eating fish is good for one’s memory”) one finds in
many North American English-speaking speech communities. Both of these forms
of speech projection, it should be noted, involve attributing speech to an entity
other than a distinct individual. I assert that both the relationship between
evidentiality and projected speech in Nanti discourse and the use of projected
speech to represent agency militate against attributing speech to indistinct sources
(see section 4.2 for further discussion).
As I will make clear in 4.2, the source situations employed in particular
instances of speech projection have a great deal to do with the communicative and
social goals of the speaker and their mediation by Nanti language ideologies.
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4.1.2 Strategies of Extraction
As might be expected, the majority of instances of speech projection in
Nanti interaction involve the extraction and projection of segmentable forms.
However, other aspects of a source situation are also extractable, including
prosodic features, intonational contours, gestures, and kinesic behavior of the
individuals in the source situation.
In this section I examine the aspects of source interactions that Nanti
individuals extract from source situations, and the strategies they employ to do so.
I also discuss some of the more generic communicative goals that these strategies
tend to be employed in aid of.
I will first consider the extraction of verbal aspects of interactions from
source situations, beginning with prosodic and intonational features.
It is frequently the case that projected speech in Nanti interactions is
prosodically and intonationally ‘flat’ or unmarked. However, in certain instances
of speech projection, the prosodic and intonational features of the projected speech
are noticeably foregrounded.
The following excerpt, which incorporates an example of this sort, is from
one of the first lengthy conversations Beier and I had with Migero, in 1997. This
interaction took place a few days after Beier and I relocated to Montetoni from
Maranxejari, and was occasioned by the arrival of a letter from the Matsigenka
schoolteacher, which I was asked to read and translate30. This is part of the same
interaction from which data segment 3.6 was taken.
In the portion of the interaction from which this excerpt was taken, Migero
was enunciating his unwillingness to go to Maranxejari for a community meeting
                                                 
30 At this time, the Matsigenka schoolteacher was vigorously attempting to coerce the Montetoni
Nanti to relocate to the newly-established downriver settlement of Maranxejari.  The letter
consisted of a series of demands related to this general objective
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to which the schoolteacher had summoned him in the letter. He introduces the
topic by projecting the schoolteacher’s speech31:
Data segment 4.7
M: maixa noxemaxota^xe            ixa^nti     ogari
   maixa no-xem-axo-t-ax-e        i-xant-i    oga-ri
   now   1S-hear-APP-EPC-COMP-IRI 3MS-say-RLI that-DCTR
maixa sanxeba oxari     maixa xaman^ti
maixa sanxeba oxa-ri    maixa xamant-i
now   text    this-DCTR now   tell-RLI
pijataxe           irapatojit^e.
pi-ja-t-ax-e       i-n-apato-ji-t-e
2s-go-EPC-COMP-IRI 3M-IRP-congregate-CL(sphere)-EPC-IRI
xamani   irapatojite.
xamani   i-n-apato-ji-t-e
tomorrow 3M-IRP-congregate-CL(sphere)-EPC-IRI
M: Now I have heard that he says - rather that letter now tells - “Go. They
will gather. Tomorrow they will gather.”
In this case, “pijataxe” is uttered in an ‘explosive’ manner, with the
utterance beginning with an abrupt pulse that reaches a high volume very quickly,
presumably by the rapid opening of the glottis after pressure has been allowed to
build up behind it. The length of the vowels in all the projected speech is also
considerably shortened with respect to normal conversational speech, which is
common in adult speech in ordering children to perform tasks. Finally, the pitch of
the utterance is lower than that of the surrounding speech, and noticeably flat. I
have observed that it is common for both Nanti men and women to employ a low,
                                                 
31 This example is also very interesting for reasons having to do with the strategies of
transformation it exemplifies (see section 4.1.3, below).
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flat pitch when they give an imperative to someone (once again, especially
children) that they seek to constitute as an order.
The effect of the projection of these prosodic and intonational features is to
mark the affective posture of the quoted speaker as both angry and dismissive.
Another interesting example of the foregrounding of prosodic and
intonational features comes from a narrative that Bixotoro told me in 1998 about
an encounter with some residents of the Inxonene area32. Towards the end of his
narrative, he recounts how the mother of one of the individuals he encountered
later came to Marijentari in an attempt to convince the people there of the non-
violent intentions of her son.
Data Segment 4.8
B: oxanti   inti   xametiri.
   o-xant-i i-nt-i xameti-ri
   3FN-say-RLI 3MS-COP-RLI be.good-ADJ
B: She said “He is good.
tera inxenxijiro     itsyaxore.
tera i-n-xenxij-i-ro i-tsyaxo-re
NEG 3MS-IRP-remember-RLI 3MP-arrow-POSS
He doesn’t remember his arrows [i.e. he is not violent].
tera inxenxijiro,         inti        xametiri.
tera i-n-xenxij-i-ro      i-nt-i      xameti-ri
NEG  3MS-IRP-remember-RLI 3MS-COP-RLI be.good-ADJ
                                                 
32 The Inxonene area was the uprivermost settlement area in the Tinpija basin. In the late 1960s
violence in the Inxonene area led the residents of the Marijentari area, including Bixotoro, to break
of contact with those Nanti living upriver. In the early 1980s Bixotoro was party to the first
encounter between residents of the Ixonene and Marijentari regions in over a decade. The
encounter was brief and unamicable, with the Marijentari Nanti assuming that those from Inxonene
had come downriver for nefarious purposes.
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He doesn’t remember them, he is good.”
In projecting the woman’s speech, Bixotoro lengthens the vowels
noticeably, and gives it a highly modulated intonational contour. I have observed
these speech characteristics in situations in which Nanti individuals appear to be
striving to placate their interlocutors and present an accommodating and non-
aggressive affective posture.
In both cases of the foregrounding of prosodic and intonational features, it
appears that what is being foregrounded, along with the referential content of the
utterance, is the affective posture of the speaker to which the projected speech is
attributed. In the example of Migero reporting the schoolteacher’s command to
attend the meeting, it is schoolteacher’s aggressive and peremptory posture that is
foregrounded by the extraction of the prosodic and intonation features from the
source situation, while in the example of Bixotoro’s projection of the speech of the
mother of one of the bentarorira, it is her non-aggressive and supplicating posture
that is foregrounded.
I have observed that in additional to collocations of lexical items, which are
readily extracted from source situations, certain non-lexical but meaningful sounds
can be projected.
These sounds include, for example, that of wheezing due to a respiratory
illness. Wheezing is indexical of the severity and kind of respiratory illness being
suffered, and the wheeze can be reported as the onomatopoeic form soja. In the
following example, also part of the already-mentioned conversation in which
Migero criticizes the sanitarijo, Migero employs this extraction strategy:
Data Segment 4.9
M: pine    tyejerina, tya  ixanta^xe?
   pine    tyejerina  tya  i-xant-ax-e?
84
   you.see tyejerina  what 3MS-say-COMP-IRI
M:  You see, what did Tyejerina say?
ixantaxe         axa  soja soja.
i-xant-ax-e      axa  soja soja
3MS-say-COMP-IRI here soja soja
He said here [indicating his own chest] “soja, soja”
matsi poxapaji     sanitarijo.
matsi pox-apaj-i   sanitarijo
CLNEG come-ADL-RLI sanitarijo
It was not the case that sanitarijo came (in response).
Other indexically meaningful sounds that can be extracted from a source
situation include the sound of severe diarrhea, tsixiririri. In both cases, the
extracted sound is obligatorily transformed into an iconic and stereotypical
onomatopoeia.
As Nuckolls has shown in her detailed study of onomatopoeia in Pastaza
Quechua, another language spoken in the Amazon Basin, sound-symbolic aspects
of a language like this can play a significant role in communicative activity
(Nuckolls 1996). The extent of the use of sound symbolism in speech projection,
and its interactional significance in Nanti society are areas which requires further
investigation.
As the interaction between Esexira, Ityarira, and me (data segment 3.2)
showed, gestures can be extracted from a source situation and projected into the
ongoing interaction as speech. The extent of this extraction strategy, both in terms
of what kinds of gestures are extracted, under what circumstances, and how
frequently, is unclear to me. In fact, I was very surprised when I witnessed this
instance of projection of non-speech as speech. I will return to the significance of
this below, but suffice it to say that the intersection of gesture and speech in
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speech projection too, like sound-symbolism, is an area that requires further
investigation.
Kinesic displays can also be extracted from a source situation and be
projected as mimetic kinesic displays in tandem with the speech being projected.
The extraction and projection of kinesic displays, like that of prosodic and
intonational features of speech, appears to be tied to the projection of affective
postures, as Besnier has remarked in the case of prosodic features in reported
speech on Nukulaelae atoll (Besnier 1992).
Thus, for example, kinesic displays that I have noted accompanying speech
projection include abrupt arm thrusts that accompany reports of angry speech;
mincing retreating steps with hands held close to the body with palms facing out
and head slightly turned, which accompany disdainful speech; and gaze directed
towards the ground, accompanying speech projected from a situation involving
rejection of a request.
The question of what kinds of kinesic features of an interaction can be
extracted, as well what kinds of kinesic features undergo transformation into
speech, or are transformed into some type of mimetic display, remains an
interesting question for future research.
I would like to point out here that while the discussion of each of these
examples of extraction strategies shows that considerable further research is
required to understand the processes at work, the very fact that these phenomena
become noticeable in the framework of projected speech speaks to the merits of
the wider perspective that this approach allows. In fact, until I began to
reformulate the descriptive framework I was employing in analyzing Nanti speech
reporting practices (as I then conceived the matter), phenomena of the kind I have
just described were mostly invisible to me.
It should be noted that these extraction strategies involving non-
segmentable aspects of the source situation are not automatically employed in
86
every instance of speech projection. Rather, they are employed when the aspect of
the source situation they make available to the interactants is salient to the ongoing
interaction.
This characteristic of how these extraction strategies are employed is of
course by no means restricted to strategies involving non-segmentable aspects of
interaction. Speech too is extracted from the source situation to serve the
discursive needs of the interactants.
The following interaction illustrates the preceding points. The interchange
concerns a notable happening that had transpired the previous day, during a feast.
The happening involved Tyejerina, one of the most politically prominent men in
the village, giving a t-shirt to Ityarira, who had recently arrived from Marijentari33.
Early on in the feast, Tyejerina decided that it was time for Ityarira to have
a shirt (at that point he was wearing a pair of shorts, but no shirt). Tyejerina went
back to his house, where he had an unused t-shirt, and returned with it. He gave
Ityarira the shirt, helping him to put it on. As Ityarira put on the shirt, the entire
chant line came to a stop to watch, making the entire process quite conspicuous.
The event was notable for at least two reasons. First, it was incredibly
generous of Tyejerina. Nanti individuals very carefully store new clothes for future
use, since they are very difficult to acquire. Tyejerina had been saving this t-shirt
for at least a year. Second, the giving and acceptance of the gift created a
significant reciprocity relationship between Ityarira and a (politically prominent)
non-kinsman in the community, strengthening the bond between Ityarira and
Montetoni.
The next afternoon, after Esexira woke up, he visited me as part of his
visiting circuit around the village. During his visit Esexira brought up the events of
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the previous day. The following is a brief excerpt from the beginning of the
conversation.
Data Segment 4.10
E: pine    maixa majani       ipaxiri.
   pine    maixa majani       i-p-ax-i-ri
   you.see now   a.little(AN) 3M-give-COMP-RLI-3MO
E: you see, now, he gave him a few (clothes).
oga, oga, majani       ipaxiri.
oga  oga  majani       i-p-ax-i-ri.
that that a.little(AN) 3M-give-COMP-RLI-3MO
Uh, uh, he gave him a few (clothes)34.
L: nonejaxe.
   no-nej-ax-e
   1S-see-COMP-IRI
L: I saw.
E: jee, pinejaxe?
   jee  pi-nej-ax-e
   yes  2S-see-COMP-IRI
E: right, you saw?
L: jeje.
   jeje
   yes
L: yes.
                                                                                                                                       
33 After a hiatus of six years, in 2001 another family group chose to migrate from the Tinpija basin
to the Xamisuja basin. Although they planned to settle about half a day’s walk upriver, at
Pirijasanteni, they were invited to visit Montetoni.
34 The fact that Esexira recycled this utterance and prefaced it with hesitation markers probably
indicates that he was puzzled at the lack of an appropriate backchannel or response from me.
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E: xametitaxe?
   xameti-t-ax-e
   good-EPC-COM-IRI
E: Was that good? [i.e. Did that seem like the right thing to do?]
L: jeje.
   jeje
   yes
L: yes.
E: ixanti      maixa, jeje iro-   iro    noxogaxe
   i-xant-i    maixa  jeje iro-   iro    no-xog-ax-e




clothes     now
E: He said then, “Yes, I want clothes now.”
L: ari ixanti?
   ari i-xant-i
   indeed 3MS-say-RLI
L: Is that that what he said35?
E: ari    ixanti.
   ari    i-xant-i
   indeed 3MS-say-RLI
E: That’s what he said.
                                                 
35 This does not constitute a next-turn repair initiator (NTRI) as it might in English, but it is rather
an appropriate response for an attentive and cooperative conversationalist to make upon receiving
new and interesting information. This resembles, then, the ‘what-saying’ processes observed in
other indigenous Latin American societies, such as the Kalapalo, Shuar, and Kuna, (Basso 1985,
Gnerre 1986, Sherzer 1983,).
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Here it is clear that the process of extraction operates to highlight for the
purposes of the present conversation a very particular part of the situation in which
it was uttered. The topic that Esexira has broached is Tyejerina’s gift to Ityarira,
and in the conversation, we collaborated in creating an evaluation of Tyejerina’s
act. The question of the evaluative stance we took towards the act makes salient
Ityarira’s own evaluative stance towards the act (or at least, towards the
desirability of clothes).
This salience makes particular utterances of Ityarira relevant to our
ongoing interaction, while others thereby become irrelevant. Esexira’s extraction
therefore brackets out those utterances in the source situation that do not bear on
Ityarira’s evaluative stance.
A final example relating to this point comes from my field notes. When a
Nanti individual mentions that he or she has just come from visiting another
person, it is very common for their interlocutor to inquire as to what was learned
during that visit. This is typically done by asking where the people in the
household are (tyara ijati? ‘where did he go?’) or by asking what the person
visited said (tya ixanti?, ‘what did he say?’).
Once I learned that this was an appropriate way to interact, I also began to
ask these questions. What is interesting from the current standpoint is that the
responses in these cases tend to be brief, and more to the point, tend to address
matters of interest to the asker of the question. Thus, asking what someone said
typically does not prompt a projection of the entirety of the conversation, rather it
prompts the projection of portions of the conversation that the person asked deems
salient to the asker.
The following interaction took place between Bisarota and me during my
2001 fieldwork. Bisarota had just returned from visiting the house in which
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Ityarira was staying, and it was the first visit he had made to him. Ityarira had
arrived in the village only two days before, and little had been seen of him.
Migero had, however, instructed me to treat Ityarira and his family for the severe
eye infections and reasonably serious respiratory illness they were suffering from,
and so I had visited them early in the day.





   pi-nij-ax-e
   2S-speak-COMP-IRI
L: Did you speak (to him)?
B: nonijaxe.         noxa^nti   xameti yogabinti?
   no-nij-ax-e       no-xant-i  xameti y-ogabint-i
   1S-speak-COMP-IRI 1S-say-RLI good   3MS-treat-RLI
ixanti      je, xameti yogabintaxe.
i-xant-i    je  xameti y-ogabint-ax-e
3MS-say-RLI yes good   3MS-treat-COMP-IRI
B: I spoke (to him). I said “Did he treat you (with medicine) well?” He said
“Yes, he treated me well.”
In the interaction that Bisarota and Ityarira had, the two no doubt discussed
many other topics, such as the almost obligatory questions and answers about
where the various parties had traveled to recently (which, moreover, in Ityarira’s
case was a very interesting topic). However, in reporting on the interaction,
Bisarota did not report on these other topics of conversation, but chose to report
the one part of the conversation that was especially salient for me. Extraction is
thus calibrated by the interaction into which the speech will be projected.
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4.1.3 Strategies of Transformation
Meaningful aspects of a source situation that are removed from that
situation are rarely projected directly into the ongoing interaction without
undergoing some kind of alteration or change. These changes are effected through
strategies of transformation that alter the extracted aspects of the source situation
in particular ways before they are projected into the ongoing interaction.
With the data segments that served to exemplify the kinds of source
situations employed by Nanti speakers, I have already provided instances of
certain transformation strategies. Since transformation is evident only through
comparison, the study of strategies of transformation requires data not only about
the projected speech, but also speech in the source situation.
At present, I do not have available data that speaks directly to these issues,
indicating an important direction for future research. In this section, then, I will
rely on comparisons of projected speech in data segments to plausibly similar
utterances in everyday Nanti interaction.
Perhaps the most striking example of a strategy of transformation at work
was that of the transformation of a gesture (a nod) into an utterance, in data
segment 3.2. This is an example of a strategy that transforms the modality of a
meaningful aspect of a source situation into an utterance, thereby making it
projectable as speech.
Another transformation strategy is the exaggeration of prosodic,
intonational, and gestural features of a segment of projected speech associated
with the foregrounding of the affective posture of the individual to which the
projected speech is attributed. For example, while I cannot be certain that the
projected speech in data segment 4.8, in which Bixotoro projects the speech of the
bentarorira’s mother, is exaggerated with respect to the original interaction, the
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prosodic qualities of that projected speech border on the comical in comparison
with similar uses I have observed in Nanti interaction in Montetoni36.
Similarly, the prosodic characteristics of the speech of the schoolteacher
that Migero projects in data segment 4.7 seem like exaggerations of the prosodic
features associated with giving a peremptory order in typical Nanti interaction.
In exaggerating prosodic features in this way, the speaker appears to
foreground the affective dimensions of the utterance. Thus, we can see these
‘strategies of exaggeration’ as a form of ‘aural highlighting’ that serves to make
the affective posture of the speech a figure against the ground of the utterance. In a
sense, then, it is possible to see these strategies as auditory counterparts to
strategies that bring attention to objects in the visual field, like pointing, drawing,
and underlining (Goodwin 1994).
Perhaps the two most ubiquitous strategies of transformation found in
Nanti speech projection are those of hypotaxis and hypertaxis. The former strategy
involves the removal of morphemes or lexemes from an utterance extracted from a
source situation, while the latter involves augmenting the source utterance with
additional morphemes or lexemes.
The use of hypotactic strategies is very widespread in Nanti discourse. It is
common for projected utterances to be considerably more concise than the
utterance in the source situation, with most of the repetition that is typical of much
of Nanti discourse having been stripped out. My impression is that when Nanti
individuals engage in speech projection, they frequently reduce an utterance to its
                                                 
36 I suspect that the impression of absurdity was in fact one of the effects that Bixotoro sought to
achieve - an interesting example of the functioning of authorial penetration in non-textual projected
speech. Bixotoro has on more than one occasion expressed his suspicion about the true intentions
of the residents of the upper Tinpija, and he seemed to be suggesting deliberate duplicity on the
part of the woman in the data segment under discussion.
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essentials. What those essentials are depends, of course, on the communicative
goals of the speaker.
Hypertaxis is much less common in Nanti discourse than hypotaxis. An
interesting example of use of strategies of hypertaxis occurred during my 2001
fieldwork, during the speech phase of a feast meal. After Migero and several other
prominent Nanti men had addressed the group, Migero asked me to speak to the
group. As this occurs at every feast meal I have attended, I was prepared, and gave
a five-minute speech, doing my best to speak in the oratorical style appropriate for
the event.
Migero then spoke again, projecting my just-given speech to the
audience37. However, Migero was unusually expansive in his projection of my
utterances, so much so that it took him ten minutes to project my speech.
At one point, Migero even stopped to say “inti irasi irinijane”, ‘This is his
speech,” assuring the gathered group that he was still projecting my speech. It
appears that his use of the hypertactic strategy was so great that he recognized that
he might have overdone it.
Migero’s augmentations of the source utterances he projected included
more elaborate morphology, which made the points more forceful, and also
repetition of important points, an aspect of Nanti oratory at which I am unskilled.
While never claiming that I said something substantively different from what I
said, Migero was successful in highlighting certain aspects of my speech,
especially aspects that echoed or supported points that he had made in his own
address some half-hour before.
                                                 
37 It is a common feature of feast-meal oratory that when one speaker gives an address that another
speaker will comment on the address, which in large part consists of projecting sections of the
preceding address and of emphasizing certain points made in it . Some mixture of hypotactic and
hypertactic strategies is therefore typical.
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Clearly, the way in which transformation operates in Nanti speech
projecting practices remains an important area for further investigation. It is
important to point out in passing, however, that although I have just begun to
scratch the surface of how speech is transformed in Nanti discourse, this
phenomenon has in large part become visible to me because of the eye-opening
nature of the projected speech framework. Thus, although the analysis of these
processes is still in its earliest stages, reframing ‘reported speech’ as ‘projected
speech’ has already yielded significant results.
Thus far, I have focused on how strategies of transformation alter an
utterance, but another important aspect of transformation strategies are the ways in
which they leave utterances unaltered.
One such aspect of transformation in Nanti speech projection practices is
the degree to which speech projection leaves the utterance extracted from the
source situation as an utterance, and the degree to which these practices involve
the transformation of the source utterance into a lexical characterization of the
utterance in terms of some recognized social act (e.g. itsanejaxiri - ‘he refused
him.’).
In Nanti discourse, certain kinds of utterances, if extracted at all from the
source situation, are overwhelming reported as utterances, rather than being
characterized as a social act of a particular kind.
For example, what can be characterized as ‘orders’, ‘requests’, and
‘promises’ are overwhelmingly introduced into discourse by projecting the speech
that constitutes the order or request, rather than by characterizing an utterance as
an order or request and identifying an action or goal for the utterance38.
                                                 
38 This can be done in Nanti, although it is rarely done. One can employ the verb root /-nebi-/, ‘to
request, ask’ in a construction like inebitaxotaxeri xogi, ‘he asked him for xogi’, and by using the
causative prefix /ogi-/, it is possible to talk about orders, yogixontetaxeri ‘he told him to leave’ (lit.
he (deliberately) caused him to leave).
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The following data segment illustrates this clearly. In the following
narrative, which I recorded in 1999, Migero, the peresetente of Montetoni,
describes his interaction with the first Matsigenka man he met in the Xamisuja
basin. By the point we join the narrative here, Migero has described how Tito, one
of Migero’s hunting companions, had approached and talked to the Matsigenka
man, and now projects the first speech from the Matsigenka man that appears in
the narrative:
Data Segment 4.12
M: ixanti     maixa oxari     oxa  xapasi
   i-xant-i   maixa oxa-ri    oxa  xapasi




M:  He said then “you will help me with these here palm fronds.”
M: nojajigaxitira.
   no-ja-jig-axi-t-i-ra
   1S-go-PL-TRNS-EPC-RLI-DEP
M: We went over there.
M: axa  noxarajigi,   yonta        neje.
   axa  no-xara-jig-i y-onta       nej-e
   here 1S-cut-PL-RLI 3MS-that.one see-IRI
M: Here we numbered [gesturing], this many, look.
M: tobajeni  noxarajiga^xe.
   tobaje-ni no-xara-jig-ax-e.
   many-AN   1S-cut-PL-COMP-IRI
M: We numbered many.
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M: axa, axa  noxarajiga^xe.
   axa  axa  no-xara-jig-ax-e
   here here 1S-cut-PL-COMP-IRI
M: Here, here [gesturing] we numbered
M: inpo^gini nojajig^i.   namujigaxeni.
   inpogini  no-ja-jig-i  no-amu-jig-ax-e-ni
   then      1S-go-PL-RLI 1S-help-PL-COMP-IRI-OBL
M: Then we went. We helped (him with) it.
M: pasi^ni yogatuti,               pasi^ni
   pasini  y-og-a-tu-t-i           pasini




M: He quickly went to get more, he quickly went to get more.
M: axa  yopijotaxeni                 xapasi.
   axa  y-opijo-t-ax-e-ni            xapasi.




M: He piled up the palm fronds up to here [gesturing the height of the pile].
Wow!
M: pairani, ityara  ityasano
   pairani, itya-ra itya-sano




M: Long ago, really long ago, we saw him.
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M: inpo^gini nojati.
   inpogini  no-ja-t-i
   then      1S-go-EPC-RLI
M: Then I left.
M: yamaxotanajara            sintipoja.
   y-am-axo-t-anaj-a-ra      sinti-poja.
   3MS-bring-EPC-ABL-RLR-DEP balsa-CL(cylinder)
M: He took (the palm fronds) away on a raft.
M: ixanti      maixa nonpoxajera             aixiro.
   i-xant-i    maixa no-n-pox-aj-e-ra        aixiro
   3MS-say-RLI now   1S-IRP-come-REG-IRI-DEP again
M: He said then, “I will come back again.”
M: ixanti      pamutaxojiga^xe.
   i-xant-i    pi-amu-t-axo-jig-ax-e
   3MS-say-RLI 2S-help-EPC-RLI-PL-COMP-IRI
M: He said, “You all will help me.”
M: patiro aixiro sirijaga   poxapaji     aixiro.
   patiro aixiro sirijaga   pox-apaj-i   aixiro
   one    again  dry.season come-ADL-RLI again
M: One summer later he came back again.
Note that not only do the orders, requests, and promises of the Matsigenka
speaker appear in this narrative as projected speech, but in fact, they almost
constitute the entirety of the projected speech.
A similar point can be made about the way decisions made in one situation
are discussed in another. While there is a verb stem in Nanti, /-pintsa/, which
means ‘to decide’, this is very rarely used in discourse. Thus, while Nanti speakers
could employ strategies of transformation that take an utterance such as ‘atsi
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nojate’, ‘OK! I’m going’ and transform it into ‘opintsataxe ojate’, ‘she decided to
go’, this is very rarely done. Instead, the speech is projected as an utterance.
Consider the following example from my 2001 fieldwork.
Data Segment 4.13
J: inpo^gini ixamantajina        ixanti
   inpogini  i-xamant-aj-i-na    i-xant-i
   then      3MS-tell-REG-RLI-1O 3MS-say-RLI
aityo       oburoxi.
aityo       oburoxi
exist(INAN) oburoxi
J: Then he responded, he said “There’s oburoxi.”
L: jeje
   jeje
   yes
L: right.
C: ixamanti?
   i-xamant-i
   3MS-tell-RLI
C: He told (you)?
J: jee, ari    ixamantina.
   jee  ari    i-xamant-i-na
   yes  indeed 3MS-tell-RLI-1O
J: yes, indeed he told me.
jee irota       noxanti    atsi noxamoso^ti.
jee iro-ta      no-xant-i  atsi no-xamoso-t-i.
yes 3MSPRO-DAFF 1S-say-RLI OK   1S-visit-EPC-RLI
Yes, because of that I said “OK. I’m going visiting.”
L: jee
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   jee
   yes
L: Right.
J: irota      nopoxantaxarira.
   iro-ta     no-pox-ant-ax-a-ri-ra
   3MSPRO-DAF 1S-come-INST-COMP-RR-3MS-DEP
J: Because of that I came here.
Here too we see that Jeronima narrates the process through which he
learned about the feast, and subsequently decided to visit, by projecting the speech
of others and himself. He does not, however, ever characterize that process as
decision-making, or anything of the sort. The speech he projects does all the work
of representing his agency in this interchange.
Another way in which transformation appears to be constrained is in terms
of channel. Specifically, if an utterance was chanted in the source situation, Nanti
individuals insert it into the ongoing interaction as chanted utterance.
A poignant example of this phenomenon of channel-preservation comes
from an interaction between me, Beier, and Ajorora, one of the oldest women in
the Nanti communities, when she revealed to us that the Matsigenka schoolteacher
had murdered her sister Oroga.
The attack which led to Oroga’s death took place some distance from the
community, and there were no eyewitnesses. In the attack, Araña hit Oroga in the
side with a rock, and it took several weeks for her to die. Significantly, Oroga did
not immediately reveal what had happened, not even telling her sister Ajorora until
a feast some days later. Oroga was unable to walk, so Ajorora visited her during
the feast, and in the course of the visit Oroga chanted to her that Araña had
attacked her, and that was why she was ill.
When Ajorora revealed this fact to us some nine months later, during our
1999 fieldwork, she projected the utterance by which Oroga had revealed that
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Araña had attacked her, and since the source utterance was a chant, Ajorora also
projected it by chanting it.
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4.1.4 Strategies of Insertion
Projected speech becomes part of an interaction by being inserted into it. In
doing so, speakers employ particular strategies of insertion to achieve particular
communicative effects, whereby they seek to achieve particular social goals.
Strategies of insertion range from some of the most grammaticalized
aspects of speech projection, such as the use of certain morphological and
syntactic devices to frame the projected speech, to some of the most pragmatically
sensitive and interactionally contingent aspects of speech projection, such as the
sequential placement of the projected speech in the flow of interaction and the
rhetorical positioning of the projected speech by the speaker.
Beginning with former end of the spectrum, we examine the grammatical
devices that Nanti speakers use to frame a projected utterance.
Nanti speakers always introduce a stretch of projected speech with a verb
of saying. Overwhelmingly this is the prototypical verb of saying /-xant/ , ‘say.’
The only other verbs of saying that I have observed being used to introduce project
speech are /-xamant/, ‘tell’, and /-xajem/, ‘call’. In both cases, though, these verbs
are immediately followed by a form of /-xant/, and I have very rarely seen them
introduce projected speech by themselves.
In the vast majority of cases, the verb of saying is minimally affixed,
typically bearing only a subject prefix and the appropriate mode affixes. In some
rare cases additional morphology, such as object, plural, and completive aspect
suffixes, like those seen in data segment 4.16, below, may be employed. I have
never seen, however, any other affixes from the rich repertoire of Nanti verbal
morphology employed to modify a verb of saying.
One systematic exception to this generalization is the projection of non-
lexical sounds as onomatopoeia, in which case I have observed the completive
aspect suffix being used, as exemplified in data segment 3.10, above.
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Sometimes the lexeme ‘maixa’, ‘now, at that point’ intervenes between the
verb of saying and the beginning of the projected speech, but I have not observed
that this is particularly consequential in how the projected speech is interpreted.
The same observations can be made of the lexeme ‘oga’, ‘that’, which appears to
serve as a hesitation particle, like “uh” in English.
Turning now to the more interactionally contingent end of the spectrum of
insertion strategies, I first want to observe that a thorough account of these
strategies is beyond the present scope of this work. Indeed, such an account of
Nanti insertion strategies would require a detailed study of Nanti ethnopragmatics
(c.f. Duranti 1992). Nevertheless, I can provide some examples of the direction
such research might take, and thereby give the reader some understanding of the
issues involved in insertion strategies of this kind.
Consider, for example, the process exemplified in the following data
segment, which is an excerpt of data sample 4.4. Of immediate interest is the
process by which Migero expresses his lack of interest in going (to Maranxejari)
and then shortly thereafter projects his own utterance back into the interaction.
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Data Sample 4.14
M: onti         te^ra nonxoge         nojate.
   o-nt-i       tera  no-n-xog-e      no-ja-t-e
   3FNS-COP-RLI NEG   1S-IRP-want-IRI 1S-go-EPC-IRI
M: It’s that I don’t want to go.
[Several utterances intervene]
noxanti    maixa te^ra nonxoge         nojate.
no-xant-i  maixa tera  no-n-xog-e      no-ja-t-e
1S-say-IRI now   NEG   1S-IRP-want-IRI 1S-go-EPC-IRI
I say now, “I don’t want to go.”
This strategy, which we might call ‘echoic self-projection’, involves
making an utterance and then projecting that same utterance and inserting it
shortly after the original utterance. This strategy appears to crucially involve this
tight pairing of an utterance and its insertion back into the interaction.
Significantly, this insertion strategy is employed in phases of interactions
in which the speaker is emphasizing her attitude towards, or evaluation of, some
proposition or state of affairs.
Thus, we can see that the strategy of echoic self-projection, which is
effected by a particular insertion strategy, namely the insertion of the projected
utterance shortly after it was initially uttered, is part of a wider social and
communicative act: that of clarifying one’s stance towards some aspect of the
social world. We can thus see that the use of the insertion strategy in question is
thus highly contingent on the trajectory of the interaction and on the social goals of
the speaker.
A comprehensive account of insertion strategies would need to continue
this line of analysis by identifying the set of significant insertion strategies
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employed by Nanti speakers and then determining their pragmatic and social
function.
4.2 Nanti Speech Projection Practices
4.2.0 Introduction
Speech projection practices, and speaking practices more generally, are
constituted not only by a particular set of strategies that are associated with that
practice, but are also constituted by patterns of use of those strategies, which arise
through the organization of strategies in specific interactional contexts to achieve
particular social and communicative goals.
In the subsequent two sections I will draw together many of the empirical
observations made in the previous two sections to argue that Nanti speech
projection strategies are involved in two major patterns of use. These patterns of
use constitute, I will argue, two major speech projection practices within the
broader sphere of Nanti discursive practice, each organized in large measure by
different salient ideologies.
These two ideologies, or possibly sets of ideologies, concern evidentiality
and representations of agency. The first set addresses the relationship between
knowledge, its gradations of epistemic reliability, and the incorporation of
knowledge of various such gradations into discourse. The second set of ideologies
addresses how human agency is represented in discourse; that is, how individuals
communicate about the acts and processes by which humans alter and effect the
world.
4.2.1 Speech Projection and Evidentiality
In this section I discuss an ideology, or a set of ideologies, operative in
Nanti society that play an important role in generating certain speech projection
practices in Nanti interaction. Specifically, I will discuss how ideologies operative
in Nanti society that concern knowledge, and the relationship of knowledge to
106
communication, play an important role in organizing the use of speech projection
strategies by Nanti individuals in communicative interactions.
My presentation, however, will not begin by positing the existence of the
ideology and then providing evidence for it. Rather, I will begin by reviewing
instances of Nanti speech projection and argue that a particular patterning is
observable, an patterning that I will argue can be accounted for by positing an
ideology regarding knowledge and its expression in language.
Examining numerous instances of speech projection across communicative
interactions involving Nanti individuals makes it apparent that much projected
speech is employed to communicate knowledge that the speaker herself obtained
through communicative interaction.
This is not by itself particularly surprising, although the cross-cultural
frequency of this phenomenon does not diminish its significance. However, it is
notable that when a Nanti speaker’s sole source of knowledge regarding some
topic is another person’s talk, they overwhelmingly convey this knowledge to
others by projecting the words of the person who was the source of that
knowledge.
Consider the following interchange, which transpired during a visit Beier
and I made to Maranxejari during our 2000 fieldwork. Prior to the exchange
below, Joja, the peresetente of Maranxejari, had asked Beier if she had any
children back at home. She replied that she did not, and provided an explanation
for her childless state, which is highly anomalous from a Nanti perspective. Beier
left the hut shortly thereafter, leaving Joja to talk to me. Not long after Beier’s
departure another Nanti man arrived, and Joja immediately told him what he had
just learned39:
                                                 
39 Nanti individuals have expressed curiosity about Beier’s and my childless state for many years,
and our previous explanations about wishing to wait to have children until some future point have
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Data Segment 4.15
J: noxa^nti   pijoxanajaxeri                 pitomi?
   no-xant-i  pi-jox-anaj-ax-e-ri            pi-tomi
     1S-say-RLI 2S-set.aside-ABL-COMP-IRI-3MS  2P-son
J: I said “Did you leave behind a child (in your land)?”
oxanti      nomantsigataxe.         ari    oxanti.
o-xant-i    no-mantsiga-t-ax-e      ari    o-xant-i
3FN-say-RLI 1S-be.sick-EPC-COMP-IRI indeed 3FN-say-RLI
She said “I was sick”. That’s what she said.
tobajeti  natsiperejaxa     asi
tobaje-ti no-atsiperej-ax-a asi
much-INAN 1S-suffer-COMP-RR so,then
noxamosotero         noxotoro.
no-xamoso-t-e-ro     noxotoro
1S-visit-EPC-IRI-3FN doctor
“I suffered alot, so I visited the doctor.
oxanti      jara     pijanenexi,





She said ‘you will not have children because you were sick.’”
oxanti      tera nojanenexi  ontime.
o-xant-i    tera no-janenexi o-n-tim-e.
3FN-say-RLI NEG  1P-infant   3FN-IRP-exist-IRI
                                                                                                                                       
failed to make any impression. These explanations appear to strike Nanti interlocutors as simply
meaningless. Beier’s narrative in this case seems to have finally provided an explanation that
strikes Joja, at least, as sensible.
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She said “I don’t have any children.”
It is typical of Nanti communicative interactions that Joja passed along the
knowledge he had just acquired using projected speech. It would have been quite
unusual had he simply reported the information, without projecting speech40.
This use of projected speech is by no means restricted to knowledge
acquired through recent communicative interaction. In the following example,
Migero discusses with me his knowledge regarding Yonatan, an elderly Nanti man
he met some twenty years ago.
Data Segment 4.16
M: pairani  nonejaxi^ri,        nonejaxiri.
   pairani  no-nej-ax-i-ri      nonejaxiri
       long.ago 1S-see-COMP-IRI-3MO 1S-see-COMP-IRI-3MO
M: Long ago I saw, I saw him.
ixanti      noponijaxa           tsinxateni.
i-xant-i    no-ponij-ax-a        tsinxateni
3MS-say-RLI 1S-come.from-COMP-RR tsinxateni




                                                 
40 Interestingly, in retelling the information he received from Beier, Joja never turned to me to
corroborate any of the facts. One way to interpret this is that he considered his projection of Beier’s
speech evidentially superior to my support of Beier’s story.
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inosixapitsajigaxi      nosinto.
i-nosix-apitsa-jig-ax-i no-sinto
3MS-drag-SEP-PL-COMP-RLI 1P-daughter
He said to us “They took away my daughters41.”
It is important to note that Migero has never visited the settlement of
Tsinxateni, so his sole source of knowledge regarding Yonatan’s residence there is
Yonatan’s words. Similarly, in the third line of this excerpt, Migero quotes
Yonatan talking about the kidnapping of his daughters by missionaries, an event
that Migero similarly knows about only through the utterances of residents of
Tsinxateni.
This example thus corroborates the observation set out above, that Nanti
speakers employ speech projection to communicate knowledge to which they
gained access only via the speech of others.
The extent to which Nanti individuals appear to hew to this principle can
be sometimes quite striking. For example, in tracing migration histories and
constructing genealogies, I often asked about people’s birthplaces. Typically,
people responded by projected speech, as in the following example.
Data Segment 4.17
J: oxanti       pimetsyoti          syegorija.
   o-xant-i     pi-metsyo-t-i       syegorija
   3FNS-say-RLI 2S-be.born-EPC-RLI syegorija
J: She said “you were born in Syegorija”.
Since people do not typically have memories of their birth, and hence no
longer have direct experience of their place of birth, they must ultimately rely on
others to inform them of where they were born. For Nanti speakers, this means that
                                                 
41 This refers to the kidnapping of his daughters by Dominican missionaries in the mid-1970s (see
Chapter 1)
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they typically report their mother’s speech when they inform others of where they
were born.
In order to see how the preceding uses of reported speech fit into broader
Nanti ideologies of knowledge, we now need to look at the epistemic conditions
under which Nanti individuals make knowledge claims of particular kinds.
The first general feature to note in this regard is that Nanti individuals tend
to be very prudent and careful in making knowledge claims. Knowledge that has
been obtained by being present to witness the topic of discussion can be talked
about unproblematically. But when inference and probability judgments come into
play in making knowledge claims, Nanti individuals become circumspect.
This circumspection takes two forms in discourse, which appear to
correlate to gradations in the epistemic reliability of a potential knowledge claim. 
The first form that this circumspection takes is to qualify one’s utterance
using a second position clitic, /-xa/, which serves to indicate indefiniteness or
uncertainty. The kinds of claims that merit the use of the indefiniteness clitic are
typically ones that involve inferences about behavior and action based on
substantial but incomplete knowledge of the circumstances.
Consider the following example, in which Migero talks about an elderly
man who died of a respiratory infection only a few days before Beier and I arrived
in Montetoni in July of 2000:
Data Segment 4.18
M: jame      ixami       ainyomexa.
   jame      i-xam-i     ainyo-me-xa.
   NEG(COND) 3MS-die-RLI exist(AN)-CNTR-IND





You almost saw him when you arrived.
The inference that he would be alive but for the respiratory infection is
highly likely to hold true, but it is not certain that it would. It is possible, for
example, that the man in question could have survived the respiratory illness only
to have been bitten by a snake. Or alternatively, he could have survived, only to
suddenly move to another Nanti community.
Now consider another example from 2000, in which I conversed with
Jorija, a resident of Maranxejari. Jorija had recently gone hunting at the
headwaters of the Tsironpija River, a tributary of the Mano, whose headwaters
abutt those of the Maranxejari. Jorija had crossed the line of low hills that separate
the headwaters of the two rivers on a hunting and fishing trip that lasted several
days. Curious how far downriver he had gotten on his trip, I asked him if the
mouth of that river was far away.
Data Segment 4.19
L: agatija                  tsironpija
   aga-t-i-ja               tsironpija
   finish-EPC-RLI-CL(fluid) tsironpija
onaxe                       saamani?
o-n-ax-e                    saamani
3FNS-be.in.a.place-COMP-IRI far
L: Is the mouth of Tsironpija river far?
J: samanixa
   samani-xa
   far-IND
J: Far, presumably.
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As subsequent discussion made clear, Jorija had traveled far down the river
on his hunting trip but had not arrived at the mouth of the river. As a result, he
could reasonably infer, but could not be sure, that the river mouth was far away.
For example, the river could well double back so that its mouth is in fact not very
far if one were to take an overland route throughout the forest.
A final example comes from my 2001 fieldwork, and is part of an
interaction that Beier and I had with Ajorora, Migero’s mother, during a visit she
made to Montetoni for a feast. Ajorora had been a member of a fairly unsuccessful
xogi-fishing expedition upriver of Maranxejari, and had decided to make a visit to
Montetoni, after she heard that a feast was under way. In the excerpt below,
Ajorora recounts that the remainder of the members of the xogi-fishing group
returned to Maranxejari.
Data Segment 4.20
A: ari    ijataxita^xe.                te^ra
   ari    i-ja-t-axi-t-ax-e            tera
   indeed 3MS-go-EPC-TRNS-EPC-COMP-IRI NEG
inejaba^xena.           inpo^gini maixa, inpo^gini
i-nej-ab-ax-e-na        inpogini  maixa  inpogini
3MS-see-REC-COMP-IRI-1O then      now    then
maixa axa  poxajixa         otsyapini.
maixa axa  pox-aj-i-xa      otsyapini
now   here come-REG-RLI-IND night
A: Indeed he went over to Maranxejari. He did not watch me [i.e. He did not
see me leave]. So then now, so then now, he presumably arrived back (in
Maranxejari) at night.
Note that in the above excerpt, Ajorora uses the indefinite clitic on the verb
root /-pox/, indicating that the knowledge claim she makes here is qualified. This is
because of the fact that her knowledge is based on an inference that is reasonably
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reliable, but not entirely so. That is, her knowledge claim is based on the inference
that people who have expressed an intention to go to a place and who have
departed for that place, and who are also easily capable of reaching the destination,
will in fact reach the destination.
As the above examples demonstrate, the knowledge claims made in
instances in which /-xa/ is used are very likely to hold. They are knowledge claims
based on partial knowledge of the circumstances, supplemented by inferences and
reasoning that are only likely to fail under unusual circumstances. We can call
these inferences ‘near inferences’.
As inferences become increasingly distant, Nanti speakers tend to become
increasingly diffident in making knowledge claims, even with the use of the
indefinite clitic42. Beyond a critical point Nanti speakers make no knowledge
claims. What is perhaps most striking about this point is how conservatively Nanti
individuals tend to draw this line.
Consider the following example. In late July of 2000, while I was staying
in Montetoni, several Nanti from Maranxejari came for a visit. Maranxejari is less
than two hour’s walk from Montetoni, and in the late afternoon - at around 3 p.m. -
the visitors left to return to Maranxejari. As dusk was falling I asked Migero, who
had hosted the visitors: “ipigajigajira”? or “have they gotten back yet”? Migero
responded: “te nogote”, or “I don’t know”. The inference involved in answering
                                                 
42 There are occasions when Nanti speakers make knowledge claims in discourse requiring
inferences based on matters of which they have not had direct experience.  Such claims are related
to temporally very stable features of the world, such as animal populations; the places in which
people live; or highly routinized activity, such as regular hunting, farming, or gathering activity. As
I discuss below, knowledge like this, which is widely distributed throughout the speech
community, is qualitatively different from knowledge that is more particular and personal.
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the question either positively or negatively was too great to even countenance a
qualified, speculative response.
Thus far then , it is possible to conclude that as far as making knowledge
claims in talk is concerned, Nanti ideologies of knowledge recognize three major
gradations:
1) Knowledge gained through direct experience, which can be introduced into
discourse without any additional framing regarding its epistemic status;
2) knowledge based on a combination of partial direct experience and near
inference, which requires the use of the indefiniteness clitic /-xa/;
3) knowledge claims that either involve far inferences, or for which the speaker
has insufficient direct experience upon which to base near inferences. Knowledge
claims of this sort are not introduced into discourse.
In light of the relationship just described between the gradations of
epistemic quality of knowledge and discourse involving the mention of such
knowledge, consider the place of projected speech. First, we note that projected
speech is employed precisely to relate knowledge that the speaker obtained solely
through talk. Speech projection is thus a communicative strategy by which
speakers can make knowledge claims about matters that are otherwise highly
problematic as topics of discourse in the context of Nanti ideologies of knowledge
and language.
It is important to note, however, what kind of knowledge claim is made in
projecting another person’s speech. Interestingly, when a Nanti speaker projects
another’s speech, she is not making knowledge claims regarding the subject of the
reported speech, but rather, that a particular person produced a particular utterance.
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Thus, projected speech is still firmly based in direct experience, adhering to the
ideological principle that knowledge claims should be based on direct experience.
In a sense, it is possible to see that the use of projected speech by Nanti
individuals fills what would otherwise be a debilitating gap in the range of types of
knowledge that can be introduced into discourse. Moreover, it is possible to see
Nanti speech projection in cases like those given above as a solution to two
conflicting factors: first, an ideological one that knowledge claims should be based
on direct experience; and second, one that stems from social needs arising in
interaction, namely the need to talk about matters that one did not directly
experience43.
Thus, we see one aspect of Nanti speech projection practices - its use to
make knowledge claims of a particular sort - as a practice that emerges from the
interplay of ideologies of knowledge and language on one hand, and
communicative goals arising in interaction on the other
Before turning to the next section, it is important to point out that Nanti
speakers do at times make knowledge claims in ways that appear to contradict the
picture sketched above. There are, for example, occasions when Nanti speakers do
not employ reported speech to relate knowledge gained through speech.
However, an examination of these instances reveals that they are
qualitatively different from the kind of knowledge described above. Specifically,
they are cases of knowledge which, although acquired through talk, have become
very widely diffused through the speech community. As knowledge becomes
increasingly shared by members of the speech community, Nanti individuals
                                                 
43 It is interesting to note, from this perspective, that Nanti speakers engage in fairly minimal
authorial penetration (in the traditional sense of the term) of the speech they project. For example,
the origo always remains anchored in the source situation, which serves to iconically distinguish
the projected speech from the surrounding speech of the speaker, thereby marking the speech as
originating from another speaker.
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appear to find it less necessary to tie that knowledge to a particular source by
means of speech projection.
An example of this process at work can be seen in geographical knowledge
regarding regions far downriver from Montetoni, such as the locations of various
Matsigenka communities. Although only a small number of Nanti individuals have
traveled to these regions and obtained knowledge via direct experience about the
location of these communities, the location of these communities is never
discussed by means of projected speech44. Rather, people make knowledge claims
about their location in the same way that they make knowledge claims about
matters of which they have direct experience.
Another apparent exception, mentioned above, is the fact that Nanti
individuals make knowledge claims that employ inferences based on regular,
highly routinized, and temporally stable features of the world - but features that
they have not verified by direct experience for the particular inference they are
making.
Thus, for example, when a visiting ornithologist asked if a certain bird
species can be found in a particular location, Nanti hunters answer affirmatively or
negatively, based on their knowledge about the kinds of habitats in which that bird
species is found, and not because they have actually checked on the matter
recently.
These facts suggest that Nanti ideologies of knowledge recognize a sphere
of ‘common knowledge’; knowledge that is common both in the sense of it being
shared, and also in the sense that it is knowledge about aspects of the world that
are ubiquitous, stable, and regular. Significantly, knowledge of this sort appears to
                                                 
44 This was presumably not the case, say ten years ago.  The claim I am making here could be
interestingly investigated by means of a longitudinal study that tracks how certain topics are talked
about over time.
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fall into the set of facts about the world that need not be backed-up in discourse by
direct experience.
4.2.2 Projected Speech and the Represention of Agency and Evaluative       
Position
Human beings differ from most entities in the physical world by displaying
agency and by taking evaluative positions. Animals also display varying degrees
of agency, and evaluate the parts of their world, but human beings appear to be
alone in making the agency of others, and the way they evaluate their world, an
object of communication. In fact, it is typical for human discourse to take the
evaluations and agentive actions of humans as their main topics45.
The goal of this section is to describe how Nanti individuals talk about
agency and about taking evaluative positions, and how such talk involves the use
of speech projection. I will argue that speech projection is one of the most
important means by which Nanti individuals represent in discourse the agency of
individuals and their taking of evaluative positions. As in the previous section, I
shall strive to show how this particular Nanti speech projection practice can be
understood to spring from the interplay of particular ideologies with trajectories of
social action.
It is important to note, however, as a methodological caution, that it is
unlikely that conceptions of agency and evaluation can be transparently read out of
discourse data. We should expect ideological mediation to intervene between the
cognitive and discursive domains, at the same time as ideologies partially
constitute the cognitive domain.
                                                 
45 Some recent work on human cognition argues that the ability of humans to understand each
others as intentional agents is in fact the basis of uniquely human cognitive abilities (Tomasello
2000).
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I therefore restrict my attention in this discussion to how Nanti individuals
represent agency and evaluation in discourse. I wish to be clear here that I am not
making claims about how Nanti individuals conceive of agency or of the nature of
evaluation, nor am I making claims about possible Nanti ethnophilosophies of
agency and evaluation46. Rather, I am seeking to describe how Nanti individuals
communicate about agency and evaluative positions, and specifically, what role of
speech projection plays in such communication. While the results of this
discussion suggest some intriguing possibilities about Nanti ideologies of agency
and evaluation, those matters are beyond the cope of this present work.
The preceding section showed that an examination of projected speech in
Nanti discourse reveals many uses of projected speech in Nanti communicative
interaction that are related to Nanti ideologies of knowledge. However, many
instances of projected speech do not appear to be part of this speech projection
practice.
This is especially the case for instances of speech projection in which the
source situation is not a past situation, but rather a future or conditional situation.
In these instances speech projection cannot be plausibly playing a strictly
evidential function, as described in the previous section.
An examination of speech projection from these non-past source situations
yields an interesting observation: that the projected speech in each case introduces
                                                 
46  As interesting as such questions are, it is unclear whether the ethnographic methodologies of
linguistic anthropology are well-suited to investigating such questions. While I believe that it is
possible to develop robust descriptions of the ways in which agency and evaluative position are
represented in discourse, going from discourse processes to cognitive processes is far from
straightforward. Specifically, I believe that positing straightforward isomorphisms between how a
concept such as agency is represented in discourse, and how that concept operates in other
cognitive spheres leads to highly suspect models of cognitive processes and organization.
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into talk either an evaluative position or a highly agentive interactional move on
the part of the person to whom the speech is attributed.
Significantly, other than descriptions of physical actions, projected speech
is the primary means for communicating about agency in the past as well. As
discussed in section 4.1.2, when utterances constituting what one could call
‘orders’, ‘requests’, and ‘promises’ are extracted from a source situation, they are
rarely transformed into characterizing lexemes. Rather, they are left as speech.
Let us now look at a data segment that exemplifies these uses of projected
speech. The interaction we now examine is one from which I have already
excerpted portions (data segments 4.2, 4.5, and 4.6), the 1998 discussion between
me and Tyejerina, in which he discussed the conditions under which my presence
in Montetoni was welcome. This excerpt is very rich for our present purposes, as
in it, Tyejerina projects both his own speech and that of Migero from a variety of
situations. These include present, negative present, and conditional situations, as
well as past and negative past ones.
Data Segment 4.21
T: tera nonxante       pijataje.
   tera no-n-xant-e    pi-ja-t-aj-e
   NEG  1S-IRP-say-IRI 2S-go-EPC-REG-IRI




I do not say that.
oxanyota           xatinga  onti        pixanti
o-xanyo-t-a        xatinga  o-nt-i      pi-xant-i
3MS-be.like-EPC-RR straight 3MS-COP-RLI 2S-say-RLI
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janta nojataje          notimira.
janta no-ja-t-aj-e      no-tim-i-ra
there 1S-go-EPC-REG-IRI 1S-exist.in.a.place-RLI-DEP
Rather, it is the case that at noon you said “I am going back to my land.”
noxanti    nani, nani, xameti.
no-xant-i  nani  nani  xameti
1S-say-RLI fine  fine  good




nonxa^nte      pijataje
no-n-xant-e    pi-ja-t-aj-e
1S-IRP-say-IRI 2S-go-EPC-REG-IRI
I do not send you away against your will and say “go back.”
jame      nonejaxoti         xanyorira   saburi,
jame      no-nej-axo-t-i     xanyo-rira  saburi
NEG(COND) 1S-see-APP-EPC-RLI be.like-NOM machete
xotsiro, jame       nonejaxoti         nonxa^nte
xotsiro  jame       no-nej-axo-t-i     no-n-xant-e




Had I not seen, for example, the machetes and knives (that you brought), had
I not seen them, I would say “go back.”
itya nonejaxenpi         tera tera nonxante
itya no-nej-ax-e-npi     tera tera no-n-xant-e
when 1S-see-COMP-IRI-2SO NEG  NEG  1S-IRP-say-IRI
janta mabani      pisyaninxa











I did not say (that).
noxanti    jame      pitentiro,           paniro
no-xant-i  jame      pi-tent-i-ro         paniro
1S-say-RLI NEG(COND) 2S-accomany-RLI-3FNO one(AN)
papuntaxa,              inxa^nte        iro
pi-apunt-ax-a           i-n-xant-e      iro
2S-arrive.alone-COMP-RR 3MS-IRR-say-IRI 3FN.PRO
yonta        intinxami peresetente inxa^nte
i-onta       intinxami peresetente i-n-xant-e




I say, had you not accompanied her (i.e. Beier), had you come by yourself, he
would say - that one, the chief, the president - he would say “go back.”
If we now examine each instance of speech projection in this data segment,
we can observe that each one projects either an evaluative position or a highly
agentive move. For example, when Tyejerina indicates that he gives his approval
to our return to our land, he projects his own speech: “noxanti nani, nani, xameti”,
‘I say “fine, fine, good.”’
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Similarly, when he describes behavior on my part that would occasion us
being ordered out of the village, he inserts the highly agentive act of ordering us to
leave as projected speak: ‘inxante/nonxante pijataje’, ‘I/he would say “go back.”’
It is important to note that these phenomena are by no means restricted to
non-past source situations like those comprising the previous example. Consider,
for instance, the following excerpt of a conversation between Esexira and me,
which begins after a 13 second pause following directly on the sequence of talk in
data segment 4.10.
Following the discussion of Tyejerina giving his shirt to Ityarira, I was
curious if perhaps Ityarira had decided to settle in Montetoni, rather than in
Pirijasanteni, as he had originally announced. Migero had suggested to Ityarira that
he re-settle in Montetoni. Ityarira had demurred, however, saying that he would
settle in Pirijasanteni instead. Given the interaction with Tyejerina, however, I
wondered if Ityarira had perhaps reconsidered.
Data Segment 4.22
L: intime pirijasanteni?
   i-n-tim-e         pirijasanteni
   3MS-IRP-exist-IRI pirijasanteni
L: Will he live at Pirijasanteni?
E: intime            pirijasanti.
   in-tim-e          pirijasanti
   3MS-IRP-exist-IRI pirijasanteni
E: He will live at Pirijasanteni.
ixanti,     ixa^nti     axa  noxa- noxogantaxa
i-xant-i    i-xant-i    axa  ?     no-xog-ant-ax-a





He said, he said “there (i.e. Pirijasanteni) is where I want (to live) now.”
noxanti    yonta        ainyo     peresetente.
no-xant-i  y-onta       ainyo     peresetente
1S-say-RLI 3MS-that.one exist(AN) president
I said “there is the peresetente47.”
ixa^nti     ixa^nti     jara     notimi   axa.
i-xant-i    i-xant-i    jara     no-tim-i axa.
3MS-say-RLI 3MS-say-RLI NEG(FUT) 1S-exist-RLI there
He said, he said, “I will not live there (i.e. Montetoni).”
ixa^nti    (noxantatsi ?)     pirijasanteni.
i-xant-i    no-xant-a-tsi     pirijasanteni
3MS-say-RLI 1S-remain-RR-STAT pirijasanteni
He said “I (am staying - partially unintelligible) Pirijasanteni.”
ari    ixan^ti.
ari    i-xant-i
indeed 3MS-say-RLI
That’s what he said.
jee, ari    ixant^i     nontime          pirijasanti.
jee  ari    i-xant-i    no-n-tim-e       pirijasanti
yes indeed  3MS-say-RLI 1S-IRP-exist-IRI pirijasanteni
Yes, that right, he said “I will live in Pirijasanteni.”
ari    maixa nontimaxe             pirjasanteni.
ari    maixa no-n-tim-ax-e         pirijasanteni
indeed now   1S-IRO-exist-COMP-IRI pirijasanteni
                                                 
47 Combining the uptake that Esexira reports in the next line with the fact that Migero attempted to
convince Ityarira on more than one occasion to settle in Montetoni rather than Pirijasanteni, this
utterance apparently serves to index the parts of conversations between Migero and Ityarira in
which Migero sought to convince Ityarira to settle in Montetoni.
124
“Indeed now, I will live in Pirijasanteni.”
L: jeje, xametitaxe.           aityo      xipatsi.
   jeje  xameti-t-ax-e.        aityo      xipatsi
   yes   be.good-EPC-COMP-IRI exist(INAN) soil
L: Right, great. There’s (good) land (there).
E: aityo       xipatsi.
   aityo       xipatsi
   exist(INAN) soil
There’s (good) land (there).
ai-         pine    ainyo     maixa posi^nipageri.
aityo       pine    ainyo     maixa posinipageri.
exist(INAN) you.see exist(AN) now   game
There-, you see now, there’s game (there)
xomaginaro    ainyo.    osyeto,       osyeto.
xomaginaro    ainyo     osyeto        osyeto
woolly.monkey exist(AN) spider.monkey spider.monkey
There’s woolly monkeys. And spider monkeys, spider monkeys.
Thus, my question about where Ityarira will live, which is not really a
question about the future, but rather about Ityarira’s decisions and current
intentions, leads Esexira to project Ityarira’s speech.
Esexira describes Ityarira’s resolve to settle in Pirijasanteni, and to do so
even in the face of efforts by Migero to convince him to settle in Montetoni,
entirely by projecting utterances of Ityarira. At no time does Esexira rely on
descriptions of internal ‘mental’ processes, or even characterizations of Ityarira’s
actions in terms of a social act of some kind (like ‘refusing’).
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It is also the case that Nanti individuals overwhelmingly employ speech
projection to represent their own agency. Thus, speech projection is not simply a
way to discuss the agency of others.
Consider the following sequence of talk from 2000, in which Migero
discusses how he came to visit his brother a few months prior to this conversation,
after having not visited Maranxejari. The excerpt begins with Migero projecting
the speech of his brother-in-law Jorija, who lives in Maranxejari, and who
unexpectedly arrived in Montetoni one day:
Data Segment 4.23
M: ixanti      pirenti    imantsigat^a.
   i-xant-i    pi-irenti  i-mantsiga-t-a
   3MS-say-RLI 2S-brother 3MS-be.sick-EPC-RR
He said , “your brother is sick.”
irota       nojatasita





For that reason I went and visited him over there (in Maranxejari).
noxa^nti   atsi nonxamosotaxite,              je.
no-xant-i  atsi no-n-xamoso-t-axi-t-e         je
1S-say-RLI OK!  1S-IRP-visit-EPC-TRNS-EPC-IRI yes
I said, “Alright, I will visit over there, yes.”
Thus, Migero represents his decision to visit his brother by projecting his
own speech announcing his plans.
Nanti individuals tend to find people’s departures, travels, and arrivals a
point of substantial interest. In discussions about both their own comings and
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goings, as well as those of others, it is very common for Nanti individuals to
project the speech of those departing48 (or arriving) and the reaction of those
present at their departure (or arrival).
Consider the following example, which I recorded during my 2001
fieldwork. The interaction took place a few minutes after Ajorora, the mother of
Migero, the peresetente of Montetoni, and Joja, the peresetente of Maranxejari,
arrived in Montetoni. She now lives in Maranxejari, but she had gone upriver of
Maranxejari with a large group to participate in a xogi-fishing expedition. The
expedition was somewhat of a failure, since not enough xogi was used, but she and
her family group decided to stay and gather jetari.
Erebaxin, one of the men who built the dam, decided to visit his mother
Maroja in Montetoni before he returned to Maranxejari. He arrived on the day
before a feast and left after the communal noon meal on the next day. As he passed
Ajorora, her daughters, and their husbands, who were still camped near the site of
the dam, he mentioned to them that there was oburoxi in Montetoni (i.e. that there
was a feast underway). With this news, Ajorora and the rest of the group decided
that they would visit Montetoni.
Data Segment 4.24
A: jee, oga  ixamotira                oga  xatongo.
   jee  oga  i-xamo-t-i-ra            oga  xatongo.
   yes  that 3MS-make.dam-EPC-RLI-DEP that upriver
A: yes, he built a dam upriver (for xogi-fishing).
L: jee.
                                                 
48 Departures from a settlement are a considerably more common interactional setting for speech
projection than departures from non-settlement sites. This is no doubt in large part because most
non-settlement sites are without human inhabitants (e.g. a garden or hunting site).  Arrivals back to
one’s home does not appear sufficiently newsworthy to warrant speech projection in most cases .
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   jee
   yes
L: yes.
A: mameri. inti        jetari iryo   nagaxe.
   mameri  inti        jetari iryo   no-ag-ax-e
   none    3MS-COP-RLI jetari 3MSPRO 1S-get-COMP-IRI
A: None (i.e. they didn’t get any fish). On the other hand, I got some jetari.
L: tera irage?
   tera i-n-ag-e
   NEG  3MS-IRP-get-IRI
L: He didn’t get (any fish)?
A: ma^meri. tera ira^ge,         aryo mameri.
   mameri   tera i-n-ag-e        aryo   mameri
   none     NEG  3MS-IRP-get-IRI indeed none
A: None. They didn’t get (any fish), indeed none (at all).
inti        jetari iryo nagax^e.
i-nt-i      jetari iryo no-ag-ax-e
3MS-COP-RLI jetari 3MS  1S-get-COMP-IRI
On the other hand, I got some jetari.
C: iryo jetari
   iryo jetari
   3MSPRO jetari
C: jetari
A: iryo nagaxe.         aryota      nagaxe.
   iryo no-ag-ax-e      aryo-ta     no-ag-ax-e
   3MS  1S-get-COMP-IRI indeed-DAFF 1S-GET-COMP-IRI
A: I got some (jetari). That’s right, I got some.
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asi     maixa, maixa noxa^nti - ixanti
asi     maixa  maixa no-xant-i  i-xant-i
so.then now    now   1S-say-RLI 3MS-say-RL
ijataji            ixanti       potsyatira.
i-ja-t-aj-i        i-xant-i     potsya-t-i-ra
3MS-go-EPC-REG-RLI 3MS-say-RLI  be.sweet-EPC-RLI-DEP
A: So then I said49 - he said “he went back (there is) oburoxi” (lit. sweetness,
referring to relatively unfermented oburoxi).
C: aryo   ixanti?
   aryo   i-xant-i
   indeed 3MS-say-RLI
C: Is that right, he said that?
A: xara  noxamosotaji.
   xara  no-xamoso-t-aj-i
   there 1S-visit-EPC-REG-RLI
A: (I said) I’m going back (to Montetoni) to visit.
ixanti      nani.
i-xant-i    nani
3MS-say-RLI fine
A: He said, “fine.”
C: ixanti      nani.
   i-xant-i    nani
   3MS-say-RLI fine
C: He said, “fine.”
It is pertinent that most of the speech that is projected here consists of
utterances announcing departures to various destinations and their interlocutor’s
reactions to those utterances. In the former case, these announcements constitute
                                                 
49 Ajorora interrupts her projection of her own speech here, which she continues in her next turn at
talk, in order to project the speech of Erebaxin, which serves as the motive and pretext for her visit.
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the public manifestation of their decision to travel to some destination, and the
latter, their interlocutor’s evaluation of that decision.
Interestingly, it is not unusual for Nanti individuals to project speech
announcing a departure even when there are no interlocutors present in the source
situation.
For example, during my 2000 fieldwork, Bixotoro was living in
Maranxejari. One day he was fishing and hunting on a very small tributary
between Maranxejari and Montetoni, called Majenpato. He had left Maranxejari
by himself in the morning, and after spending most of the day on the Majenpato by
himself, he headed upriver and arrived in Montetoni in the late afternoon.
After visiting his brother, Migero, he visited me, and I asked him where he
had gone that day, which is a very common topic to broach with a visitor. He
narrated his day, which was marked by little hunting or fishing success, except for
a handful of majo beetles, and then he said:
Data Segment 4.25
B: inpo noxanti    tota nonxamoso^te         ige
   inpo no-xant-i  tota no-n-xamoso-t-e      ige
   then 1S-say-RLI wait 1S-IRP-visit-EPC-IRI my.brother
B: Then I said ‘Hold on, I will visit my brother.”
Given that Bixotoro was alone, it is unlikely that he said this aloud. Rather,
Bixotoro represents the outcome process that led to him choosing to visit his
brother as projected speech.
It is worth noting that Nanti use of projected speech to communicate about
both agency and evaluative positions means that Nanti individuals largely do not
talk about internal states or processes (like ‘mental’ processes) as such. It is highly
unlikely, however, in light of research in cognitive psychology on theories of mind
(e.g. Tomasello 2000) that Nanti individuals do not understand each other as
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having beliefs and intentions, and as making decisions and judgments. An
interesting question for further research, then, is how the use of projected speech
by Nanti individuals articulates with internalistic understandings of agency and
evaluation.
The fact that there appear to be rarely used lexical resources (like the verb
stems /-pintsa/, ‘to decide’ or /-sure/, ‘think’) that can be used to talk about agency
without resort to projected speech gives added significance to the overwhelming
use of projected speech to represent agency in discourse.
While at this time it is not possible to provide a deep explanation for why it
should be the case that Nanti individuals vastly prefer relying on speech projection
to represent human agency and evaluation, it is safe to say that some operative
ideology serves to make internalist (i.e. ‘mentalistic’ or ‘spiritual’) representations
unattractive. Whether this is an ideology of ‘privacy’, which makes the ‘internal’
aspects of agency and evaluation out-of-bounds for discussion, or whether it is an
ideology of the self that involves an alternative formulation of subjectivity that
does not recognize the same distinctions as the Cartesian model of the self, is a
question for further research.
4.2.3 Speech Projection Practices and Social Action
In the previous two sections I have argued that two important spheres of
Nanti speech projection practice arise through the interplay of particular Nanti
ideologies and the communicative needs of interactants in given situations.
My purpose in this section is to provide an extended example of how these
speech projection practices become braided into trajectories of social action and
thereby become socially consequential in Nanti society. Using evidence from a
series of events that transpired during my 2000 fieldwork, I seek to show how
Nanti speech projection practices were critically involved in the way that a
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complex social and political situation developed between the two Nanti
communities.
The empirical basis for this section is the actions and discourse surrounding
the relocation of three families from Montetoni to Maranxejari in 2000. The first
family to relocate to Maranxejari went there due to the sickness of the family’s
youngest child. Critically, the adult man of the family was Bixotoro, brother to
both Migero and Joja, peresetentes of Montetoni and Maranxejari, respectively.
The parents felt that they might be more likely to obtain medicine or healthcare in
Maranxejari and went down to seek help for the child.
Once there, though, his brother Joja began to put pressure on Bixotoro to
remain permanently in Maranxejari. Remain he did, although he did not begin
building a house there by the time of our arrival in June 2000, which was taken by
many Nanti individuals to signal a certain ambivalence.
The second family to relocate to Maranxejari also did so at Joja’s urging.
The adult man of the family, Josuxaro, had been hunting near Maranxejari for
several weeks, taking advantage of the fruiting maxatexi trees in the area to hunt
the xusi (Crested Guan) that come to feed on the fruit50.
For some time Josuxaro and his family stayed in small shelters on the
riverbank, as is typical during extended hunting trips. However, Maranxejari was
so close to the area in which he was hunting - less than half an hour’s walk - that
Josuxaro and his family began to spend the evenings in Maranxejari, where sexatsi
and more comfortable lodgings were available51.
                                                 
50 Josuxaro devotes a considerable part of his hunting activity to hunting with blinds, which is most
successful near fruiting trees.  It is not unusual for his family to leave Montetoni with him for days
at a time to be together near the hunting area.
51 Josuxaro’s family had also depleted their gardens, and had been relying on their neighbors for
sexatsi for some time. It is possible that Josuxaro’s family also saw staying in Maranxejari as an
opportunity to obtain sexatsi without continuing to ask their neighbors in Montetoni.
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Once the family began to spend evenings in Maranxejari, however, Joja
began to urge him to relocate entirely to Maranxejari. Josuxaro in effect acceded to
Joja’s urgings by not returning to Montetoni for several months and by sleeping in
Maranxejari. His wife and youngest children for the most part stayed in
Maranxejari entirely during this time.
The third family relocated after the adult man of the family, Jeronima, lost
a fishing net that he had borrowed. The loss of the net was keenly felt by both its
owner and by the others who borrowed it, and based on comments made in
Montetoni, it appears that many people considered that Jeronima made insufficient
efforts to retrieve the lost net. Given that they were willing to voice these opinions
to me, it is likely that the man in question was also subjected to them, which would
no doubt have been a socially awkward situation.
In the space of a few short months then, three families had relocated from
Montetoni to Maranxejari. The political significance of this set of circumstances
was two-fold. First, the population size of Maranxejari is a point of special concern
to Joja, who appears to regard it as an index of the importance and legitimacy of
the community. The arrival of these three families was thus a significant boost, in
Joja’s eyes, to the community of which he was the leader. At the same time, Nanti
individuals presently appear to identify an individual’s place of residence with
particular attitudes and loyalties. Thus, many Nanti individuals appear to have seen
this series of relocations not merely as a change in residence, but also a change in
allegiances.
When Chris Beier and I arrived in late June 2000, many of the residents of
Montetoni were quite unsettled about the relocation of the families. What seemed
to trouble people the most was the uncertainty of what was happening, and why. In
each case the families had left with no word indicating that their departure would
be permanent; they simply did not return. Chance encounters between hunters in
the areas between the two communities served to communicate that the families
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were staying in Maranxejari, but no information about their motives for doing so
was available to the residents of Montetoni.
Moreover, visits between the two communities had ceased after Bixotoro
failed to return. Although visits between the two communities are infrequent under
usual conditions, Migero normally makes a point to visit Maranxejari roughly once
a month. His mother and sisters also come to visit Montetoni with a similar
frequency. However, Migero had not visited Maranxejari for many months, and
visits from Maranxejari had also ceased. Evidently, all parties felt it preferable to
break off contact as the situation developed. However, the cessation of these inter-
village visits also meant that information flow between the two communities was
significantly reduced.
When I asked individuals in Montetoni what the families were doing in
Maranxejari, and why they had relocated downriver, they would say “tera inxante”
“he did not say”. The broaching of the topic, however, would each time cast a pall
over the conversation, with people turning quiet and serious. Thus, although there
was very little talk about the situation, when it did come up, people’s demeanors
showed that they considered it a grave matter.
At the same time, people were eager to have us talk about what we had
heard while passing through Maranxejari on the way upriver. Unfortunately,
although both Bixotoro and Josuxaro had said to us “notimi axa maixa”, ‘I live
here now’, we were too surprised, and too busy with the tasks of arriving and
pushing on to Montetoni to investigate further. Nevertheless, the fact that I was
able to project Bixotoro and Josuxaro’s speech to the effect that they had relocated
to Maranxejari caused consternation.
Migero complained that these were the first words that he had heard on the
matter, and repeated “tera inxantena, tera inxamantena,” ‘he didn’t speak to me
(about it), he didn’t tell me’. He pointed out with some distress that he had to hear
this news from me, rather than from the people who had relocated.
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Despite the fact that everyone in Montetoni now seemed to believe, based
on what I had told them, that the families planned to stay in Maranxejari, there was
still relatively little talk about the matter.
Roughly a week later, Beier and I visited Maranxejari to attend to some
health care matters in the community. While there we spoke to both Bixotoro and
Jeronima, who asked if we had told the people in Montetoni that they had both
said that they were now living in Maranxejari. We said that we had, and projected
the speech of several people in Montetoni asking what else had been said. We also
projected Migero’s statements that he had to hear about their decision to relocate
from us.
Although they had broached the topic, both Bixotoro and Jeronima soon
seemed quite uncomfortable, and seemed especially embarrassed when I related
Migero’s complaints. However, we did not ask for, nor did they offer, any
elaboration on their motives and reasons for relocating to Maranxejari. In the
afternoon of that same day Beier and I returned to Montetoni.
When we returned to Montetoni, we were almost immediately asked by
several people, including Migero, to relate what Bixotoro, Josuxaro, and Jeronima
had said during our visit. Unfortunately we were not able to provide much new
information, though people were interested that we had told Bixotoro and
Jeronima about Migero’s comments. Nevertheless, we could tell that what little
news we did provide spread rapidly through the community, based on
conversations we overheard.
The next major development occurred roughly a week later, when
Bixotoro, Jeronima, and Joja arrived in Montetoni early one morning. They made a
beeline for Migero’s hut where they stayed for about half an hour. Jeronima and
Bixotoro had come to announce their relocation to Maranxejari, and to give an
account of why they had decided to do so.
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After Bixotoro and Jeronima had made their announcements, food was
given to the visitors. The conversation after the meal was very subdued and the
visitors appeared eager to return to Maranxejari. They left shortly thereafter.
Immediately after the departure of the visitors, intense discussions began
around the village, relaying what the visitors had said to those not present for the
original utterance (including Beier and myself).
During this visit, two specific utterances were made by the visitors that
reverberated for weeks afterwards. The first was one of Bixotoro, that he was
relocating to Maranxejari because there was ‘xameti xipatsi’, ‘good land’, there.
The second was made by Jeronima, proclaiming that ‘nojoxanajaxero nobanxo’, ‘I
am abandoning my house.’
Bixotoro’s utterance became the topic of quite a bit of discussion, since this
echoed the rhetoric of the conflict between Araña and the Montetoni Nanti in
1996-1997. Bixotoro’s explanation that he was moving to Maranxejari because
there was good land there implied that the land in the Montetoni was inadequate.
However, both Jeronima and Bixotoro had been vocal proponents during the 1996-
1997 period of the opposite position that the land in the Montetoni area was good
land. This about-face left many Nanti individuals very puzzled.
However, what developed as the main focus of the community-wide
discourse regarding the relocation of the families to Maranxejari was Jeronima’s
utterance regarding his abandoning of the house. This utterance became the basis
of a powerful criticism of Jeronima’s and Bixotoro’s relocation to Maranxejari,
which framed the relocation of the familes as the abandonment of houses that had
been built through communal labor.
The construction of the village was an effort that involved considerable
collaborative labor. Anywhere between five and fifteen men were involved in the
construction of each house, ensuring that they were completed very rapidly -
typically in less than a week.
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The developing discourse pointed out that by abandoning these houses,
those who had relocated to Maranxejari had in essence thrown away the labor that
their neighbors and friends had provided. Nanti individuals pointedly stated that
the help would not have been given if it had been known that the houses would
shortly be abandoned.
I first heard this point articulated by Migero, but it swept through the
community swiftly, so that within a few days everyone with whom I broached the
topic of the relocated families made the observation that they had abandoned their
houses - houses that ‘maganiro’, ‘everyone’ had built. Critically, the projection of
Jeronima’s speech played a central role in these criticisms, forming the basis upon
which the criticism was built.
During the next feast, a considerable number of chants were devoted to
reiterations of this basic point, and this continued to be an important theme for
chants in the subsequent feasts held during our stay.
In a period of a few short days, then, the situation had changed radically.
For many months, there had been concern about the relocation of the families to
Maranxejari, but no coherent public discourse had emerged that articulated how
the residents of Montetoni evaluated the events. Even confirmation that Beier and I
were able to provide that the families had in fact relocated to Maranxejari did not
provoke the emergence of a discourse that evaluated the relocation of the families.
The event that triggered the development of a community-wide ideological
response, articulated through a set of discursive positions regarding the
abandonment of houses, was the visit of Bixotoro and Jeronima, and the
projectable speech that this visit made available.
I now want to reflect on the sequence of events I have just outlined in light
of the discussions of the previous two sections on the role of projected speech in
making knowledge claims, and in representing agency and evaluation.
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First consider the role that Beier and I played in providing the first
confirmation of what must have been reasonably inferable from the
circumstances52, namely that the three families had indeed relocated. Significantly,
the news we provided in the form of projected speech that the three families were
now living in Maranxejari was not treated as a perfunctory confirmation of an
obvious fact. Rather, the speech we projected was re-projected by Nanti
individuals in discussions about the serious state of affairs.
I argue that the fact that the news we brought to Montetoni was important
in both social and communicative terms was a consequence of two factors. First,
prior to our bringing this news, any discussion about whether the families had truly
decided to live in Maranxejari would have violated the evidential criteria for
making knowledge claims in Nanti discourse. In the terms used in section 3.4.1,
this would have been a ‘far inference’, and thus not a suitable basis for making a
knowledge claim. Second, prior to our arrival in Montetoni that year, there had
been no speech available from Bixotoro, Josuxaro, or Jeronima for projection that
addressed the fact that they had decided to relocate. Since we projected their
intention to stay as an utterance, this made the utterance available for re-
projection, making it possible to say that the three men had decided to relocate. In
the absence of the utterance we projected, Nanti ideologies regarding
representations of agency in discourse made unacceptable talk about any decision
that the three men might have made.
                                                 
52 By this point, Bixotoro had been gone for over six months, and even Jeronima had been gone for
about three months. There is no precedent in Nanti social life for a ‘visit’ of anything over a few
days in length, so I imagine that the conclusion that they had relocated was fairly clear. This did not
make the conclusion one that could be readily talked about, however, since discussion of their
decisions to relocate would depend on the availability of projectable speech.
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Similar observations can be made about the sudden development of the
discourse criticizing the relocation of the three families after the visit of Bixotoro
and Jeronima to Montetoni.
Until Bixotoro and Jeronima returned to announce their relocation and to
provide an account of their departure, talk about the situation was apparently quite
restricted, and in any event, no public evaluation of their relocation developed.
It was only when substantive projectable speech became available that a public
discourse evaluating the relocation arose.
There is good evidence, however, that it was not a simple lack of interest in
the relocation on the part of the residents of Montetoni that accounted for the
absence of any public discourse prior to the visit of Jeronima and Bixotoro. As I
mentioned above, there appeared to be keen interest and consternation about the
state of affairs.
Rather, I interpret the events as evidence of the centrality for Nanti
individuals of projectable speech for talking about the motivations and decisions of
others. Since Nanti individuals rarely talk about the decisions and motivation of
others by reference to internal states or processes, and instead employ projected
speech to discuss the intentionality and agency of others, this makes the
availability of projectable speech crucial for such discussions.
In the events following the relocation of the families to Maranxejari,
however, there was no such speech available to be projected. It is for this reason, I
believe, that my early inquiries in Montetoni regarding the motivations of those
who had left consistently yielded the response ‘tera inxante’, ‘he didn’t say.’ In a
significant sense, I suggest, the absence of projectable speech rendered their
motivations undiscussable.
This immediately changed, of course, once Jeronima and Bixotoro visited.
Almost immediately, the residents of Montetoni began discussing the motivations
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that Jeronima and Bixotoro had provided, a process that depended crucially on
projecting Jeronima’s and Bixotoro’s speech.
The first theme that arose in these discussions was contrasting the reason
cited for the relocation, namely that there was good land available in Maranxejari,
with both Bixotoro’s own speech from several years prior and the actual quality of
land in Maranxejari and Montetoni. Several people I spoke to enumerated the
reasons for the superiority of land near Montetoni, citing the large areas of arable
land available nearby, the relative plentitude of palm thatch, the superior river
conditions for xogi-fishing, and the greater plentitude of game. By contrast, this
discourse evaluated the motivation of those who had relocated to Maranxejari as
senseless.
Then, discussion depending on Jeronima’s announcement that he was
abandoning his house served to cast the relocation - because it involved the
abandonment of houses - as a socially unconscionable act. This discourse took
Jeronima’s use of the verb /-jox/, ‘to discard, set aside’ as its central theme53. The
focus of this discourse was the fact that Jeronima’s house was the result of
communal activity, something that ‘everyone’ had built. People reiterated that
“tera irobatixero paniro,” ‘he didn’t build it by himself,’ suggesting that it might
be appropriate to abandon a house that one built oneself, but not one that had been
built by the community. During subsequent feasts, many Nanti individuals even
chanted “jara nojoxanaxero nobanxo,” ‘I will not abandon my house,’ thereby
contrasting their agency with that of those who had relocated.
The public discourse thus condemned the relocation of the families to
Maranxejari in two important ways. Each strand of the discourse required as its
basis, however, the projectable speech of Jeronima and Bixotoro.
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I argue that this is best understood as a demonstration of the importance of
projected speech in discussing agency in Nanti discourse. Unlike speech
communities in which speculative discussion of other’s internal states lead to
discussions of other’s motivations, decisions, and opinions (like our own, for
example), Nanti society appears to disprefer such speculation. This makes the
propagation of utterances through speech projection a critical factor in the
development of public discourses.
In the events outlined above, I contend, the atypical geographical
separation of the social actors led to a situation in which projectable utterances
which were critical for the development of a public discourse on the important
events effecting the communities were unavailable, impeding the development of
this discourse. This in turn delayed the development of an ideological response to
the novel and critical set of circumstances in which the residents of Montetoni
found themselves.
The effect of the development and circulation of this discourse is not
entirely clear to me, since I left Montetoni a few weeks later and did not return
until the subsequent year. Nevertheless, by the time I returned in 2001, two of the
three families had returned to Montetoni. Only Jeronima had built a house and
stayed in Maranxejari. Whatever the series of events that led to the return of the
two families to Montetoni, it is hard to imagine that public evaluations of their
relocation to Maranxejari did not play a role in the process.
                                                                                                                                       
53 Significantly, this verb is used do describe the abandonment of one person by another, especially
for individuals who leave one spouse to take another. This discarding constitutes a rejection of one
person in favor of another.
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Chapter 5: Nanti Speech Projection Practices from a Comparative
Perspective
5.0 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the empirical evidence,
analyses, and theoretical positions taken in the previous chapters from a broader
ethnographic perspective. By doing so it possible to gain further insight into the
possible variation of speech projection strategies, as well as to see how similar
strategies may be utilized in differently in different societies to produce quite
dissimilar speech projection practices.
Comparative work of this nature serves two purposes. First, it allows us to
begin a typology of speech projection strategies, an important step in building a
truly useful framework for the cross-cultural studies of projected speech. Second,
comparative work gives us further insight into how speech projection practices
arise from the intersection of speech projection strategies, salient local ideologies,
and communicative and social goals. By seeing how, for example, similar or
identical speech projected strategies are incorporated into quite distinct speech
projection practices, it is possible to better understand the role of ideology in the
emergence of speech projection practices.
Some of the best research on speech reporting practices for comparative
purposes coincidentally examines speech reporting in three other indigenous
societies of the Greater Amazon region: the Kalapalo of the upper Río Xingu of
central Brazil, the Kuna of Panama’s San Blas archipelago, and the Shokleng of
eastern Brazil54.
                                                 
54 An absence from this list that might be noted by those familiar with studies of reported speech in
indigenous Latin America is Larson’s work on Aguaruna reported speech (Larson 1978). The
Aguaruna are a Jivaroan people of some 40,000 individuals who live in northern Peru. Given the
relative geographic proximity of the Aguaruna to the Nanti, it is possible that Aguaruna speech
projection practices are related to those of the Nanti.
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There is evidence that the importance of reported speech in Nanti, Kuna,
and Kalapalo society may not be at all atypical for Amazonian societies, but might
reflect an areal discourse trait (Beier, Michael, and Sherzer, to appear). In addition,
other studies of indigenous Amazonian languages that do not incorporate an
ethnographic focus on discourse nevertheless give indications that reported speech
plays a major role in communicative activity in those societies (Larson 1983,
Longacre 1976).
5.1 Kalapalo
The first set of speech projection practices I examine are those of story-
tellers among the Kalapalo, a group of some 200 individuals living in the upper
Xingu region of central Brazil, whose oral traditions have been studied extensively
by Ellen Basso (Basso 1985, 1986, 1987,1995, 2000).
Basso examines Kalapalo speech projection practices in the context of an
important part of Kalapalo verbal life, the telling of certain traditional narratives,
called akiña. These narratives principally concern happenings in the mythic past,
and are frequently related in public performances.
Basso’s research reveals two particularly interesting features of projected
speech in akiña narratives. First, that projected speech is the principal means by
which akiña performers render the affective postures, motives, and subjective
perspectives of characters in these narratives. Says Basso,
                                                                                                                                       
Larson’s study is based on a significant corpus of written texts, but unfortunately for the
present purposes, her approach to reported speech is neither ethnographic or interactionally-
grounded in its methodology. Instead, she examines reported speech as it relates to discourse
grammar, a formalistic approach to grammatical organization on the super-sentential level
(Longacre 1983). Consequently her theoretical syntheses are not germane to themes I develop here,
and an understanding of how the data she presents speaks to speech reporting practices, as I have
outlined them, would require a complete reanalysis of her basic data.
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In fact, in all Kalapalo stories (historical or otherwise) the emotions and
motives of the characters (and thus the uniqueness of the characters
themselves) are realized through their quoted speech, rather than through
labels or a narrator’s more direct description of feelings and motives.
(Basso 1995, p295)
Basso’s comments on this use of projected speech by Kalapalo akiña
performers strikingly parallels Nanti uses of projected speech (see section 3.4.2),
in which Nanti individuals frequently represent human agency and evaluative
posture, not through the labeling of acts or processes (e.g. ‘decisions, ‘orders’,
‘attitudes’, ‘judgements’), but rather by projecting utterances that are attributed to
the relevant parties.
Although Basso’s most detailed work on quoted speech principally
concerns how individuals’ biographies are represented (Basso 1995), in examining
this question she touches on issues of how their agency and their evaluative
postures are represented, and reveals further similarities with certain Nanti speech
projection strategies. As Basso remarks:
A character’s subjective version of reality emerges from an interactive,
interpersonal field of interpretation, planning, and the formulation of goals,
as well as the comprehension of consequences as they are spoken about
with others. Such interpretations are constituted as speech-centered events
(rather than, for example, “thoughts” or even “utterances”) during which
people comment upon, validate, or dispute one another. (ibid., p296)
Kalapalo akiña performers thus appear to eschew reference to ‘internal
processes’ (e.g. ‘thoughts’) in describing and comprehending human action, just as
Nanti individuals do. Basso notes, as I have for Nanti individuals (see section 4.2),
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that “Even when acting alone, a person will be described as speaking” (Basso
1996, p 38).
Basso also notes a preponderance of projected speech in the phases of
narratives that focus on affect and motive. This indicates that not only is it possible
to employ projected speech for representing the subjectivity of individuals, but that
this use constitutes one of its major communicative functions. Says Basso,
In stories people tell about their pasts, conversational dialogues are most
apparent when emotional events and problems of motive are foregrounded,
and it is in such contexts that the speaking personality appears in all its
surprising idiosyncrasy. (ibid., p302)
The second aspect of Kalapalo speech projection practices that reflects
interestingly on those of Nanti society is the evidential dimension of Kalapalo
“quoted speech”. As in Nanti society, Kalapalo individuals understand quoted
speech to be “actual reproductions of things said,” but this latter notion is more
subtle than it might first appear:
I have used the phrase “quoted speech” rather than “reported speech”
because the Kalapalo understand these conversations to have been
ultimately learned from actual participants in the events in question, actual
reproductions of the things said. We might question whether such words
were “really” spoken in the past, though evidentiality often provides good
reason to accept some conversations as well remembered. But this is to
miss the more important point about quoted speech, which is that Kalapalo
narrators use it to realize ideas of the emotional quality of interpersonal
contact, which has a deeper truth for them than whether they are literally
replicating speech. (ibid., p295)
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Basso’s comments regarding the “deeper truth” that guides Kalapalo akiña
performers in their speech projection suggest that they operate with a notion of
faithfulness when projecting speech that is not cogently captured by the traditional
conception of faithfulness in speech reporting as isomorphisms between
segmentable forms in the reported and reporting events. As Basso remarks, akiña
performers employ quoted speech to realize the “emotional qualities of
interpersonal contact,” rather than simply “replicating speech”. As such, it appears
that the performers of akiña narratives are guided by faithfulness to qualities of
individuals and of their interactions, which is very similar to what appears to guide
Nanti speakers in certain uses of projected speech55.
This indicates that a notion of ‘faithfulness’ that depends on the
congruence of reported utterances to the personal and interactional qualities of
individuals to whom the utterances are attributed is not restricted to Nanti society.
This fact suggests that a deeper understanding of what such a type of faithfulness
constitutes, and how it operates in speech projection, would be a fruitful direction
for further research.
In comparing Kalapalo and Nanti speech projection practices, I find the
parallels between the two systems of practice quite remarkable, considering that
the two groups speak genetically unrelated languages (Kalapalo is a Carib
language), and that they occupy opposite peripheries of the Amazon basin,
separated by more than 3000 kilometers. The parallels are all the more remarkable
because the number of societies for which detailed ethnographic information on
speech projection practices exists is so small.
                                                 
55 In this light, it would be very interesting to know how uses of projected speech by akiña
performers compare to uses of projected speech by Kalapalo individuals in other communicative
contexts, especially ones in which performance is less foregrounded.
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These parallels raise several intriguing questions for future work. Are these
parallels an indication of an areally-diffused set of ideologies that inform speech
projection practices across the Amazon Basin? Are these practices, as Basso
suggests, part of a cohesive ideological and discursive system that links language,
personhood, and interaction (see below)? Or do these parallels, rather than
indicating the operation of diffusional processes, indicate that speech projection
offer certain affordances that are available in any speech community for the
representation of agency, subjectivity, and evaluative posture?
In closing, I want to remark on Basso’s comments on the significance of an
understanding of Kalapalo uses of projected speech:
In another light, the way speech is quoted - what is said and how what is
said points to something beyond the particular instance of speaking itself -
reveals ideas the Kalapalo have about language itself, its use as
conversation, and its functions and consequences for thought and action. In
short, a careful look at quoted speech in Kalapalo stories directs us to an
understanding of how particular characters are conceived and related to
each other, and how these conceptions suggest a broader framework of
propositions about language, personhood, and society. (Basso 1987, p229)
Basso thus sees in projected speech a useful tool to examine the
interrelation of language, personhood, and social organization, which are each
factors in speech projection practices. This interrelation, which has also been the
subject of philosophical and theoretical elaboration by Benjamin Lee (1997), can
be understood to arise, at least in part, from the fact that speech projection
practices take language itself as the object of socially strategic manipulation and
transmission. Speech projection practices thereby bind language, the person, and
society, and the ideologies that constitute these components, in a single
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communicative moment. While I have scratched the surface of how these
processes operate in Nanti society, it is clear that considerable work is still
required to gain a deep understanding of the processes that link these different
facets of the communicative moment.
Despite significant similarities in Nanti and Kalapalo uses of projected
speech revealed by a review of Basso’s research, there are no doubt important
differences in the kinds of processes and states that Kalapalo and Nanti individuals
find it interesting or useful to represent via projected speech. A fine-grained
comparison of Nanti and Kalapalo speech projection practices would no doubt
point to revealing differences and similarities that would shed an interesting light
on the speech projection practices found in each society. That remains a task for
further investigation.
5.2 Kuna
I now turn to the speech projection practices of the Kuna, which contrast
with those found among the Nanti in some revealing ways. The Kuna are a
relatively large indigenous group of some 35,000 individuals (De Gerdes 2000)
living principally along the Caribbean coasts of Panama and Colombia, whose
speaking practices generally, and speech projection practices in particular, have
been studied by Joel Sherzer (1983, 1990).
Sherzer’s work on what I call speech projection practices, has focused on
what he has characterized as the “retellings and reformulations” that are
widespread in Kuna discourse (Sherzer 1981, 1983). Sherzer’s work is
illuminating in two different ways. First, it provides a detailed description of social
uses of reported speech that appear to be quite different in important ways from
the social uses of reported speech in Nanti. Second, the varieties of retellings and
reformulations that Sherzer describes provide an interesting example of how
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discursive genres and speaking practices in a single society can be organized by
the different strategies of projections that are employed in them.
One of the principal uses of projected speech in Kuna society, according to
Sherzer, is to harness other people’s words to communicate about some matter of
concern to the speaker. As Sherzer remarks:
Kuna speakers tend to present facts, opinions, or arguments not as their
own but as retellings and reformulations of what others have previously
said. Discourse of all kinds is heavily embedded with speech that has
previously occurred, typically in the form of first-person direct quotation.
(Sherzer 1983, p 202)
As Sherzer describes it, this strategy enables Kuna speakers to present arguments
or comments not as something arising from a possibly biased speaker, but as a
simple factual report:
While quoted, embedded speech is frequently found in colloquial Kuna, the
more formal the discourse, the greater the potential for embedding within
embedding - the placing of words in the mouths of others being one the
major Kuna rhetorical strategies. It is possible to adopt a certain point of
view or argue for a particular position as though it does not belong to
oneself but is simply a report of what someone else has said, in a ‘gathering
house’ speech, in a personal conversation, or in a dream. An individual’s
own behavior can be cleverly extolled and compared with that of another
which is criticized, all as part of a retelling. (Sherzer 1983, p 203-204)
Thus, projected speech in Kuna society appears to be used to distance the
speaker (i.e. the person projecting the speech) from the utterance. In this way it is
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possible to make criticisms, for example, without socially committing oneself to
that critical position, which might risk direct confrontation:
Since the Kuna continually insist on viewing themselves as a harmonious,
egalitarian society, the process of deeply embedding criticism of others in
the form of quotations with quotations functions, like ritualized dialogue
and ‘counsel, ’ to avoid face-to-face confrontation between individuals.
This rhetorical strategy is a most appropriate and useful form of social
control in Kuna society (Sherzer 1983, p204-205).
In this respect, the interactional use to which Kuna speakers put speech
projection diverges substantially from Nanti uses of projected speech. In
particular, Nanti speakers use projected speech to link themselves unambiguously
to evaluative positions (see chapter 4), rather than using it as a way to obscure
their relationship to a given evaluation. Indeed, everything about Nanti speech
projection practices suggests that a person is intimately linked with their
utterances56.
Sherzer’s observations serve as a clear reminder of the fact that speech
projection strategies, even when possibly underwritten by similar ideologies (see
footnote), may be organized into strikingly different speech projection practices.
Such differences arise, despite possible ideological congruences, because of the
different interactional settings that arise in different societies, which lead in turn to
individuals formulating different kinds of social goals, and employing different
strategies to pursue them. Speech projection practices therefore can never be
                                                 
56 It is also possible to see Kuna uses of projected speech in the same light, but in the Kuna case,
the linkage between speakers and their utterances is used in a ‘negative’ sense. That is, by using
someone else’s words, one avoids identification with the sentiment or content of those words.
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reduced analytically to expressions of ideology, but must instead be seen as
emerging through the interplay of ideology, speech projection, and social action.
Another feature of Kuna speech projection that differs markedly from
Nanti speech projection is the depth of embedding of utterance within utterance
found in Kuna projected speech, and the resulting ambiguity which can arise
regarding to whom an utterance is being attributed.
Sherzer has noted instances of up to five levels of embedding in certain
retellings (Sherzer 1983, p 203). Interestingly, in Nanti speech projection, I have
yet to observe more than three levels of embedding, and even three levels is quite
unusual. The fact that this kind of embedding exists in Kuna discourse, but not in
Nanti discourse, strongly suggests that Nanti speakers find some aspect of multiple
embedding problematic.
One possibility is that the problem with multiple embeddings in Nanti
speech projection is one of evidentiality. In this context, it is revealing that the
cases of greatest embedding depth found in Kuna discourse appear to arise in
narrative episodes in which the time depth of the projected utterances reaches into
the earliest eras of Kuna history. These are necessarily periods of history of which
the speakers have no direct experience, and indeed, one has to move far down the
chain of embedded utterances before the speech of an individual with direct
experience of the matter at hand is being projected. Thus, the multiple embeddings
of Kuna discourse are also a series of steps back in time, with each step carrying
the speaker further and further away from direct experience of the matters being
discussed. As discussed in section 4.2, distance from direct experience is
problematic in making knowledge claims in Nanti discourse, and this could serve
to make high degrees of embedding problematic under most circumstances.
The epistemic fuzziness of multiple embedding is also attested to by the
ambiguity regarding to whom utterances should be attributed in the deeper levels
of embedding. As noted in section 4.1, Nanti individuals do not attribute utterances
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to vague or ambiguous sources, and this too would appear to militate against the
use of multiple embeddings in Nanti discourse, if the ambiguity that arises in Kuna
discourse is indicative of the attributional problems that arise with multiple
embeddings.
Finally, I want to turn to an examination of one form of retelling that
Sherzer mentions, those by arkar (chief’s spokesmen) of a chief’s chant, to show
how this genre can be succinctly analyzed and described in terms of the projected
speech framework outlined in the previous chapter.
Arkar retellings involve the recounting of a chief’s chant immediately after
its performance in a gathering house meeting. These retellings, which are largely
an extended series of instances of speech projection, involve recasting into
everyday Kuna speech the original utterances of the chief, which frequently
employ highly esoteric and metaphorical language.
This discourse genre is thus centrally organized by particular strategies of
transformation involved in the projection of the chief’s talk. In particular, these
strategies involve the replacement of terms and turns of phrase from an esoteric
lexicon with ones from a more quotidian one. In short, the discourse genre of
arkar retellings can be distinguished from those of the chiefs precisely by the
speech projection strategies involved.
This example is also interesting in that it exemplifies a kind of
transformation strategy not found in Nanti society, that of lexical substitution from
a parallel lexicon57.
Kuna speech projection practices thus contrast with Nanti practices in
several interesting ways that enrich both our understanding of the diversity of
speech projection strategies, and our appreciation of the complexity of interplay
                                                 
57 One can see phenomena as diverse as bowdlerization and translation as instances of similar
strategies.
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between ideology and social interaction in the genesis of speech projection
practices.
5.3 Shokleng
I turn next to Urban’s discussions of some of the important processes
involved in the transcription and translation of audio-recordings of Shokleng
discourse by Shokleng consultants, which shed an interesting light on processes of
transformation involved in speech projection. The Shokleng are an indigenous
group of some 400 individuals who live in eastern Brazil, and are speakers of a Ge
language.
The process of speech projection, as I described it in the preceding chapter,
bears some interesting parallels to what Greg Urban calls “transduction”, the
process by which discourse from an original context is relocated to a new one
(Urban 1996). Urban’s discussion of the transcription and translation of Shokleng
audio recording is intended as an exploration of some of the processes of
transduction involved in the creation of transcribed texts and as such makes
several observations relevant to understanding the transformative processes
involved in speech projection.
Two aspects of transduction that Urban observed in the creation of the
Shokleng texts are especially germane: the systematic deletion and addition of
features in the written text that were absent in the audio-recording, and the role of
power relations in the ‘faithfulness’ of the transcript to the recording.
In the first case, Urban found that when Nãnmla, a literate Shokleng
consultant, transcribed audio-recordings of myths that Urban recorded from Nil, a
respected Shokleng elder, certain systematic differences between the audio-
recording and the transcribed text emerged. These differences ranged from the
presence in the transcribed text of morphemes that were absent from the “phonetic
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trace” of the audio-recording, to the absence of morphemes and even entire
phrases from the text that were present in the recording.
Urban summarized the systematic differences in two observations:
1. The text explicitly included segmentable forms that were not explicitly present
in the original recording, but which were pragmatically inferable by the
transcriber.
2. The text did not include metadiscursive elements present in the recording that
served to mark portions of the recording as “errors” or “deviations” from intended
utterances. Similarly, the “errors” so marked were absent from the transcribed text,
and the “corrections” were present without other comment.
In terms of the projected speech framework, the systematic differences
noted by Urban between the recording and text-artifact versions of the recorded
interaction constitute evidence of the use of specific hypertactic and hypotactic
strategies of transformation by Nãnmla in the projection of Nil’s speech from the
audio-recording to the text-artifact. Urban thus provides us with a very clear and
detailed example of the ways in which these strategies work in a specific setting. 
The challenge for future my research on speech projection in Nanti society
is to similarly characterize the nature of the hypo- and hypertactic strategies
employed in everyday Nanti interaction.
It is important to mention that according to Urban, Nãnmla had as a very
conscious goal the most accurate replication possible of the authoritative
recordings of Shokleng myths that he was working from. The above
transformations, therefore, are part of what Nãnmla considered accurate
reproduction of the original. While these transformations are part of a fairly
culturally novel activity (transcription of audio materials for an anthropologist) for
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Nañmla, the Shokleng consultant, it is to be expected that Nãnmla organized this
new activity by recourse to his (ideological) understandings of language and
meaning. However, in what way the transformations involved in Nãnmla’s
projection of Nil’s speech are related to Shokleng speech reporting practices more
generally, Urban did not comment.
The second interesting observation that Urban makes in the context of his
study of transduction in the already-mentioned transcription process concerns the
role of power relationships in affecting the ‘faithfulness’ of the transduction. In
this area, Urban’s research focuses on the systematic differences between
transcriptions produced by two different consultants, Nãnmla and Wãñpõ. Nãnmla,
already discussed above, regarded the Shokleng elder Nil as an unquestioned
authority on matters of cultural knowledge, such as the audio-recorded myth. The
second consultant, Wãñpõ, was a peer of Nil’s, and was regarded by both other
Shokleng and himself to be an authority on par with Nil. The relationship between
Nil and Nãnmla was therefore quite asymmetric with respect to their status as
“knowers” of the myth, while that between Nil and Wãñpõ was relatively
symmetric.
What Urban found was that the transcription produced by Wãñpõ diverged
from the original audio-recording to a greater degree than that produced by
Nãnmla, and in particular “responded” to the text to a much greater degree,
“correcting” the audio-recording in places that he found wanting (Urban 1996, p
30 - 33). This led Urban to observe that
The more symmetrical and egalitarian the relationship between the
originator and copier ... the greater will be the divergence between copy
and original, and the more likely will it be for the copier to respond to the
originator. (ibid., p 37).
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In other words, power relationships play a role in the degree to which (and,
perhaps, in which ways) projected speech is transformed.
Urban’s observation thus brings power relations directly into speech
projection practices, a lacuna in my treatment of the phenomenon up to this point.
While theorizing the place of power relations in speech projection practices is
beyond the scope of the present work, it seems likely that future work will reveal
differences like those noted by Urban to be understandable in terms of the
differential access that individuals have to certain transformational strategies in
particular social contexts (Bourdieu 1991).
My own impressionistic observations regarding the use of transformation
strategies in Nanti speech projection also point to the significance of power-
relations in Nanti speaking practices. I have observed, for example, that politically
and socially prominent individuals, such as Migero and Tyejerina, appear more
likely to project the speech of others from non-past source situations than less
socially-prominent individuals. Since these source situations are those used to
represent the agency and evaluative positions of others, this suggests that these
socially more prominent individuals exercise greater power than others in
representing, and thereby possibly affecting, others.
While these observations do not contradict my analysis of how speech
projection practices are involved in representing the agency and evaluative
position of others, it suggests that another dimension needs to be added to my
study of speech projection practices: that of social differentiation and asymmetry
within Nanti society. While speech projection strategies, as I have described them,
are clearly an important means for communicating about agency, it also appears
that how Nanti individuals deploy these strategies depends on power relations
operative in Nanti society. This is clearly an area for further research.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This study had three major foci: the empirical description of Nanti speech
reporting practices, the formulation of an ethnographically adequate framework for
describing speech reporting activity, and the explanation of the organization of
Nanti speech reporting practices in terms of Nanti ideologies salient to language
use.
While my principal goal was a rich empirical and theoretical understanding
of Nanti speech reporting practices, I was first obliged to critically evaluate, and
subsequently reformulate, the frameworks available for describing reported
speech. As I argued, what I called the ‘traditional’ framework is inadequate for
describing reported speech as part of human social life, since this framework
adopts a non-interactional stance towards reported speech. In its place, I proposed
a descriptive framework that assumes speech reporting to arise from strategies that
extract an utterance from one situation, transform that utterance, and then insert it
into a new interaction. This process, which I dubbed ‘speech projection’ to
distinguish this particular understanding of the process from previous ones
operating under the rubric of ‘reported speech’, is understood to involve a wide
range of strategies that are combined in contingent constellations in any given
instance of speech projection. By incorporating this flexibility directly into the
model, the analyst can more easily describe the wide range of speech projection
strategies found in any particular society, as I demonstrated in the Nanti case, as
well as describe the typological spectrum of speech projection practices found
among different societies (see chapter 5).
As I discuss in chapter 3 and 4, however, speech projection practices are
not simply a collection of strategies, but are instead constituted by emergent
organization of these strategies that stems from the deployment of these strategies
to meet social and communicative goals in particular social interactions. I argued
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that this emergent organization depends in large part on language ideology, basing
my position on the seminal work of Voloshinov and more recent work on language
ideologies. In the Nanti case, I identified Nanti ideologies regarding knowledge
and the representation of agency and evaluative position as central in organizing
the speech projection strategies I describe  into speech reporting practices.
In the course of this study, I also identified several areas that warrant
further attention. Perhaps the most important such area is the question of how the
use of various speech reporting strategies is differentially distributed in Nanti
society. In chapter 5 I suggested that Nanti use of speech projection to represent
human agency and evaluative position may be linked to the power relations that
obtain between the individual whose agency is represented and the person who is
representing that individual’s agency. Specifically, preliminary evidence suggests
that socially prominent and powerful Nanti individuals are much more likely to
represent other individuals’ agency by projecting speech from non-past source
situations (i.e. from situations that have not transpired) than less socially
prominent and powerful individuals. The suggests that the ability for a Nanti
individual to create and manipulate representations of the agency of others - which
in Nanti society is achieved chiefly by the use of projected speech - is related to
their power within the community. Clearly, this topic is one that merits further
investigation, since it links speech reporting practices to power relations, and
perhaps even to the processes that create and maintain power asymmetries in Nanti
society.
Related to this topic is that of Nanti understandings of agency and
evaluation. Research in this area has indicated that Nanti individuals make very
little reference in discourse to ‘internalistic’ mechanisms and processes like
‘mind’, ‘spirit’, ‘belief’, ‘thought’, or ‘judgement’ in order to communicate about
agency and evaluation. Indeed, descriptions of actions and projections of speech
are the principal means by which such matters are discussed (see chapter 4). In this
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empirical context, a better understanding of how Nanti individuals conceive of the
states and processes involved in human agency and in taking evaluative positions
would be invaluable for understanding why projected speech plays such a crucial
role in this area.
Finally, as I indicated in my discussion of transformation strategies, it will
be important to carry out ‘longitudinal’ studies of speech projection in the Nanti
communities in order to more precisely specify the kinds of transformations to
which utterances are subjected by Nanti individuals. Only by obtaining recordings
of communicative interactions in source situations, and comparing those to
subsequent projections of utterances will it be possible to characterize in detail the
transformation strategies employed by Nanti speakers.
I want to conclude by reflecting on an aspect of the work of Voloshinov’s
colleague Mikhail Bakhtin58, who was also concerned - but in a different way from
Voloshinov - with the problem of reported speech. Bakhtin was in no small
measure engaged by reported speech because of its centrality to human
communication and interaction. As Bakhtin remarked,
The transmission and assessment of the speech of others, the discourse of
another, is one of the most widespread and fundamental topics of human
speech. In all areas of life and ideological activity, our speech is filled to
overflowing with other people’s words, which are transmitted with highly
varying degrees of accuracy and impartiality (Bakhtin 1981, p 337).
As Bakhtin makes clear, though, the words of other people that overflow
from our speech are not always transparent reports of another person’s words:
                                                 
58 There is, of course, a long-running and ultimately fruitless debate over whether Bakhtin actually
wrote the works that were published under Voloshinov’s name (Holquist 1997, Matejka and
Titunik 1986 ).
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Every conversation is full of transmissions and interpretations of other
people’s words. At every step one meets a “quotation”, or a “reference” to
something that a particular person said, a reference to “people say” or
“everyone says,”  to the words of the person one is talking with, or to one’s
own previous words, to a newspaper, an official decree, a document, a book,
and so forth. ... Thus talk goes on about speaking people and their words
everywhere -- this motif returns again and again; it either accompanies the
development of other topics in everyday life, or directly governs speech as
its leading theme. (ibid., p 338-339)
As Bakhtin notes, the “quotation[s]” that one meets in every step of interaction are
frequently not framed as such. Rather, the originary utterance is simply assimilated
into the speaker’s own utterance -- a process that Bakhtin refers to as
‘ventriloquism’.  For Bakhtin, then, our communicative lives are filled with a kind
of covert speech projection.
In light of the projected speech framework, a ventriloquized utterance can
be seen as an utterance that has been projected into the ongoing interaction without
being framed as utterance belonging to another person. Thus, ventriloquized
utterances differ from ‘reported speech’ in the insertion strategies employed to
introduce them into an interaction. While the insertion of another’s speech into an
ongoing interaction as reported speech involves a particular framing (minimally,
an associated verb of saying), ventriloquized speech does not employ that insertion
technique.
Two observations follow from these reflections. First, that the framework
of projected speech appears to allow for a unified treatment of reported and
ventriloquized speech in terms of different sets of transformational strategies that
mediate the source utterance and the projected one. This is excluded as a
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possibility in traditional descriptive framework of reported speech, which gives
speech report framing devices an essential role in determining the ontological
status of an utterance as ‘reported’.
More significantly, however, Bakhtin’s notion of ventriloquism, combined
with its incorporation into the speech projection framework, allows us to see
clearly that speech projection operates in at least three different, but interrelated,
ways:
1) by projecting of originary utterance as an utterance attributed to a
speaker of some sort (‘reported speech’),
2) by projecting a non-utterance (e.g. a gesture, see section 3.x) as an
utterance attributed to some speaker, and
3) by projecting an originary utterance without attributing it to a speaker
(ventriloquism).
From this perspective, it is possible to see that speech projection, in full
generality, is the process by which communicative aspects of prior interactions
come to inhabit new interactions. Speech projection is truly then, to paraphrase
Bakhtin’s words, one of the most widespread and fundamental processes in
human interaction.  I hope that the present study has shed some additional light on
this process, whose full implications for human society and communication still
await discovery.
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Appendix 1: Linguistic Background
A.1 Genetic Affiliation
Nanti is a member of the Kampa language group, a set of closely-related
languages of the Arawakan language family. The Kampa language includes five
linguistic varieties, in addition to Nanti, that linguists have typically distinguished
from each other as distinct “languages”, the largest of which are further subdivided
into several dialects59: Asháninka, Ashéninka (Apurucayali, Pajonal, Perene,
Pichis, and Ucayali/Jurua dialects), Kakinte, Matsigenka (Alto Urubamba, Bajo
Urubamba, and Manu dialects), and Nomatsiguenga.
Aikenvald, in her 1999 classification of the Arawak languages, groups the
Kampa languages with the Piro-Apuriná group, Amuesha, and Chamicuro into the
South-Western Arawak sub-family (Aikhenvald 1999).
A.2 Phonology
The phonology of Nanti has much in common with those of the other
Kampa languages, and especially with Matsigenka, to which Nanti appears to be
most closely related.
The consonantal phonemic inventory of Nanti differs slightly from that of
Matsigenka, in having a voiceless glottal fricative, and in not having a voiceless
palatalized velar stop60.
                                                 
59 The internal organization of the Kampa group remains somewhat unclear, with different authors
providing somewhat different divisions between languages and dialects, which is further
complicated by disagreements on names for the language varieties. The organization I present is
based on Payne, Payne, and Sanchez 1982 (c.f. Aikhenvald 1999, Kaufmann 1994.)
60 It is possible that the Manu dialect of Matsigenka shares these features with Nanti, in
contradistinction with the Upper Urubamba and Lower Urubamba River dialects (Shepard 1999,
p.c.; Snell 2000, p.c.)
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While the phonemic inventory61 of the two languages are otherwise similar,
the allophone sets for many of the consonants in the two languages are quite
different. This difference can be traced largely to the processes of alveolarization
(see below) for [+back] consonants, in which the tip of the tongue is raised
towards the alveolar ridge before front vowels, producing a secondary alveolar
articulation for the velar stops, and transforming the velar glide into an alveolar
fricative or affricate. Alveolarization is not found in any of the other Kampa
languages.
Another process that appear to be unique to Nanti within the Kampan
language family is  rhinoglottophilia. Rhinoglottophilia associated with the glottal
fricative results in the nasalization of adjacent vowels under certain circumstances,
as well as nasalization of the fricative itself.
Nanti has a five vowel phonemic inventory (see Table 2), like most of the
Kampa languages, with the exception of the Ashéninca languages, which have a
three vowel phonemic inventory (Payne, Payne, and Sanchez 1982). The phonemic
vowel inventory of Nanti and Matsigenka are identical, as are their allophone sets,
apart from the present of surface nasalized vowels in Nanti.
Like some Matsigenka dialects, Nanti differs from the other languages of
the Kampa group by possessing an unusual monomoraic dipthong /µi/.
                                                 
61 In the phoneme inventory tables, phonemes are placed between slashes (e.g. /k/) while
allophones are placed between square brackets (e.g. [ks] as is common practice. The orthographic
representations phonemes is also included, and is placed between angle brackets (e.g. <x>).
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Table 1: Nanti Consonant Inventory
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front central back
high <i>, /i/, [i, i:]
<ii>, /i:/, [i:]
<u>, /µi/, [µˆ, ei,
i]
middle <e>, /e/, [e, e:]
<ee>, /e:/, [e, e:]
<o>, /o/, [o, o:]
<oo>, /o:/, [o:]
low <a>, /a/, [a, a:]
<aa>, /a:/, [a:]
Table 2: Nanti Vowel Inventory
Important phonological processes in Nanti, some already touched on
above, include the following:
Palatalization
All stops and nasals possess a palatalized allophone, which appears in the
following environment
C -> CJ / _eCi
Examples:
/i + kem + i/ -> /ikemi/ -> [ikJemi] ‘he hears’
/i + kem + ak + e/ -> /ikemake/ -> [ikemake] ‘he heard’
/i + nej + i + ri/ -> /inehiri/ -> [inJeiri] ‘he sees him’
/i + nej + ak + e +ri/ -> /inehakeri/ -> [ineJakJeri] ‘he saw him’
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Alveolarization
As already discussed, in certain environments, back consonants exhibit
allophones in which the blade of the tongue is raised towards the alveolar ridge.
These allophones occur in environments preceding a front vowel.
The velar stops exhibit this in the most noticeable fashion. Both phonemes
exhibit allophones with a secondary place of articulation in the alveolar area.
k -> ks  / _e  k -> kS  / _i
g -> gz  / _e  g -> gZ  / _i
In the case of each phoneme, the second allophone can be understood to
arise from height assimilation, which we discuss next.
The back unrounded glide also experiences alveolarization, although in its
case, this occurs most noticeably preceding the back rounded vowel.
y-> Z ~ dZ  / _ o
Height Assimilation
The (voiceless) alveolar fricative undergoes height assimilation to esh
preceding  the high front vowel.
s -> S / _ i
Examples:
/n + abis + i/ -> /nabisi/ -> [nabiSi] ‘I pass by’
/n + abis + ak + e/ -> /nabisake/ -> [nabisakse] ‘I passed by’
/no + s + i + ro/ -> /nosiro/ -> [noSiro] ‘I pour it’




 Vowels adjacent to an intervocalic glottal fricative /h/ exhibit significant
nasalization.
/maho/ -> [mãhõ] ~ [mãõ] species of edible beetle
/isigaji/ -> [iSigã˜i] ‘he runs back’
However, vowels following word-intial /h/ do not appear to exhibit nasalization
/hame/ -> [hame] ‘had not’ (counterfactual)
/hereto/ -> [hereto] spider
Leniton/Elision
 Both the alveolar tap /r/ and the glottal fricative /h/ exhibit lenition and
deletion. The glottal fricative /h/ is deleted in intervocalic environments, if a
permissible diphthong (typically [ai] or [ei]) can be formed by doing so62.
h -> O / a_i, e_i
/r/ is lenited or deleted in penultimate position in a word if it sits between a
front vowel and the low vowel.
r -> j ~ O / e_a#, i_a#
A.3 Stress System
Nanti possesses a typologically very unusual stress-system63.  Specifically,
stress assignment in Nanti words overwhelmingly depends on syllable
prominence, which arises from nuclear sonority, rather than on syllable position,
                                                 
62 In some cases, this renders the identification of underlying /h/ complicated. In these cases vowel
nasalization (discussed above) and the behavior of morphemes with respect to epenthesis (see
below) provides critical clues.
63 There is good  evidence, however, that the major features of the Nanti stress system are shared by
other languages in the Kampa group (J. Payne, 1991)
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which is the vastly more typologically common criterion for stress assignment.
The Nanti stress-system can thus be reasonably considered a sonority-driven
stress system (Kenstowicz 1994).
Unlike the other sonority-driven stress systems described in the literature,
however, the Nanti stress system is iterative (i.e. involves multiple feet per
prosodic word), and thus exhibits complexities not noted in other sonority-driven
stress systems. This includes a sensitivity to stress clashes that can produce
domino-like shifting of stresses in a word, and exhaustive footing phenomena that
produce degenerate feet only under certain conditions involving the prominence of
the syllable in the degenerate foot and the prominence of nearby syllables.
A.4 Epenthesis and Deletion
Nanti does not tolerate heteromorphemic consonant clusters or
heteromorphemic vowel hiatus. However, Nanti is highly polysynthetic language
(see section 2.3.4), which in the process of word-formation frequently
concatenates morphemes which would produce undesirable consonant and vowel
clusters. In order to avoid these problems in the surface forms of these words, two
processes come into play, epenthesis and deletion.
Interestingly, these two processes are restricted to non-overlapping
domains of the word. Epenthesis is restricted to the post-root environment, while
deletion is restricted to the pre-root environment.
There are two different epenthetic processes in Nanti, consonant epenthesis
and vowel epenthesis. Consonant epenthesis occurs at morpheme boundaries at
which a pair of adjacent heteromorphemic vowels arise during word-formation.
Epenthesis inserts a /t/, breaking up this unacceptable cluster. Tautomorphemic
diphthongs do exist in Nanti, and are not subject to epenthesis
168
Vowel epenthesis occurs to resolve consonant clusters that arise from
morpheme concatenation during word formation. Adjacent heteromorphemic
consonants are separated by an /a/ by this process.
Deletion is limited to vowel deletion, which serves to resolve vowel hiatus.
In all cases, the leftmost vowel of the cluster is deleted. There are no consonant-
final prefixes in Nanti, so that vowel deletion alone can resolve undesirable
clusters in pre-root environments.
A.5 Morphology
Like all the Kampa languages (D. Payne 1982, Snell 1998, Swift 1988),
and like many indigenous languages of the Americas, Nanti is a highly
polysynthetic agglutinative head-marking language. As is characteristic of the
Kampa languages, Nanti verbal morphology is highly complex, exhibiting both
prefixes and suffixes, including a system of applicative suffixes that has been
described as one of the most complex of any human language (T. Payne 1997, in
reference to Nomatsiguenga applicatives). The morphology of other word classes
is considerably less elaborate, however.
Verbal morphology
Nanti possesses upwards of four dozen verb affixes, of which only one is
obligatory. Most verbs carry at least three affixes, and as many as six affixes on a
verb stem is not unusual.
Verbs are obligatorily marked for mode, in which a two-way  realis/irrealis
distinction is made. Nanti verbs are not marked for tense. Instead realis mode
affixes are used for events that occur(ed) in the past and present (as well as events
that will not occur in the future). The irrealis suffix is used for events that will
occur in the future (as well as events that did not occur in the present and past).
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Agents and patients are typically marked on the verb, either agreeing with
overt noun phrases or appearing as the sole marking of noun phrases in the clause.
In the absence of overt NPs (which is discursively the most common case),
agent/subject and patient marking (if relevant) on the verb is obligatory. Agents
and subjects are marked with prefixes, and patients with suffixes.  The marking is
nominative-accusative.
The set of verb prefixes is relatively small, consisting of the agent/patient
prefixes, an irrealis prefix that co-occurs with the irrealis suffix, and a set of four
causatives that differ in the degree of intentionality involved in the act of causation
and desirability of the outcome of the action.
Nanti possesses a set of seven directional/trajectal suffixes, including
distinct suffixes to indicate motion away from the deictic center (ablative, /-anaj/),
motion towards the deictic center (adlative, /-apaj/), motion back to the deictic
center (regressive, /-aj/),  activity carried out punctually at a distance from the
deictic center (punctual translocative /-axi/), action carried out duratively at a
distance from the deictic center (durative translocative /-aa/) , activity carried out
in the course of a rapid trip away from and returning to the deictic center
(returnative /-u/),  activity carried out upon reaching the deictic center (receptive /-
ab/). There is also evidence of two other trajectal/directional suffixes that are
productive in neighboring Kampan languages (Snell 1998), but which appear to
have been re-analyzed as part of the verb stem in Nanti. These are: activity carried
out while passing by the deictic center (/-apana/), and action carried out at the
deictic center during a trajectory that began away form the deictic center and once
again departs from the deictic center (/-apanu/).
Several directional/trajectal suffixes are systematically used metaphorically
to indicate temporal aspect or ontological status. For example the ablative, which
in its directional sense is used to indicate movement away from the deictic center,
is also used to indicate the initiation of an action or a change of state. Similarly,
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the regressive is used to indicate repetition of an action or return to a state, and the
returnative is used to indicate a briefly maintained state. In addition /-ab/ is
frequently used to indicate increased focality of the object of a verb.
Nanti has a single purely aspectual suffix, the completive /-ax/, which
cannot occur in negated verbs.
Nanti possesses six applicative and/or valence-increasing verb suffixes.
These include /-axo/, which indicates a general broadening of the action of the
verb stem to include another object;  /-ant/ a suffix that indicates both instrumental
and resultative meanings ; /-asi/, which indicates intention; /-imo/, which indicates
action in the presence of the applied object; /-axag/, which indicates comitative
action with respect to a third entity; and /-apitsa/, which indicates action that seeks
to separate the subject or indirect object from the applied object.
In addition to the realis/irrealis modals, Nanti possesses two other modal
suffixes: /-be/, which indicates that the action indicated by the verb did not reach
its expected or desired goals; and /-rixa/, a conditional.
Nanti has two suffixes that indicate the manner in which the action of the
verb is performed. These include /-ge/ which the indicates that the action verb was
performed in multiple places and times, or by multiple, uncoordinated agents, and
/-uma/ which indicates that the action of the verb stem is carried out completely or
without exception.
Nanti possesses two passive suffixes, a realis passive /-gani/, and an irrealis
passive /-enxani/. Verb stems which are affixed with these suffixes do not appear
to take any other suffixes. The patient of the verb is marked by the appropriate
person prefix.
Nanti possesses two stative suffixes. The precise difference between these
two statives has been difficult to determine, although /-ts/ appears tends to be used
with intransitive verbs and /-anxitsa/ with transitive ones.
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 An important suffix for indicating relationships between verbs is /-ra/,
which I term a ‘dependency’ suffix. The precise function of this morpheme is not
clear, but appears to indicate a temporal embedding or sequentiality of the verb
bearing the suffix to the preceding verb. It also appears to indicate a weak causal
relationship.
Nanti also possesses a large set of verb suffixal noun classifiers. These
classifiers appear with a restricted set of verb stems, but appear to be obligatory
within this set, which is comprised mostly of subtly distinguished verbs that
describe breaking, cutting, tearing, and piercing actions of various kinds. Most of
these noun classifiers are related to nominal forms for parts of plants, and either
mark shape features (e.g. /-gij/, large and roundish, like papayas, balls, or heads; /-
poja/, cylindrical, like a tree trunk or a sexatsi root), combinations of shape
features and mechanical properties (e.g. /-abant/, flat, thin, and flexible, like a leaf
or a sheet of paper; /-meni/, flat, thin, and rigid, like a machete blade), aggregate
qualities (e.g. /-se/, undifferentiated mass, like a shoal of stones or a pile of
mashed yuca), or just salient classes of objects (e.g. /-si/, leaves; /-ja/ fluids).
In addition, there is a small set of body-part noun classifiers that appear
frequently with  verbs having to do with certain actions done to body parts, like
washing or holding.
Nominal Morphology
Nanti nominal morphology is much more restricted that its verbal
morphology, being limited to a set of five possessive person prefixes, a plural
suffix (/-jegi/), and a nominal locative (/-xu/), and a nominalizer (/-rira/) that
derives nouns from verbs.
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Adpositions
The nominal locative /-xu/ and the verbal dependence suffix /-ra/ are sole
adpositions found in Nanti. Both are quite semantically empty, the semantics of
location and trajectory being mostly handled by the verb stems themselves, many
of which encode very precise information of this sort, or by the directional/trajectal
verb suffixes. In virtually all cases pragmatic inferences relying on the verb stem
or the wider communicative context are critical in determining the meanings of
these adpositions.
Clitics
In additional to verbal and nominal affixes, Nanti possesses a set of six
second-position clitics. These include a set of three “discourse clitics” -
morphemes that indicate the pragmatic status of the clause bearing the clitic to
other clauses uttered by the current speaker or an interlocutor. These are /-ta/, the
discourse affirmative clitic, which indicates evaluative alignment or topic
continuity with another clause; /-npa/, which indicates evaluative disalignment or
topic discontinuity; and /-ri/, the discourse contrastive clitic, which indicates co-
reference with subject of a previous clause, but a contrastive posture with respect
to what is predicated of that subject.
In addition, one finds a pair of evidential clitics, /-xa/, which indicates
indefiniteness or uncertainty, and /-ro/, which indicates definiteness or certainty.
Finally, there is a clitic /-me/, which marks the clause as either
counterfactual of contrary to reasonable expectation, and which also serves to
mark ‘rhetorical’ questions.
A.6 Constituent Typology, Syntax, and Pragmatic Ordering
My investigations into Nanti constituent typology suggest that Nanti may
not be characterizable as employing a basic word order which can be defined in
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terms of the grammatical relations64 into which those forms enter. Rather, it
appears that the pragmatic salience of constituents is the most reliable predictor of
word order.
While my observations at this early stage of research are necessarily
tentative, I suggest that in Nanti, grammatical relations can be reliably inferred
from the rich semantics of verb roots and the complex verb morphology that
typically accompanies these roots. Verb roots and affixes frequently carry
considerable information about suitable agents, patients and oblique participants.
In concert with assumptions about suitable agents and patients (and instruments
and the like) having to do, for example, with animacy hierarchies, constituent
order need not be recruited to identify the grammatical relations with which a
particular constituent is associated.
The syntactic result of this, I argue, is that one tends to find
morphologically complex verbs collocated with nouns that are associated with it in
a syntagmatically very flexible manner. The grammatical relations of these nouns
can be inferred by their association with a particular verb, rather than through their
order with respect to other constituents in the clause. This makes constituent order
available for other for other purposes, such as signaling pragmatic salience.
In any event, it has proved very difficult to characterize Nanti syntax in
terms of a basic constituent order,
Evidence that this difficulty arises in other languages in the Kampa family
can be found in David Payne’s discussion of constituent order in Axininca Campa
(Payne 1981). In this discussion Payne indicates that many aspects of this
language, including the most commonly observed constituent order in discourse,
                                                 
64 The term ‘grammatical relations’ is being used in the technical linguistic sense here to refer to
agent/subject/patient roles in sentences. My observation should not be in any way construed as
claiming that Nanti is not ‘grammatical’. Rather, my point is that in Nanti grammatical relations are
not signaled by word order.
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and the observation that relative constructions and adjectives normally follow the
modified noun65, favor characterizing it as an SVO language. He notes, however,
that other aspects of the language favor an SOV typology, including the fact that
genitives precede the noun they modify, that qualifiers may precede the noun, and
that many sentential qualifiers follow the verb.
This mixed evidence leads Payne to conclude that Axininca Campa is
currently changing from one constituent order to the other, although he notes that
it is not possible, in the absence of further comparative  data, to determine in
which direction it is changing.
I think it is an interesting question if it is indeed possible to characterize
Axininca Campa in terms of even a ‘mixed’ basic constituent order, or if this
language, like Nanti, challenges our assumptions about the relationship between
constituent order and grammatical relations66.
Rather than Nanti being characterizable in terms of a basic order of
constituents determined by grammatical relations, then, it appears possible that
Nanti word order is instead determined by the pragmatic status of the free
morphemes in a sentence, according to principle that new, indefinite, or otherwise
“newsworthy “ information is placed early in the clause. Nanti, then, may well be a
what Payne has characterized as a “pragmatic constituent ordering language67”
(Payne 1997, p82).
                                                 
65 The significance of this and the other implicational facts  Payne adduces to support one
constituent order over another follow from Greenberg (1963).
66 Elicitation-based research I carried out in 1999 with Samuel Panduro of Nueva Luz on
constituent order in simple declarative sentences in Matsigenka also suggests that word order is
highly flexible in that language.
67 It merits mention that Nanti largely fits Payne’s set of five features that correlate with languages
that exhibit pragmatic constituent ordering (Payne 1997, p82): 1. Polysynthetic morphological
typology;  2. Agent and/or patient marking on the verb. (Nanti exhibits both); 3. A tendency
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That this is a feature of all the Kampa languages, and not simply Nanti, is
suggested by the fact that despite all the linguistic works on these languages
(Payne 19xx, Swift 19xx, Snell 19xx, Kindberg 19xx), not a single one has treated
the syntax of a Kampan language, except in passing (Payne 1981, p 9-14).
Pragmatic ordering, it is worth noting, is hard to analyze within the framework and
with the methodologies of elicitation-based linguistics, which tends to rely on
relatively decontextualized  utterances for its analyses.
A.7 Morpheme Codes Used in the Text
 The following list includes all the morpheme codes used in the interlinear
translations included in this text. The morphemes arranged in terms of prefixes,
suffixes, clitics, and non-affixal morphology
Prefixes
Code  Morpheme  Morpheme Gloss
1S no- first person subject
2S pi- second person subject
3MS i-/y- third person masculine subject
3FNS o- third person feminine subject
                                                                                                                                       
towards ergative case marking on noun phrases; 4. “Loose” syntactic structure, i.e., nominal
elements may occur under a different intonation contour than the verb, and adverbial, or other
clause level elements, may freely intervene between  the verb and the nominal elements; 5. A
tendency to avoid the use of full noun phrases in discourse. The occurrence of clauses with two or
more noun phrases is rare.
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Thomas Payne notes that it is precisely the
indigenous languages of the Americas and Australia which are particularly sensitive to pragmatic
ordering principles (Payne 1997, p 81).
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1P no- first person possessive
2P pi- second person possessive
3MP i-/y- third person masculine possessive
3FNO o- third person feminine possessive
IRP n-/r- irrealis prefix
CAUS1 ogi- causative 1: intentional causation
CAUS2 omin- causative 2: intentional causation with unwilling 
animate causee
Suffixes
1O -na first person subject
2O -npi second person subject
3MO -ri third person masculine subject
3FNO -ro third person feminine subject
PL -jig plural subject or object
EPC -t epenthetic consonant
EPV -a epenthetic vowel
RLI -i irreflexive realis mode
IRI -e irreflexive irrealis mode
RLR -a reflexive realis mode
IRR -enpa reflexive irrealis mode
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ABL -anaj ablative directional
ADL -apaj adlative directional
REG -aj regressive directional
RET -u returnative trajectal
TRNS -axi translocative
APP -axo general applicative
PURP -asi purposive
INST -ant instrumental
DEP -ra dependent verb marker
CL(cylinder) -poja cylinder noun classifier
CL(fluid) -ja fluid noun classifier





IND -xa indefinite clitic
DCTR -ri discourse contrastive clitic
DAFF -ta discourse affirmative clitic
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Non-affixal morphology
 NEG tera negative present and past
NEG(FUT) jara negative future
NEG(COND) jame conditional negation
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